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ABSTRACT
Since the initial research was begun on this dissertation, the role of 
intervention by the State in the economic affairs of a country has 
assumed renewed topicality. While much of the impetus for this interest 
in the subject can be related to the bicentennial anniversary of the 
appearance of 'The Wealth of Nations', the emergence of certain political 
and economic problems in the South African context has been responsible 
for the increased controversy in this country. While recognising that 
che field of state intervention in the South African economy is so 
widespread and its effects, in many cases, so indirect that detailed and 
objective analysis of every avenue of intervention is impossible within 
the confines of the present study, the researcher has attempted to analyse 
the effects of the State's policy of intervention (in the form of industrial 
protection) on industrial growth in South Africa. This has been done m  
an endeavour to relate how some of the current economic problems faced by 
the country can possibly be attributed to such policy.
The method involved in the study consists initially of an attempt to 
justify economic intervention by the State. Applying this rationale to 
the policy of industrial protection in South Africa after the first 
quarter of this century, the conclusion that emerges, is that, although 
much of the initial arguments for protection were clouded by political 
considerations, there were several Important economic arguments for Indus- 
trial diversification that warranted the State protecting certain 
industries, It appears highly unlikely that secondary Industry in South 
Africa would have grown to the extent that it did, after the first quarter 
of this century, in the Absence of che tariff and other protective policies 
followed by the State, Similarly, it can be argued, that many of the 
problems that recently have manifested themselves would not have occurred
were it not for the persistence and continuation of such policies beyond 
the initial period.
Growth in secondary industry continued on a rapid basis until the 
nineteen sixties after which there was a levelling off and the economy 
began to suffer severe unemployment problems coupled with persistent 
deficits in the current account of the balance of payments. The study 
attempts to analyse these problems according to the type of protective 
policies pursued by the State during this period. The pattern of 
tariff protection in South Africa is analysed both on a historical basis, 
(according to various investigations into such policy over time) and on 
an effective basis (according to two recent attempts at this type of 
measurement that have recently become available), In addition, the 
study attempts to relate the predictions of some of the theoretical 
literature on effective protection and patterns of industrialisation to 
the South African situation. The broad conclusion that emerges is that 
the nature of protective policies in South Africa appears to have been 
such as to have induced a specific type of import substitution which 
although 'initially responsible for high levels of growth is presently 
proving restrictive, In addition, one can attribute the importation of 
vast amounts ef capital goods as well as the lack of exports ef manufactured
goods to such policies,
The major recommendation that emerges from the study is that, given 
the present situation in South Africa, a possible way for the country to 
recover from some of its present problems as regards unemployment and 
balance of payments difficulties is for the State to modify its protective 
policies. In addition, it is suggested that this modification be framed 
in such a way as to increase the level of tariff protection on more 
intermediate stages of the productive process. While this may encourage 
a greater amount of import substitution at these stages it may well induce
local producers to substitute labour for capital and thus reduce the 
heavy reliance on imported capital goods that appears to be characterising 
local production. By encouraging the use of one of the country's most 
abundant resources, viz. labour, the country may yet develop a considerable 
comparative advantage that may facilitate exports of manufactured goods.
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1.
chapter I
THE CONTRIBUTION OF ECONOMICS TO THE ANALYSIS OF POLICY IN FREE-ENTERPRISE 
ECONOMIES ”
l.f The nature of Economics and a definition of economic policy.
The economic analysis of policy has been a relatively new development 
in the subject matter of Economics. This may be explained by a number of 
reasons. The preoccupation with 'laissez-faire' philosophy, coupled with 
the Jevonsian positivist revolution, ensured that any discussion of the 
duties of the state tended to be left out of economic theory during the 
nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, as the nature and extent 
of Ftate intervention in economic affairs has grown, particularly since 
the Great Depression, an increasing need arose to incorporate this aspect 
into economic theory. Although economic theorists in this period became 
aware of the importance of analysing policy measures, there was a tendency 
to concentrate their analysis on specific measures rather than examine 
policy in totality. This tendency can be attributed to the continual 
practice of various text books in the subject to analyse individual policy 
measures associated with specific problems, e.g. full employment, inflation, 
balance of payments problems etc. In addition, as Robbins so aptly 
pointed out, 'it follows from the very nature of a science that until it 
has reached a certain stage of development, definition of its scope is 
necessarily impossible'(D. This ia true of the Study of economic policy.
Pioneering work in the field of the theory of economic policy has been 
most comprehensively performed by Several Dutch economists such as Tinbergen, 
Kirschen and bthers. In order to appreciate fully the role of an economist 
in a^iiyaing pol.-y, one should start by describing the nature of economic
) L , Robbins, r»y„ Mature and Significance of Economic Science, London:
Mac Millau, IV"' ', p*2.
science. ’Economics is concerned with that aspect of behaviour which
(2)
arises from the scarcity of means to achieve given ends’ . Because 
the subject matter deals with the behaviour of animate objects, with humans 
having free wills and desires, one has to extract stable responses. The 
economist, in order to be scientific, ought to base his conclusions on 
factual evidence. Central to the economist's approach
is a conceptual scheme, a hypothesis or preliminary conclusion. This is 
based on some ideology or on what Joan Robinson refers to as a ’metaphysical 
proposition'^. The ideology itself is not scientific in that it is 
incapable of being tested, but provides a 'quarry from which hypotheses 
can be drawn’, They do not belong to the realm of science and yet they are 
necessary to it, Without them we would not know what it is we want to know 
In other words ideology provides a foundation for establishing order for a 
vast array of facts. A theory is chen used to impose order on observation, 
to explain how things are linked together.
Theory attempts to explain the relationship or regularity between 
two or .more observations, and one oi uhe important practical consequences 
is that it enables one to predict as yet unobserved events. It is 
essentially this predictive power that determines the success or otherwise 
of a theory. In the construction of a theory, economists should exercise 
extreme caution. They must, as best they can, allow the evidence to 
determine the validity of what they think may be true. They must not let 
their perceptions influence or manipulate the evidence, nor must they 
interpret the evidence in such a manner that value judgements influence 
their conclusions. In other words, economists should adopc a positive 
approach. Without the possibility of controlled experiment, economists 
have to rely on the interpretation of evidence in rtder to test a theory. 
There is the inherent danger that as a result of interpretation frequently
^  L. Robbins, o£. cit., p.3.
(3) j. Robinson, ^Economic Philosophy; Penguin 1973 , p.9.
J. Robinson, i°c» cit.
involving judgement, judgement may in turn be coloured by prejudice. It 
is essentially in the relatively new field of the theory of state that 
,ie frequently finds this prejudice manifesting itself. Academics, 
determined to criticize or justify certain actions of State, often are 
guilty of allowing their passions or normative judgements to predominate.
In essence, Economics turns out to be 'the elucidation of it. 
implications of the necessity of choice in various assumed circumstances 
Economic policy, in its broadest sense, can be said to refer to the whole 
subject matter of Economics. The term indicates certain acts of behaviour 
that are applicable to individuals, firms and certain institutions. It 
consists of 'the deliberate manipulation of a number of means in order to 
attain certain aims'(6). Thus the individual, in deciding or choosing how 
to allocate his income, in order to attain the greatest satisfaction, makes 
a policy decision. Similarly, a firm, in deciding on the use of factor 
inputs to maximize profit, makes a policy decision. The attainment of 
these aims is based on the maximization of an individual Ophelimity 
function^. In the same way, when economic policy is used in the context 
of certain organisational groups such as trade unions, agricultural or 
industrial organizations etc., there is indirect reference to a collective 
ophelimity function viz., the maximization of certain objectives pertaining 
to these organizations. In its narrowest sense, economic policy refers to 
Government and to actions in the economic ield. Economic policy, 
therefore, is the economic aspect of Government policy in general; it is 
the intervention of Government in economic affairs in order to further its
(5) l . Robbins, Op. clt,, p,83.,
(6) j. Tinbergen, Economic Policy. Principles and Design, Amsterdam: N.H.P.Co^
(?) The term 'ophelimity' was originally used by Pareto in his 'Principles', 
as a substitute for 'utility'. The purpose of the substitution was to 
avoid the metaphysical aura surrounding 'utility'.
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aims. in pursuit of these aims, Governments have tended to set themselves . 
certain specific objectives which can be stated in economic terms, and
ZQ\
which, in principle,are capable of measurement (either ordinal or cardinal)
Thus choice is involved in economic policy, in that a decision has to 
be made about ends or objectives and the means for attaining these. The 
logic of finding the best economic policy, that is, of finding the extent to 
which certain means should be used in order to achieve certain aims, is, in 
a sense, an inversion of the logic to which the economist is accustomed.
The task of economic analysis is to consider the data (including the means 
of economic policy) as given or known, and the economic phenomena and 
variables (including the aims of ecomomic policy) as unknown^ ^. In this, 
positive Economics has a distinct role to play. It has to remain neutral 
as between ends, but assuming neutrality, does not imply that economists 
should not deliver themselves on ethical questions any more (as Robbins 
expresses it) than botanists should not have views of their own on the lay 
out of g a r d e n s . Even though Economics cannot help solve differences 
about the ends of policy, scientific analysis can help resolve differences 
about means to attain these ends. Economic analysis enables one to be 
aware of the implications of the alternatives. When one speaks of 
rationality in choice one must, in whatever sense the term "policy" is used, 
have complete awareness of the alternatives rejected. In other words, 
economic analysis can help judge the consistency of the aims assumed as 
well as the combination of aims and means, By detecting inconsistencies 
it may narrow down possibilities and thus contribute to a solution. Thus 
there is scope for the objective analysis of economic policy, despite the 
tendency of the nature of the science to be fraught with some Of the 
difficulties mentioned above. It is possible, in other words, to Conduct 
scientific enquiry into the nature of economic policy.
^  E.S. Kirschen, Economic Policy in our time , Amsterdam: N.H.P.Co, 1964
J. Tinbergen, 0£, cit., pp.8 and 9.
L. Robbins, ojj, c i t , . p .150,
1.2 The objectives of economic policy
The distinctive characteristic of economic policy, as defined in 
the most specific context, refers to action on the part of Government 
to attempt to improve the collective welfare of a community. K.irschen(11) 
divides these objectives into mainly short and long-term categories.
It is obvious that these objectives change over time, and the classification 
does not imply any order of priority. Furthermore, there is no clear 
cut distinction between short and long-term objectives and, in fact, each 
of the "short term" objectives have implications for the longer time 
period. The short-term objectives include:
a) Full employment, i.e. the reduction of cyclical unemployment m  the 
short-run, as well as a longer-term objective of reducing structural
and frictional unemployment.
b) Price stability:- the longer-term implication of this policy objective 
is that if not held in check in the short-run, inflation introduces
structural distortions in the economy.
c) The improvement in the balance of payments:- to protect gold and
foreign exchange reserve in the short-run, while in the longer run. 
to attempt to change the proportion of expenditure on 'ports and
imports.
The longer-term objectives are:
d) A constantly rising output and income over timet
e) Better allocation of factors of productionincorporating the 
promotion of competition and co-ordination, increasing mobility of 
labour and capital within countries and the promotion Of internal
division of labour.
f) The satisfaction of collective needs, including essentials such as 
general administration, the provision of defence, education and 
public health, and the carrying out of a policy of international 
affairs.
g) Improvement in the distribution of income and wealth:" implying 
better living conditions for the less privileged members of a 
community.
h) Protection and priorities to particular regions, or industries 
this arises from the problems connected with over-concentration of 
industries on a geographical basis and the excessive reliance on a 
limited number of industries within a country.
i) Improvement in patterns of private consumption,'" attempting to 
deter people away from excessive consumption of alcohol or tobacco.
j) Security of supply;- implying the safeguarding and provision of 
essential materials, 
k) Improvement in the. size and structure of the population :" guarding 
against overpopulation or having too large an unskilled working 
population.
1} Reduction in working hours this does not necessarily imply a
lowering in productivity, but an increase in welfare, to the extent 
that the working population is more content and enjoys more leisure. 
Perhaps the qualification could be added that the community works 
harder but for a shorter period of time.
Kirschen emphasizes that the classification is arbitrary and the 
objectives are not independent of one another. The concept, 1 improve­
ment ', is used from the point of view of Government. The characteristic 
feature of these objectives is that they are all framed in terms of 
improving the general welfare of the community*
1.3 The instruments of economic policy
In contrast to the choice of objectives which are characterized by 
their relationship to a general social welfare criterion, the choice of 
instruments ought to be selected on some rational criteria of efficiency 
and cost. Governments, in choosing instruments, ought to seek the optimum 
combination of maximum social return and minimum social cost. In spite of 
the authority of Government being centralised in carrying out these 
instruments (which is a decided advantage if one were to compare this to a 
situation where various separate institutions were to implement separate 
aspects of policy), it is essentially in this area that an economist 
discovers difficulties in analyzing policy. Firstly, utility and costs 
are not easy to measure within a national framework. Furthermore, one 
should realize that policies designed to fulfil one objective often have 
an effect on other objectives and one must bear this interdependence in 
mind when considering various aspects of policy. A further difficulty 
manifests itself when one realizes that the analysis of instruments 
frequently brings conflicting interests into the picture. Thus,while 
objectives are generally considered to be be - icial, the implementation 
of instruments often exhibits opposing effects on the interests of different 
social and economic groups in a country. Theoretically, the choice of 
instruments ought to be consistent with the need to distribute equitably 
the cost of these instruments between different economic and social groups. 
But each group,having their own self-interest in mind,will instinctively 
prefer certain instruments to others. This factor will not fail to 
influence the choice of instruments, while the need to maintain national 
cohesion will limit the use of certain instruments.
The role of the economist in such circumstances will be to attempt 
to analyze the effects of these instruments on the stated objectives and, 
with the aid of scientific analysis, the analyst has a definite function
to perform in advising whether one instrument is preferable to another in 
the attempt to achieve a particular objective, in spite of the difficulties 
mentioned above. Through the use of statistical method, economists can 
predict with a reasonable degree of accuracy the consequences likely to 
arise from implementing a particular policy measure. The economist is 
not in a position to say whether the Government is right or wrong in 
introducing a measure to achieve a stated objective, but can say that one 
measure may, in certain circumstances, be preferable to another in that 
its effects on the public at large are likely to be less harmful.
Kirschen^12'* distinguishes between the following sets of instruments:
a) Public finance - including instruments such as the Government balance, 
Government expenditure and revenue and Government debt
b) Money and credit - including instruments such as interest rates, 
credit control measures etc.
c) Exchange rate - referring to devaluations and revaluations of currency.
* d) Direct controls - dealing with import and exchange controls, immigration,
trade and wage controls etc.
e) Institutional controls -involving instruments such as tariffs, subsidies
taxes, selective credits etc.
Within this framework, one can distinguish numerous instruments and 
apply these to Various objectives, in an endeavour to select the optimum 
combination of instruments to achieve a certain policy objective* In 
theory, one can, by looking at empirical studies on the effects of these 
instruments in various countries at different stages of development, assess 
which instruments are more successful than others, in attaining certain 
objectives. However, one also detects, in such analysis, that there exists 
a vast amount of iivetdependence between different policy instruments. A 
policy measure, designed to fulfil one policy objective, has a definite 
effect on other policy objectives, in that it either helps achieve or
^ 2  ^E*S. Kirschen, jap. cit., p.3.
conflicts with other objectives. This important factor tends to make 
the analysis of policy instruments on specific objects a difficult exercise, 
and emphasizes that the approach to the study of economic policy be treated 
as a coherent entity and not,, as is the tendency in many textbooks on the 
subject, as a study of specific components. Economists should take into 
account the totality of various measures and emphasize the conflicting 
nature inherent in the implementation of these measures.
Thus the economist can contribute to the analysis of policy in the
following way: by studying the available evidence, the economist can
possibly predict the outcome of various government actions. Equally
important, while it is possible to quantify objectives, an economist can
comment on the reality of these objectives, and the possible consequences
of the instruments used to attain these objectives. The ability of the
economist to assess this within a total framework, incorporating a more
dynamic or general equilibrium approach, places the discipline ahead of
other social sciences that attempt often to assess the merits of aspects
of Government economic policy, In fact, several other social science
have exhibited their shortcomings by attempting to isolate the effects of
(13)one policy measure on the social system *
Frequently, these social scientists oversimplify the complex issues 
at stake and allow value judgements to predominate their conclusions*'1'^ ,
By virtue of their limited knowledge of Economics and the scientific method 
involved in the subject, students of other disciplines simply try to relate 
the effects of, for example, tariffs on the political structure,thus 
neglecting to mention the possible side effects that tariffs exert on other 
objectives, or the way in which other instruments affect a particular 
objective.
Examples of this are evident when one considers the present debate on 
the validity of a Noo-marxist approach to economic development.
(14) phis criticism of the revisionist school is well illustrated in an 
essay by Harrison M. Wright.« The Bui:den_oL. thc_.JhLcs_eiLt!
Liberal-radical controversy oyer Southern ^ fHcan nistory , Cape Town: 
UavTcT Philip, 1477% PP* 95, 96,
1 • 4 The jubuj '.cation for state, intervention
Having demonstrated how economic theory can be used in analyzing 
public policy, one can now attempt to explain the economic justification 
for state intervention in a free enterprise economy. It should be 
realized that, when discussing policy, one implies that there exists an 
authority to carry out policy and in terms of the most specific definition 
of economic policy,the authority is the State or Government.
Over time, and during the past few decades in particular both the 
nature and extent of state intervention have increased considerably.
Partial evidence of this is presented by statistics on government 
expenditure in that country which is presumed to epitomise the free- 
enterprise economy, viz. the United States of America. As recently as 
the early 1930's, total US government expenditure barely amounted to 10 
per cent of net national expenditure; by 1940 it had increased to 25 
per cent; by 1950 to 29 per cent and by 1970 to 42 per cent^15\  Although 
these figures are important it should be pointed out that the size of the 
public sector does not by itself indicate the extent of state control of the 
economy. As Hayek maintains in referring to Germany in the late 1920's,
once the state controls directly a certain proportion of activities 
(approximately 50 per ce.it of national income), indirect control of almost 
the whole economic life of the nation is exerted*-1^  . The fact of the 
matter is that statistics on expenditure do not take into account the vast 
amount of indirect controls exerted in many countries by governments.
(15)
E.J. Mishan, 'On the Road to Repression and control' Encounter,
July 1976. p.6. '
y 1 > <
F.Ai Hayek, The Road to Serfdom. London: George Routledge and Sons Ltd
1945.p.45 ''
Even during the period when writers on the subject were advocating a system
of laissez-faire, reference was made to several duties of Government that
were considered necessary and proper for a well-operated state'. Despite
these duties having increased vastly recently,many liberally-minded
economists today regard some of the extended duties as essential. Milton
Friedman comments on the changing nature of liberalism over the past few 
(17)
centuries . During the early nineteenth century, liberalism emphasized 
freedom as the ultimate goal and the individual as the ultimate entity in 
society. The concept of laissez-faire was regarded as a means of reducing 
the role of the state and extending the role of the individual. During 
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century liberalism came to 
be associated with a readiness to rely primarily on the state rather than 
on private arrangements to achieve desirable objectives. Thus the earlier 
liberal regarded an extension of freedom as the most effective way of 
promoting welfare and equality. The twentieth"century liberal regards welfare 
and equality as prerequisites, or alternatives, to fr jdom. ’In the name of 
welfare and equality, the twentieth-century liberal has come to favour a revival 
of the very policies of state intervention and paternalism against which 
classical liberalism fought ’ .
before enquiring into the reasons why there has occurred a practically 
universal acceptance for intervention by the state in economic affairs> it 
is worthwhile citing some of the works of writers in the earlier period.
These authors considered obvious items such as defence, police enforcement, 
postal services and education as the only areas for state intervention.
The whole philosophy of the early laissez-faire advocates rests on the 
proviso that the activities of Government be drastically circumscribed.
An example from the most influential of the advocates of laissez-faire,
(17)
Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago.* Univ. of Chicago Press,
1962
Adam Smith, is well-representative of this type of philosophy. Smith^19  ^
argues that as long as there is no violation of the laws of justice, when 
individuals are left free to pursue their own interests in their own way, 
the s».ate is discharged from a duty of controlling the industry of private 
people and directing it to those areas that would be of the greatest benefit 
to society. The state has neither the wisdom nor know-how to ensure this 
objective. In fact, according to Adam Smith, the only duties that should 
be ascribed to the state involve protecting the socie'ty from violence and 
invasion by other societies, protecting each member of a society from in­
justice and oppression, and thirdly, erecting and maintaining certain 
public works and institutions which individuals would not interest them­
selves in, because of the costs and limited profits involved.
Other early writers such as H. Storch and J,B. Say^20  ^ refer in similar 
terms to the role of State but their arguments specifically refer to the 
divergence bet' een private and social gains and as such can be considered 
to be precursors of welfare economics, J.S. Mill outlined this divergence 
forcibly when he wrote, 'it is greatly the interest of the community 
collectively and individually, not to rob or defraud one another* but 
there is not the less necessity for laws to punish robbery and fraud; 
because, though it is the interest of each that nobody should rob or cheat, 
it is not any one's interest to refrain from robbing and cheating 
others when all others are permitted to rob and cheat him. Penal laws exist 
••• chiefly for this reason, because even a unanimous opinion that a 
certain line of conduct is for the general interest, does not always make 
it people’s individual interest to adhere to that line of conduct' ^ 2 1 K
(19  ^ Wealth of Nations. Book IV, Chp IX, Methuen & Go Ltd., 5th Ed., Edited
(20) by Edward Cannan, pp.184,185,
See W,J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State
2nd Ed., Londoni G, Bell & Sons Ltd! 1.9651 pp. 186-188."-------
(21) ,
J.S, Mill| Principles, Book V, Chp X. Section 12, Longmans Green 
and Co, 1926.“pp71T6'6.
13.
(22)
It was essentially through the writings of Fredrich List “ in 
the mid-nineteenth century that the most forceful pleas for intervention 
of the State in the national interest were made. Implicit in List's 
arguments were the divergencies between individual and suate interests.
List,although agreeing with the broad laissez-faire philosophy,emphasized 
that this was valid only in the context of "equal" nations. List 
differed from Adam Smith in that the latter stressed the belief that 
what is best for all nations must be best for each nation, or alternatively 
phrased, cosmopolitical and national interests always should coincide.
List strove to define a policy beneficial to a single nation viz. Germany, 
and so individual interests would best be served if the national interest 
was s r /ed. These two diverged as well on the concept of capital. 
o ’.': * i u, in the 'Wealth of Nations', tended to narrow capital to a purely 
material form, whereas List's conception includes mental capital i.e. all 
the discoveries, improvements and perfections of those generations that had 
lived before. Using this idea of productive capital List expounded a theory 
of development. Society tends to pass through 'several degrees of culture'
- savage, pastoral, agricultural, agricultural-manufacturing and finally 
a commercial stage. The latter stage referred to highly-developed 
countries. List argued that the way to attain the final stage was to 
establish manufacturers which, according to him, developed 'the moral 
forces of the nation', utilised a country's products to a better extent, 
provided an impetus for agriculture and created labour and capital. He 
concluded that it deserved introduction even at the expense of a temporary 
loss because of the impetus given to future production, List thus showed 
that intervention was justified on a rational basis, for,if there was no 
intervention,the degree of supremacy of powers like England in the early 
nineteenth century could only ensure that other nations e.g. Germany, 
would become mere providers of food.
(22) p. List, The National System of Political Economy. Translated by
S.S. Lloyd. London: Longmans and Co. 1904. The original was written
in 1841,
The general effect of List's writings was to emphasize the
importance of a national as opposed to an individual standpoint. The
results of the positivist revolution in the late nineteenth century tended
to direct various writers in Europe to shy away from ethically normative
discussion, such as it was believed was necessarily evoked in discussion
of the duties of the state, and it was left to followers of Welfare
Economics to later take over to some extent the analysis of the economic
(23)
functions of Government . Baumol's work probably represents the most 
lucid discussion of Welfare Economics and the theory of the State. 
Perturbed by the fact that the writings of early authors (even though 
these showed an awareness of those functions that should not be entrusted 
to private enterprise )were arbitrary in the selection of these areas , 
Baumol attempts to define ' which .... are the circumstances in which the
people composing an economy will find that a particular extension of the
authority of their government is requisite for the most efficient v t 
of their own interests'
Baumol's analysis is couched in terms of the formal welfare maxi­
mizing function, namely that if the activity of members of a group can 
be changed in such a way that it will further the economic well-being of 
some of its members, without at the same time adversely affecting any of 
them, then welfare maximization has not been achieved and the situation is 
capable of improvement. The question revolves around situations where 
individual and group interests diverge. In these instances there appears 
justification for intervention and thus improvement. Baumol cites an 
example <of military training in this regard. From an individual point of
view, failure to contribute may be rational. Coercion in such a situation
W. Baumol» ojd. cit., pp.194 and 195.
Wk Baumol, oj>. cit., p.51.
is in the national interest - thus it becomes the task of Government to 
override the decisions of the market. This is not due to the Government 
believing that people are not competent of judging, but rather that the 
market fails to provide machinery for these decisions to be given effect.
In other words, any particular extension of the power of Government, 
although it presumably involves restriction of choice and decision,will 
not necessarily affect the persons governed disadvantageously. This is 
in spite of the possibility that in the absence of such restriction each 
person might have pursued the course most beneficial to himself under the 
circumstances. It is essentially in those cases where the welfare of the 
various members of a society is partly dependent on each others activity 
that the possibility exists that persons in pursuit of their own interests, 
will be led to act in a manner contrary to the interests of others. In 
this sense it may be to the advantage of a society to prevent this 
happening, and if society is unable to do so,there is a valid case for 
coercion.
This may well sound paradoxical, for one might argue that coercion 
by itself, or enforced modification of individual behaviour,must necessarily 
be disadvantageous. As Baumol argues, the dichotomy between restriction 
and non-restriction is misleading. The essence of restriction is that it 
be universally applied and no-one should be exempt. This is preferable to 
restriction on the activities of every individual, but one. In the choice 
between non-restriction and uniformed restriction, it may well pay a person 
to submit to a coercive arrangement which prevents him from harming the 
other members of a group, provided the others are also forced to desist.
Thus*as Lombard states, the case for state intervention in modern times 
arises, not because of the rejection of individual liberty, but because 
there is no guarantee that the market mechanism will produce the kind of 
goods and services in the magnitudes thought possible and desirable by
I.wrwr*-'*
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the community. What is relevant, when an economist argues in favour or 
against state interference,is the economic norm that benefits exceed costs 
to the appropriate decision maker. If the decision maker be the state, 
the mea - aents and definition of benefits and costs should apply to the
society as -hole and not to certain individuals within the society
(25)
The list v£ objectives listed previously are characterized by the 
fact that each of these are related to some general community welfare 
function in the sense that the nation as a whole is better off if these 
are achieved, and also, there is no guarantee that the market mechanism, 
if left alone, if no coercion or intervention by the state were introduced, 
could possibly achieve these. Furthermore, as was unfortunately shown 
during the Great Depression,the needs of society are too important to be 
left to the workings of the market mechanism. Thus conscious decision 
appears preferable to blind reliance on automation and,as Van Biljon'2^  
forcibly argued in 1938,conscious decision should be used to supplement 
the forces behind supply and demand when these produce wrong results.
The Depression and the Keynesian revolution served to establish the 
justification for state intervention and as Various countries throughout 
the world emerged and developed into more industrialized societies, while 
the Governments of more developed countries strove to satisfy their 
electorates, there arose increasing justification for State intervention 
to Satisfy a newly-founded national desire. Indeed,the term 'political 
economy1 has assumed a new meaning in the present time.
1,5 The protection of industries ■- economic arguments
The arguments for public policy in protecting industries are forceful 
and conform with the criteria for state intervention listed in the previous 
section. In the absence of deliberate policy, the market mechanism could 
not guarantee that diverse industrial expansion would occur in a country.
J , A .  L o t t b a r d ,
F.J. ,Van Biljoh, "State interference in South Africa, London, P.S. Ki
& Sons Ltd, 1939*
One should remember that as an economist one cannot, at this stage, 
conclude whether the goal of industrial expansion is in fact a desirable 
objective. One can analyse the motives for this expansion, whether 
expansion is feasible and whether the means used to achieve this expan­
sion are consistent with other objectives of policy for each country. 
However, one cannot doubt the attraction for a policy of stimulating 
industrial growth in various countries. In listing these, one forms 
a first impression that several generally-accepted policy objectives 
appear to be fulfilled by the protection of industries, if protection 
is successful.
a) Industrial protection encourages diversification
Apart from the national pride engendered, in a relative state of 
self-sufficiency, the diversification of industries diminishes the 
reliance of a country on the export of a few commodities. This reason 
underlies the attempts of many less developed countries to develop a 
broadly-based manufacturing sector. Oncti more, one may argue that the 
market mechanism of supply and demand on a wor ld basis could severely 
reduce the prices of various commodities, and if a country is heavily 
reliant on a particular commodity, the price of which has shown a sharp 
decline, chaos may result. This was one of the factors influencing 
the decision of the Pact Government to pursue a policy of protection 
for industries in South Africa in 1924. Gold being a wasting asset, 
they argued, the future of the country rested on industrial diversifica­
tion, More recently, much of the arguments for diversifying exports 
from South Africa to include b,enef iciated materials and manufactures , 
sed e.g. in the Reyndets Report on foreign trade in South Africa,
are framed in terms of the need to diversify and reduce dependence on
(27)
one or two commodities
b) Industrial protection stimulates growth
The process of industrialization arid diversification frequently 
begins with the substitution of local for previously imported goods. 
Initially, goods at their final stages of production are manufactured 
locally, and over time, producers, aware of the backward and forward 
linkage effects induced, expand production to various intermediate 
processes. The overall effect of these induced effects is an increase
in the growth rate in the country, if the policy is successful^ ^•
The later chapters of this work deal with this aspect in detail*
(27) this connection see the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
the Export Trade of the Republic of South Africa, R*P. 69/72, Tables 
2/11 and 2/12, p.46. In 1970 more than 60 per cent of the value of 
total merchandise exports (excluding gold) comprised exports of 
mining and agricultural products. The largest contributors were 
diamonds (16,7 per cent), wool (5,2 per cent), fruit (5,6 per cent), 
copper (8,1 per cent) and maize (2,8 per cent)* Exports of raw 
materials amounted to approximately one-third of the value of total 
exports (excluding gold). While the proportion of exports of final 
manufactured goods to the total was approximately 20 per cent, a large 
amount of these was derived from agriculture and mining i.e. exports 
of gold coins, jewellery, canned fruit, beverages etc.
(28) For a detailed exposition of this see A. hxcschman, Strategy for
Economic Development. New Haven and London, Yale Univ. Press, 1958. 
For a specific illustration of the relationship between import- 
substituting industrialization and growth in South Africa see T.A, 
du Plessis: 'The Industrial Growth Pattern and the Real Forces of
Economic Expansion in South Africa, 1916/17-1956/57'. Doctoral 
thesis, Unisa, Pretoria 1965.
c) The promotion of industries increases employment opportunities
As industrial diversification expands, the population in any country 
will find ever-increasing employment opportunities. The working popu­
lation can become skilled and specialist in various types of industry. 
Once more, one can relate this to conditions prevailing in South Africa 
prior .to 1924. The emergence of the 'poor-white' problem encouraged the 
Pact Government to pursue an active policy of industrial expansion to 
offer these people Opportunities for employment. Whether these measures 
proved successful in the context of South Africa is difficult to assess. 
One oj. the reasons for this is that it is not possible to gauge what the 
situation would have been in the absence of protection. Furthermore, 
as the Report of the Economic and Wage Commission pointed out at the time, 
protection, if it leads to the creation of new industries, tends to
divert to those industries labour,capital and enterprise that would have 
been applied elsewhere and from industries which had already proved their 
e f f i c i e n c y . Industrial protection in South Africa during the early 
period was responsible for the emergence of a skilled White working popu­
lation and this conformed with the Government's policy of solving the 
'poor-White' problem. As the opportunities for acquiring skills are 
more prevalent in secondary industry compared to primary industry, this 
was undoubtedly a strong reason for the appeal that protection had during 
the early years of industrialization in South Africa.
The effects of depression served to emphasize the benefits of 
industrialization. Those countries that had been industrializing
.rapidly, prior to the depression,were not as adversely affected as others«
  ■    .........................................
Report of the Economic and Wage Commission (1925) U.G. -14-'26. 
pp. 79 and 80, par. 294. See also DiJ.J. Botha 'On Tariff Policy: 
The Formative Years,' South African Journal of Economies, Vol. 41(4) 
Dec, 1973, pp. 339-342.
d) Industrial expansion can reduce imports and dependence on other 
countries
Apart from the national pride aspect, industrial expansion, if is 
generally held, helps improve the balance of payments in a country by 
reducing imports and encouraging inflows of capital. The argument in 
this connection is that measures designed to encourage industrial growth 
in a country, such as tariff protection or subsidization, may effectively 
reduce imports, and because of the stimulus to growth offered, may induce 
foreign-owned parent companies to produce goods locally that were pre­
viously imported into the country. In this way there is likely to be 
positive effect on the balance of payments in the protected country.
Whether, in fact, there is this beneficial effect, will be debated later.
As will be shown, the effects are complex.
As far as reducing the dependence of one country on other countries 
is concerned, the argument is more straight forward. The prevention or 
reduction in supply by a foreign supplier of an essential raw material or 
industrial good can have a deleterious effect on an economy.
1.6 Summary and outline of other chapters
The purpose of this chapter was two-fold. Firstly, to define the 
role that Economics can perform in interpreting economic policy in a free- 
enterprise economy. The conclusion reached in this regard was that the 
analysis of policy decisions Should be discussed within a total framework.
The subject contributes to assessing the consistency of various aims of 
state and helps make one aware of various alternatives for achieving these. 
Having listed and described the accepted aims and instruments available to 
achieve these alms, an attempt was made to show the rationale for intervention 
by the state (as compared with a situation of non-intervention). Earlier 
writers on the subject limited these to certain avenues only and believed
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that the actions of Government be severely circumscribed in the economic 
field. With the advent and increased sophistication of Welfare Economics 
the case for state intervention was framed in terms of a general community 
welfare criterion, and state intervention became justified and related to 
those areas of economic activity for which the market mechanism does not 
provide any guarantee that various objectives will be achieved.
The protection of industries to encourage industrial expansion, on 
first impression, represents a powerful application of this principle 
particularly a-' it appears that many of the arguments used to justify 
protection include reference to the attainment of other objectives.
In Chapter 2 the history of protective policy in South Africa is traced.
Such policy in South Africa became formalized in 1924 and although 
initially framed in terms of political and social considerations other 
than pure economic considerations, the various measures influenced the 
productive structure and helped establish secondary industry on. a relatively 
large scale. In addition to the tariff, other forms of protection came 
into significance, particularly after World War 2, as a result of changing 
domestic and international conditions.
Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the implications of various instruments used 
to promote industrialization# Because many of these measures affect a 
country's trade with the test of the world, these chapters discuss various 
instruments in the context of trade policy - thus enabling a widespread 
analysis of intervention and its consequences. Chapter 3 focuses attention 
on choices between various policy measures designed to achieve industrial 
growth# These are discussed in terms of welfare criteria. In Chapter 4 
a greatly-improved method of assessing the influences of trade policy in 
terms of effective protection is used. This measures the extent of 
protection in terms of the value added in the production process rather 
than the traditionally-used nominal rate of protection which applies only
to final stages.
The structure of protection in many developing countries has strongly 
-'nfluenced the pattern of production in these countries. With the aid of 
the concept of effective protection one can explain this influence to a 
far better extent. In Chapter 5 a comparison between import substitution 
and export promotion as strategies for development is presented. In 
addition, the pattern of development in South Africa is examined. Chapter 
6 deals with the measurement of effective protection in South Africa.
In Chapter 7, the conclusions regarding the effects and implications of the 
policy of industrial protection in this country are discussed. In addition, 
suggestions are made as regards' future policy requirements for more rapid 
growth in South Africa. Thus in addition to presenting a critical analysis 
of protective policy in South Africa, the work attempts to offer suggestions 
regarding ways in which the country can recover from its present deeply- 
rooted problems.
<>
CHAPTER 2,
PROTECTIVE POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA
2,1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 an attempt was made to justify intervention by the 
state in the economic affairs of a community. The rationale for such 
intervention is justified in those cases in which the workings of the 
market mechanism does not guarantee the attainment of certain objectives. 
One of the most powerful applications of this principle applies in the 
case of the protection of industries to encourage industrial expansion 
and diversification. In addition, because the effects of such a pro­
tective policy incorporate several economic objectives,the appeal of such 
a protective policy is widespread.
In this cha ter an attempt is made to show the evolution and history 
of such policy in South Africa, The South African economy has gone 
through a vast process of structural change during the past 150 years.
The transformation from a low-income-yielding, primary production- 
orientated economy o- 'n economy characterized by highly diverse secondary 
and tertiary production can be divided into several distinct phases 
according to a combination of fortuitous events and deliberate policy 
measures. Throughout the period, the economic development of the 
country Was heavily dependent on foreign trade. Initially this com­
prised of exports of precious metals and even while the economy was 
becoming more broadly based and inward looking, the exports of metals 
and minerals fulfilled a vitally important role. Apart from this, the 
growth in manufacturing industry, patterned as it was by protective 
policy, has been the most characteristic feature of the past fifty years.
The watershed in protective policy in South Africa is dated to 1924 when 
a decisive change occurred as a result of the coming to power of a newly- 
elected Pact government. This marked the start of an upsurge m  indus­
trial growth in South Africa and the beginnings of an inward-looking policy. 
Since this period tariff policy,combined with other protective measures, 
have had a decisive influence on the structure of production.
To try and determine the actual extent that protection contributed 
to this growth is impossible, for one cannot predict what type of growth 
would have ensued in the absence of protection. In a later chapter the 
pattern of growth within various sectors is looked at in view of the 
protective structure. For the moment it will suffice to say that during 
the. era of protection in South Africa, over the past sixty years or so, 
manufacturing industry outstripped primary activities i.e. agriculture 
and lining» and has become the leading contributor to Gross Domestic 
Product in the country. Table 2.1 which shows the percentage contribution 
to Gross Domestic Product (at factor cost) at 5 year intervals, illustrates 
how the manufacturing sector,which contributed only 3,8 per cent in 1911, 
had grown rapidly and,by 1970,accounted for more than the combined Con­
tributions of both agriculture and mining.
2.2 Production and protective policy before Union
Prior to the discovery of diamonds in 1867, production in South Africa 
was alt, ost entirely based on agriculture. The principle types of industry 
to be found in the various colonies included wine, mohair, wool and various 
sheltered industries such as bakeries, wagon-making etc, in the Cape, sugar 
and tea in Natal, tobacco in the Free State, while the South African Republic 
was predominantly a pastoral community. Most of the physical and infra­
structural development occurred at the coastal areas and there was,as a 
result of poor transport facilities,little trade between c lonies. Because 
of the more settled conditions in the Cape Colony during this period most of
TABLE 2.1
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PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT FACTOR COST 
BY KIND OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 1911-1974 (AT CURRENT PRICES)— -- ,
YEAR AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY 
AND FISHING
MINING AND 
QUARRYING
H1
1911 21,1 27,6 3,8
1915 18,6 22,0 5,7
1920 22,2 18,3 • 7,3
1925 20,1 16,1 7,7
1930 14,2 15,6 9,3
1935 14,1 19,6 10,7
1940 12,7 18,8 12,4
1945 12,4 13,0 15,3
1950 17,7 13,5 16,4
1955 15,5 12,6 18,3
1960 12,3 14,2 18,7
1965 9,9 13,1 21,9
1970 8,3 10,3 24,2
- 1974 8,9 15,0 23,1
OTHER
Sources; Union Statistics for Fifty Years
South African Reserve Bank, Quartexiv t jlletin, March 1976.
the country’s economic development was concentrated there. The Cape 
Colony had developed an appreciable export trade in wool, wine, hides 
.and skins and grain. The export trade increased in value from 
£370,000 in 1834 to £1,330,000 in 1856  ^^, This provided farmers in 
the Colony with incomes and enabled the importation of textiles, 
agricultural implements and other necessities. In the Colony at this 
time the number of country banks increased and there was considerable 
extension in internal transportation. Prior to 1831 there was only one 
bank serving in the Cape Colony - the state-owned Lombard and Discount 
Bank that was established in 1793. Between 1831 and 1836 a further 18 
banks were established in the Cape Colony*'2'*.
As regards transportation, the early 1860's witnessed the beginhicjs 
of a railway network in the Colony. Private contractors completed t a 
line from Cape Tottn to Stellenbosch and from Salt River down the C& s 
Peninsula to Wynberg, By 1870 approximately 70 miles of what was to be 
South Africa's future railway network had been completed*3*. in 
addition there was a weekly coach service from Wellington tc the Transvaal - 
a journey lasting approximately 10 days.
At the time of the discovery of diamonds, conditions were relatively 
favourable for economic development. In spite of agricultural depression 
in the latter half of the eighteen-sixties, there was a certain amount of 
political stability in each of the colonies. While the Cape and Natal 
were granted fiscal autonomy, the Transvaal and Free State were independent*
M.ti. De Kock, The Economic Development of South Africa, London,
J?.S. King 4 Son, 1936, p.36. .
*2* M.H. De KOck, ojd. cit.,
(3)
D. Hobart Houghton and J. Dagut, Source Material on the South African 
Economy, Vol. 1, 1860-1899, Cape Town, Oxford University Press’, T9?2 
ppl 15 and 16."
De Kockjin summarizing conditions in the various territories
of South Africa just prior to the discovery of diamonds writes, 'The way had
thus been prepared for the development of the agricultural and pastoral
resources - the mainstay of the country. Banking and transportation
facilities had been improved, new and better methods of agriculture and
stock farming had been adopted, the population had >_r a  increased not only
by a large excess of births and deaths, but also by immigration, the
territory under European occupation had been considerably expanded, the
aboriginal tribes had been almost completely subdued and brought under
controli and considerable progress had been made in the direction of self 
. (4)government
The beneficial side-effects of the discoveries of diamonds and gold
were numerous. Apart from the export earnings and vast capital inflows
that ensued, a communications network to the interior was extended, a highly-
skilled immigrant population was attracted and several subsidiary industries,
such as explosives, engineering, footwear and cables etc., immediately
related to mining, were established. Furthermore, these discoveries gave
rise to the establishment and growth of retail trading outlets. The vast
movements of population in search of diamonds and gold brought about an
increase in the demand for foodstuffs as well, and agricultural production
was extended. According to De Kock, the development of the mining
industry helped satisfy many of the needs of the various territories and
lifted 'those struggling territories out of their comparative insignificance
in 1870 to a position of undoubted commercial importance on their being
united into one legislative union in 1910' ^ .
<»
(4) M.H. De Kock, ojj. hit., p.43.
(5) m .H. De Kock, Economic History of South Africa, Cape Town, Juta & Son,
1924, p.238.
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Some idea of the importance of mineral discoveries on economic 
activity in the various colonies over this period can be deduced from 
the following facts. By 1880 diamond production was valued at £3 mill^ 
Imports into the Gape amounted to £11 mill, compared to £2| mill, before 
-.he diamond discoveries^ . By 1882 exports from the Cape and Natal 
amounted to £9 mill, compared to £3 mill• in 1870 . The revenue of
the Cape increased fourfold from £0,6 mill, in 1870 to £2,4 mill, in 
1880^. By 1885 the railway link had been extended from Cape Town to
Kimberley.
In the Transvaal, gold production increased to £16 mill, in 1898  ^ ^.
The revenue of the Transvaal which in 1885 amounted to £218,000 increased 
to £1J mill, in 1889/90 1^:L\  By 1890 there was a direct railway link 
between the Transvaal and the Cape. In 1894/5 the line between the 
Transvaal and Delagoa Bay was completed and a year later the Transvaal 
Durban line became operative.
M.H. De Kock, The Economic Development of South Africa, ££. ait., p.44 
Ibid., p.44
(8) Ibid., p.45 
Ibid., p.45 
<10) Ibid., p.52 
(H) Ibid. , p.52
The tariff history of,the various territories during this period was
characterized by perpetual conflict and rivalry, In the early part of the
period the Gape,despite having acquired a large measure fiscal autonomy
during 1854,made little use of taking the opportunity of fostering the
growth of local manufacture by means of high protective duties. There
seemed little need for such action because of the overseas demand for
diamonds, wool, hides, mohair etc, which were large earners of. foreign ..exchange
In 187,?.,when responsible government was introduced in the Cape and the Colony
acquired even greater financial freedom, there was still reluctance to foster
the growth of local industry. The tariff was almost entirely a source of
(12)
revenue, which fluctuated with the prosperity of the Colony .
Perhaps a further explanation for the reluctance of the Cape government to 
impose protective tariffs is that several shipping agents held high positions 
in the government and vere not favourably disposed to increasing trade 
restriction. Nevertheless, the revenue tariffs imposed on necessities 
had the effect of encouraging the establishment Of several manufacturing
0-3)
industries such as cart-and wagon- making • In 1086 when the first 
discussion of protective duties was said to have taken place in the Cape 
Parliament a motion proposed by a Mr Douglass that every industry that could 
be successfully established be encouraged and protected from competition 
from abroad by customs duties on items such as candles, cigars and cigarettes,, 
beer, butter, etc,,was defeated by 21 Votes to IS*' \  This was indicative 
of the reluctance to impose protective duties at that stage.
■ M.H. De Kock, Economic. Histhty of Soutn Africa, Cape Town, Juta & Son, 
1924, p.305.
(13) Ibid., p.306,
(14) o.j.j. Botha, 'On Tariff Policy: the formative years', S ^ W jJS. 41(4)
Dec. 1973, pp. 327, 25. Also A.J, Bruwe- Protection in Sputh
Africa, Stellenbosch"1923 pp» 86-108., for the loader aspects or cKis
issue*
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The tariff policy in Natal had an additional element associated with
it. Apart from oKtaining revenue, the Colony attempted to attract trade
with the two inland Republics and in 1867 Natal followed a policy of levying
• lower duties on imported goods compared to those imposed in the Cape Colony,
in order to compete more favourably with the Cape. Another reason for the
low duties in Natal was that Delagoa Bay began to constitute a threat to
the Colony. Thus tariffs were not protective in this territory
and there was little development of industry. While tariffs in the Free
I
State were subject to that of Natal and the Cape, the Transvaal was in’a 
more favourable and independent position because of the proximity of
I
Delagoa Bay. Before the discovery of gold in 1886 the Transvaal was 1 
entirely pastoral and agricultural. It was a relatively poor territory.
With the discovery of gold and the subsequent migration into the territory 
the authorities applied revenue duties on a number of items and these, 
together with the duties .imposed on goods in the Cape and Natal and the 
natural protection arising out of high transport costs to the interior, 
served to establish several industries in the Transvaal. Many of these 
were immediately related to the gold mining industry, such as explosives, 
cables, candles, boots, clothing and textiles. Others such as btickmaking* 
furniture and handicraft production, bakeries, jam and sweet factories 
started production.
Against this background of divergent interests within the various 
territories and various political factors, several unsuccessful attempts 
were made to bring about a customs union in South A f r i c a . Writing 
about the state of affairs at the end of the Pietermaritnburg Conference 
(1906), Botha summarizes the position of the various ,colonies in the 
following statement: 'The divergent interests and commercial rivalries 
between the four colonies were far from resolved; if anything, they had
1^5) D.J.J. Botha, op., cit., pp. 325-331.
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been exacerbated. It had become clear, especially after the granting 
of self-government to the old republics, that commercial interests and 
political expedience required a Union of the four states' .
2.3 The importance of Union and the beginnings of protective policy
The effects of Union in 1910 served to establish a uniform system of 
tariffs between the various territories and thus helped bridge some of the 
disparities in commercial policy that were evident in these territories.
t
Eruwet writes of the other effects of Union. He argue?, that this could ,
be regarded as the first step in the South Africanization of the people, 
for it helped people look Upon themselves not as Transvalers, Free Staters 
and Colonials,but as South Africans^^. In other words,localism,prejudice 
and interterritorial niggling was in theory replaced Jby a feeling of nationalism.
Despite the uniform tariff structure brought about by the customs 
union, there still existed divergent interests that were not predominantly 
politically motivated as was the case previously. Although the Transvaal •
iexhibited a lot of anti-British sentiment and the former colonies still ;
s
remained historically tied to the traditions of the colonial power, there j
i:
was still the natural tendency for the Transvaal to prefer Delagoa Bay to j
- . ' . i
the Cape and Natal as a source of exporting and importing. Apart.-from the |j
tendency for the Transvaal wishing to secure an outlet that was independent I
of Great Britain, this preference for Delagoa Bay was based on sound economic jf
reasoning for it was nearer in distance than Durban. .Furthermore, there f
I
existed the divergent interests of different industries in the country. j
The mining industry obviously wanted low tariffs, so as not to be penalized '
f
as regards increasing costs, while the remainder of the country, more J
concerned about revenue and the protection of agriculture, desired high
tariffs.
(I*) ibid,, p.331 
(17)
A.J, tiruver, ojd. hit., p,86
In order to resolve these difficulties the Cullinan Commission was 
appointed in 1910 and reported in 1912. Its recommendations were implemented 
in the 1914 Customs Tariff Act. In general, the Commission recommended 
that agriculture and industry be accorded 'adequate protection' and that 
account be taken, in granting protection, that
GL) a fair proportion of raw materials be used or obtained in the country 
(ii) the industry has a reasonable chance of becoming successful
(iii) a fair percentage of white labour be employed.
The Commission recommended prohibitive rates of duty on a number of 
articles. In spite of this, the bias in tariff policy was essentially 
revenual. Of the 190 items listed in the tariff schedule, 120 were allowed 
in free of duty or at low levels(18 .^ During the early stages of the 
1914-18 War a dumping duty was levied. Because of World War I, it was 
impossible to establish how protective tne measures were.
The effects of the War on the beginnings of manufacturing industry 
cannot be stressed too lightly. As Do Kiewiet writes, The original 
stimulus to manufacture in South Africa was not given by tariff protectio .
It was the discovery of diamonds and gold that first created markets in 
which local producers had a natural advantage. Yet diamonds and gold did 
much to restrict industrial development. They absorbed skilled and un­
skilled labour alike. They paid such high wages that other employers could 
hardly compete with them for the services of skilled labour» They brought 
such an increase in prosperity to the land that the protection of local 
industries did not become an imperative issue. It was the Great War which
D.JtJi Botha, _opi hit., footnote p.331
gave the greatest stimulus to m an u f a ct u re ' . Van Biljon^^ also 
considers the firsc World War to have yielded enormous benefits to the 
emergence of manufacturing industry in South Africa. The protective 
influen.-e of the war was reflected in the scarcity of shipping facilities, 
increased freight rates and soaring world prices. This latter factor was 
continued in the immediate post-war years. The effects of these measures 
were similar to protective tariffs in that the difficulties of importation 
stimulated a movement towards self-sufficiency. Moreover, the diminution 
in foreign competition and increased freight and insurance rates encouraged 
local production even further. By the end of the War South Africa had shown 
the first siguo of industrial advance. Thus one can conclude that manufact 
uring industry began a period of rapid expansion only after the stimulus of 
the first World War. The slow growth prior to this period can inter alia 
be attributed to the phenomenal development of the mining industry since 
1870. It was essentially the mines that had considerably widened the field 
of employment, attracted large amounts of capital and provided huge amounts 
of revenue for the state. Until 1914 there was little need and inducement 
to venture into large-scale manufacturing. Althoughjas has previously 
been mentioned^a number Of branches of manufacturing industry did come into
existence during the earlier period, either under the stimulus of the 
mining industry or the revenue and semi-protective duties or both, these 
were essentially small scale. According to Houghton, the fact that mining 
had developed so rapidly during the latter part jf the nineteenth century, 
in that it absorbed most of the available capital, skilled manpower and
entrepreneurship,accounted for the fact that the growth u£ large scale
* • , (21) 
manufacturing was essentially a phenomenon of the twentieth century *
(19) (i,w, De Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, Social and Economic,
Oxford, Clarendon Press 1941 p.263*
(2°) p,j* Van Biljon, State Interference in South Africa, London, P.S. King
6 Son Ltd. 1939, p.91.
(2D d . Hobart Houghton, The South African Economy, Cape Towns Oxford 
University Press, 1964, p.114.
The type of manufacturing establishment that tended to arise during the 
war was concerned with the provision of final consumer goods. A problem 
usually associated with this type of development through deprivation is 
that once the war ends^ importation becomes easier and the market tends to 
become flooded. After the establishment of a number of consumer-orientated 
industries during the war, there were increasing pleas for protection after 
1918. Although during the immediate post-war period there were vast 
increases in the costs of living all over the world and it can be argued that 
these served to protect domestic industry even further, there was 
a reluctance on the part of the authorities to succumb to the pleas of 
increased protection, In 1918 the Board of Trade and Industries was 
established to keep an eye on the increase in prices and rejected many of 
the pleas for protection during this period.
At this time, the social 'poor-white1 problem manifested itself and
thousands of whites drifted into urban areas, jobless, poor and starving,
In the general election of 1924, the Hertzog-Gresswell Pact government,
appealing to the mass of unemployed Whites, emerged victorious and ushered
(22^in a new era of industrialization. According to Horwitz , the Pact, 
representing as it did a merging of the interests of Afrikaner nationalism 
and trade unionism a id being devoted to safeguarding the interests of the 
1poor-whites', laid the foundations to what was to become an era of increau ■  ^
intervention in the economic affairs of the country. In 1924 the Board of 
Trade and Industries was reconstituted against a background of important
(22) Horwitz, The Political Economy of South Africa, London, Weidenfold &
Nicolson, 1967, p.6.
international and domestic factors. Amongst these were; the effects 
of depression; increasing practices of dumping; the poor-white problem; 
drought conditions which tended to encourage migration to the cities; 
the increasing awareness of the fact that gold was a wasting asset; 
finally, the world movement to nationalism and a disillusionment with 
the imperial policy of the United Kingdom which had influenced South 
African tariff policy up to this time.
In 1925,with the passing of the Customs Tariff and Excise Duties
Amendment Act, South Africa adopted a protective policy that was to have a
profound influence on the future growth of manufacturing industry. The
number of items in the tariff schedule was almost doubled in comparison to
f 23)
the number of items in the 1914 schedule" . Apart from the usual 
arguments to justify protection, De Kiewiet^2^  states that the protection 
and employment of white labour represented an argument peculiar to the 
South African situation. The diverse and skilled operations cf manufacturing
D.J.J. Botha, op. cit., p.337. The author indicates the progression 
of customs tariffs since the beginning of the century:
General 
ad valorem 
rate
No of Tariff 
Classes
No of items 
in tariff
1 1906 10 5 143
2 1914 15 6 192
1925 20 15 371
C.W, De Kiewiet, op. cit., p.264
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industries were, particularly favourable to the employment of white labour. 
Prior to the passing of the 1925 Act, the Union had a single-column 
tariff with provision for preferential rebates. The 1925 Act broughc 
about the introduction of a double-column tariff with maximum and minimum 
rates. The latter were applicable if a protected industry were found to 
be charging excessive prices, practising a monopoly or 'maintaining un­
satisfactory labour conditions'. p ' i
Apart frvm the employment aspect inherent in the tariff structure, 
the other important factor relevant to the discussion includes the 
introduction of suspended duties, after investigation of the prospects 
and the desireability of developing the industry concerned. If the 
government felt .* at there was a need to establish a branch of -manufacturing 
industry, tariffs were.levied on certain goods in the nope, that. induSuty 
would respond positively to*the stimulus.
Another aspect of the tariff that merits consideration was the policy 
of allowing the free admission of, or levying low duties on, raw materials 
for manufacturing purposes. This was implemented partly by adjusting the 
actual rates of duties or by granting rebates. The importance of this 
aspect of the tariff was that final consumption goods were granted high 
levels of protection, on an effective basis. The low duties on inter 
mediate materials and machinery implied additional protection for consumer 
goods and no doubt encouraged and contributed much to the expansion in the 
.■reduction of these goods. This concept and its ramifications will be 
explained in detail in Chapters 4 and 5*
The effects of the revised tariff structure on economic growth in 
Sbuth Africa were analysed by a number of national commissions of enquiry 
and prominent economists and the tenor of scepticism implicit in these 
early commissions wad to prove valid over time. In 1926 the Economic
and Wage Commission^25' argued that the high labour cost for work and
restricted home market would present obstacles to the rapid development
of manufacturing industry in South Africa ^. Admitting that the
development of manufacturing industry in South Africa was due to the
(27")
effects of war and the policy of protective tariffs » the Commission
stated forcibly that 1 protection in its early stages ... does nothing to
(281
increase the resources or total wealth of a nation' . Thus diversion 
occurred from mining and agriculture i.e. 'industries which have proved 
their efficiency in the face of world competition. Protection thus 
adversely exports1 52^
According to the Commission, the justification for protective policy in 
South Af-ica rested on two incompatible grounds viz. the infant industry 
argument and the employment opportunities offered ,to White labour.
Stating that th' stisting tariff was extended to many industries using 
imported raw materials, the Commission doubted the generative effects of 
protection^ 3<^  . But its major reservations concerned labour and the 
limited market brought about by a policy 'that restricts the native's 
opportunities of employment and so keeps down his wages'^. Furthermore, 
instead of relieving the poor white problem,'so far as the protective- 
tariff has affected agriculture adversely it will have strengthened the
U5) Reporl , t the Economic and Wage Commission, 1925, U-G, 14• 26 
Ibid., par. 292
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influence tending to drive the poorer agriculturalist off the land; and 
by widening the gap between the level of earnings in agriculture and in 
urban industry, it has tended to attract more people off the land into the 
towns. But the poor white driven off the land is not suitable material 
out of which to build up an efficient industrial labour force; and we showed 
reason to believe that policy should be directed rather to keeping him on 
the land'(32).
Perhaps the most forceful criticism of tariff policy in South Africa
(33)
at that time was sounded by Frankel during the early 'thirties .
Frankel argued tha. customs tariff as a means of diverting economic
resources was not the only measure for a government to use in order to
achieve certain aims. Apart from bounties and customs duties, practices
such as special freight rates on locally-produced commodities, discriminatory
rates on imported goods, special purchase tenders etc, all represented forms
of protection^3^ . As far as the 1924 tariff structure was concerned
Frankel was concerned that the framing of tariffs did not take into account
(35)
the diverse forms of assistance that already existed . Even with 
protection, growth and development in protected industries was impossible 
without prior possession of natural resources, skill, initiative, experience 
and organization^36 .^ Tariff protection according to Frankel may encourage
z 3 7 \ ^
inefficiency and harm entrepreneurs! initiative . It may result in
(32) Ibid., par, 311
(33) S.H. Frankel, A National Economic Policy, in Coming of Age, Studies in 
South African Citizenship and Politics, J.H, Hofmeyr et al., Cape Town: 
Maskew Hi)1 "r, 1930
3^4) Ibid., p.300
(35) Ibid., p.201
(36) Ibid,, pp.203/4 
(37^  Ibid,, pp.207/8, 214
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extravagance in government expenditure("38) and, being so indirect, may
(39)
escape the criticism and notice accorded to more direct forms of protection 
In view of these possible harmful effects Frankel advocated that the 
application of tariff policy be kept under close scrutiny by Independent 
authorities(A0). Protection can be disastrous unless the comparative 
disadvantage was slight(41). Frankel compared the effects of tariff
protection to a 'powerful drug' urging that machinery should exist to
, . i (.42)
ensure that it be used as a tonic .
The Holloway Commission in 1934-35(43) was limited by its terms of 
reference to secondary industries. The Commission stated at the outset 
that underlying the report was the view that the adoptic, a practionist 
policy in South Africa was influenced by social rather than economic 
considerations. The Commission went to great lengths to Show that much 
of the industrial development that took place after 1925 and the employment 
resulting therefrom was attributable to the direct Stimulus given by the 
protectionist policy. Using statistics to prove that protected industries 
enjoyed a greater increase in employment than other industries , 
while admitting that protection had conferred several advantages to the 
economy in the form of better living standards, insurance against trade
(38) Ibid., pp.210 
(3 )^ Ibid., pp.211
(A0) Ibid., p.217 
( 4 D  Ibid., p.223
(42)
(43)
Ibid*, p.211
*f the C u * - ™ .  'commission 193^.35 dated 6th November, 1935,
uTg: 5, ' 36": ~ ~
(44) Ibid., pars. 60-67
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cycles, increased diversification and stimulus to other indur ,..ies^5\  
the Commission concluded that 1 the evidence which we have received is 
nearly unanimous on the point that the wage rates payable to European 
labour in South Africa are much higher than those paid in countries 
which compete in the South African market, and that for this reason, 
protection is an essential condition for the continued existence of 
local industry’ The Commission argued that the high cost of
European labour represented the greatest competitive ’drawback of South 
African industry, and protection was to a large extent a protection of 
wage rates payable to Europeans'^. Or, evidence presented to the 
Commission, the conclusion was reached that the major proportion of 
protected industries could not do with less protection^  ^ and unless 
Some means could be found of reducing the cost disadvantage of high wage 
rates, the country must give up the hope of achieving economic soundness 
for its protected industries.
Another reservation expressed by the Holloway Commission was that 
protection appeared to have a weakening effect on initiative and risk-taking. 
This could be concluded from the flimsy argumnts requesting tariff 
protection used by industrialists^9). In general, the Holloway Commission’s 
conclusion was that while evidence was not unfavourable to the maintenance 
of protection within reasonable limits, protection in South Africa appeared 
to have surpassed the limits that the country could reasonably bear. ’The
(45) Ibid., par. 122
(46),• Ibid. par. 126
(47) Ibid., par. 341
(48) Ibid., par. 373
(49) Ibid*, pars . 22)-243
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only sort of protection which South Africa can afford is moderate 
protection1 .
(51)Schumann, in his review of the Holloway Commission $, criticizes the 
report, in that many of its conclusions were regarded as not having been 
proved theoretically or statistically. Schumann argues that a far 
better case for protection could have been made out. In terms of a 
world that has generally adopted protectior and in which many rigidities 
exist, as well as a world where periodic depressions, unemployment and
(52)
disturbances of external trade are experienced, protection is necessary
In similar vein to Frankel, Schumann urges the creation of machinery to
continuously and systematically analyse the industrial possibilities of
the country and direct and encourage industrial development in conjunction
(5 3 )
with moderate protection
Thus one can see that the application of tariff policy in South 
Africa during this period was not devoid of criticism. Even at that 
stage, several warnings were sounded as regards the possible harmful 
effects of such policy, if implemented in an incorrect manner. Much of 
the analysis of tariffs during this period was restricted to more practical 
issues. Indeed,as will be seen in the following chapter, the more
rigid theoretical analysis of the effects of tariffs and the comparison 
between tariffs and other forms of trade control only came about after 
the Second World War.
(50) Ibid., par. 257
(51) c.G.W. Schumann,’ Report of the Customs Tariff Commission 1934-35/ 
Sciuth African Journal of Economics, June 1936, Vol. 1. pp. 172-181
(52) Ibid., p.177
<53) Ibid., p.181
Unfortunately, many of the warnings referred to above went unheeded 
and the pattern of industrial development that was established at that 
.time was further influenced by the advent of the Second World War. The 
natural protection accompanyii > the War, by virtue of the forced 
exclusion of competing imports, once more led to the rapid expansion of 
industrial production. The Iron and Steel Industry, which had been 
established in the late nineteen-twenties, proved to be strategic to 
national defence and the key supplier to the growing engineering industry. 
The food and clothing industries fed and clothed both those at home and
those serving in the armed forces. In addition to this boost there
(54)
was another aspect that Horwitz regards of extreme importance . The 
war years witnessed 1 crucial institutional change1. As the whites 
went off to serve in the battlefields or factories, non-whites filled the 
void* Although he argues that the pre-war colour bar did not dis­
integrate, the gulf was definitely being bridged by the emergence of a 
new semi-skilled class comprising Coloureds, Indians and Africans.
(55)
In 1945 the Board of Trade and Industries Report No. 282 was 
issued, The terms of reference of the Report were designed to provide 
a guideline for post-war readjustment and to define longer term industrial 
policy. The Report included reference to protective policy. While 
agreeing in principle that the extent of protection ought to be reduced 
once industries >ecame established on a firm footing, the Board stated 
that in view of the post-war situation, the possibility of dumping and 
the need for reconstruction, reduction of protection would not be wise at 
the time^^.
R. Horwitz > ojr, oit,, p . 262
(55) Board of Trade and Industries, Report No, 282, 'investigation into 
Manufacturing Industries in the Union of South Africa , First 
Interim Report, 1945 .
(56) Ibid., par. 340
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2.4 Protective policy since World War II
’The most distinctive aspect of the commercial policy of South Africa 
over the past 25 years undoubtedly lies in its extreme reliance on import 
l i c e n s i n g . The nature of protective policy changed in South Africa 
after the Second World War, partly in response to a serious balance of 
payments crisis in 1948, and partly as a result of South Africa being 
restricted in its tariff policy on entering the Gatt negotiations in 1947.
As was pointed out by the Viljoen Commission in 1 9 5 8 while the initial 
purpose f- introducing import controls was to protect the Balance of 
payments, the system was evolved in such a way as to provide domestic 
industry with adequate protection. The system has primarily revolved 
around an import licencing scheme under which the number of licences were
issued in a selective manner according to the availability and composition
of foreign exchange reserves. Lachman concluded that the
commercial policy of" import licensing which had provided substantial 
protection to domestic manufacturing industry by excluding a wide range 
of foreign goods from the domestic market and by favouring the importation 
of Capital goods and raw materials, contributed vastly to the rapid trans­
formation of the South African Economy during the I960's. He raised
doubts as to whether the inward-looking trade strategy will be beneficial
in the future and forcibly presents a case for outward-looking policies by 
concentrating on the allocative inefficiencies resulting from a system of 
import licencing
(57) p. Lachmani 'import Restrictions and Exchange Rates', South African 
Journal of Economics, March 1974 , Vol. 42, Number 1, 25.
(58) Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Policy relating to the 
Protection of Industries, U.G. 36/1958, Par. 150-161.
^ )  D, Lachman, ojj. cit., pp. 36-41.
The Viljoen Commission, in its investigation of the effects of tariff
protection on manufacturing industry in South Africa, did not confirm the
apprehensions voiced by earlier commissions on the issues of protective
policy. While it emphatically rejected import control as a means of
protection - its prime objection in this connection being that such control
is temporary, fortuitous and distorting^ - the Commission believed that
industrial development was essential for affording suitable employment and
improved living Standards for the rapidly increasing population. The
prosperity of the economy and welfare of its people were reliant on the
fortunes of secondary industry,for this provided greater, employment
opportunities than either mining or agriculture • By laying a firm
foundation for the development of secondary industry, protection in South
Africa benefited the farming c o m m u n i t y a s  well as the mining industry
(63)
for tariffs did not impose a heavy burden on these industries . In 
terms of the low duties on machinery and raw materials this was true. 
Moreover the Commission argued that protective policy in favour of 
manufacturing industry was not labour-di, "tting, as the major part of mine- 
labour came from adjacent African territories^ ^• The beneficial effects
of the rise in industrialization was reflected in the increasing standard 
of living and real incomes of the population* The Commission admitted 
that for the mass of the population this was still low and, in order to 
improve this, further industrialization was r e q u i r e d .
The Viljoen Commission, is interesting when compared to previous 
Commissions in that i_ was indicative of the change in thinking that had 
occurred among tariff-making authorities in South Africa, The need for 
protection in the 1950's no longer stemmed from protecting white workersj 
but from offering sufficient opportunities to provide employment for the 
mass of the population and ensuring increasing standards of living for 
the lower income groups. The Viljoen Commission found justification 
for tariff protection in this country in terms of the infant-im.ustry 
argument. The Reynders Reportcommenting on this aspect writes,
1 Thus conceived, tariff protection has a strong dynamic flavour, and 
fits squarely into the sphere of economic development, provided, that 
the conditions for industrialization (generally the availability of the 
factors of production and a sufficiently large market to support 
economically viable plants) exist , The findings of the Viljoen 
Commission are important in that it has been the foundation of much of 
protective policy in South Africa, throughout the -1960’s and 197o's so 
far,
With regard to the protective effects of import controls, it has 
been previously mentioned that the extent of such controls were dependent 
bn the condition of foreign exchange reserve,y in the country, While 
these reserves were low throughout the i960's import controls were in­
tensified and maintained. Undoubtedly this yielded a protective effect 
0,1 many industries. In the early 1970* s, following an improvement in the 
size of gold and foreign exchange reserves owing to the increased free 
market price of gold, import controls were liberalized and there was an 
increased resort to the tariff for protective purposes. This is exem­
plified by the fact '‘hat in 1972 the Board of Trade and Industries re-
Reynders Report, 0£* cit,, p. 124
ceived 700 applications for tariff protection compared with 390 in 
1971^^. This illustrates the extent to which industries were in­
fluenced by import controls. The renewed shortage in foreign exchange, 
coupled with the dramatic fall in the price of gold,has once more, brought 
about restrictions on imports and, as happened previously, it is probable 
that this will yield a protective effect on local industry.
2,5 Summary
The pattern of industrial protection in South Africa is unique com­
pared to other developing countries in that its justification was 
initially founded on a racial basis. P.ior to Union in 1910 the purpose 
of the customs tariff was essentially to earn revenue. The period was 
characterized by continual rivalry between the various territories. 
Initially diamonds and then gold laid the foundations for future economic 
expansion. It is argued that these tended to delay the establishment 
of large-scale secondary indus try. One of the important effects of 
Union was the formation of a common customs union between the various 
territories. While the First World War provided a boost lo local manu­
facturing production, the coming into power of a new government in 1924 
marked the beginning of an era of industrial protection in this country. 
The ensuing protective policy, which initially was confined to the 
levying of tariffs on industries that could employ ’ ge numbers of white 
workers aroused criticism and scepticism from several sources. Although 
authorities attempted to justify the tariff structure economically, there 
was widespread agreement that the tariff as was implemented in South
Financial Mail: Supplement, A Guide to Investment in South Africa,
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Africa at that time had a political bias. Despite various practical 
warnings f m prominent economists, tariffs became firmly embedded in 
• the economy. That the policy could not be revised, once the poor-white 
problem was settled, can be attributed to the influence of various 
fortuitous events on both the local and international fronts. With 
the emergence of the era of trade liberalization after 1948 additional 
means of protection were levied, either deliberately or for other reasons.
In fact, since the Second World War, arguments in favour of industrial 
protection in South Africa have been revised to conform to the interests 
of the population f"i a whole and not just a section of it. The rationale 
for such protection ann-rs to have been based on broad economic objectives. 
The importance of tariffs in establishing manufacturing industry on a 
large scale in South Africa can be assessed in broad terms by the 
relatively rapid growth iu manufacturing industry since the era of pro­
tection was introduced in the mid-nineteen twenties. Thus tariffs and 
other forms of protection have proved an important factor in industrial 
development in South Africa.
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CHAPTER 3
TARIFFS AND OTHER FORMS OF TRADE INTERVENTION - THEORIES OP NOMINAL PROTECTION
3,1 Introduction
For any government the pursuit of an active policy o f industrial 
expansion encompasses a multiplicity of objectives such as the provision 
of employment opportunities for a rising population, the improvement in 
the foreign trade pos lion of a country, an !increase in economic growth, 
the assurance thatccertain strategic goods will be supplied and the 
political appeal surrounding a certain measure of economic independence 
in a country etc. The arguments for a deliberate policy of industrializa­
tion are related to the attainment of several objectives because of the 
wide-ranging benefits that may arise as industrial expansion proceeds, 
and this no doubt accounts for the preference that many governments in 
less developed countries have shown for industrial expansion as opposed 
to agricultural expansion. In Chapter 2 the history and rationale of 
such policy in the South African context was examined.
Because tariff protection and other forms of trade control have most 
frequently been used as measures to encourage industrialization,the issues 
of trade intervention and optimum protective policies must be analysed in 
greater detail. Corden^ classifies the evolution of post-mercantilist 
economic thought into three stages. Firstly, arising out of the writings 
of Smith and Ricardo the gains from trade and* more specifically,the benefits 
from completely free trade came to be appreciated and the theory of compare-
) W.Mi Corden* Trade policy and Economic Welfare. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1974 pp.2-5.
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tive advantage dominated economic thought in Britain during the nineteenth 
century. The Case for free trade was developed simultaneously with the 
case for laissez-faire and was regarded as a special case of the argument 
for laissez-faire. This argument, on the assumptions of perfect
competition domestically and internal:t-‘M-.ly, of given factor supplies 
and technology, of externalities being absent and of free factor movement 
within countries, was appealing,for it predicted that if countries produced 
according to comparative advantage the result will be a maximization of the 
Social product for the world as a whole.
Gradually it came to be realized how restrictive these assumptions 
were. Perfect competition does not necessarily rule, there may not be 
full employment, the income distribution yielded by the laissez-faire 
solution may not be just or desirable, necessary structural changes may 
not occur and so on. And so, in combination with the modifications to 
the laissez-faire model, more and more qualifications to the argument for 
free trade emerged. When any of these assumptions are relaxed or do not 
hold, numerous arguments arise in favour of individual nations intervening 
in their international trade. This represents the second stage in the 
development of economic thought with regard to protectionist philosophy and 
reached a climax during the post World-War II era with the emergence of 
concern expressed over the plight of the less developed countries. It 
was argued that laissez-faire had failed to develop these countries,hence 
free trade proved a failure. Stern^ states that when the attainment of 
free trade is not possible the above assumptions become all the more 
significant. One should give up the ideal norm of first best and 
examine policies individually in terms of the relationships they are 
designed to rectify as well as their impact on world and national economic 
welfare» Thus in attempting this analysis, Stern argues that one enters 
a sub-optimal condition of the theory of the second best, which,although 
more complex, represents a more realistic approximation to conditions that 
actually exist.
(%) Robert M. Stern, 'tariffs and Other Measures of Trade Control: A survey
of recent developments' Journ. Kco. .hit; xi(3) , Sept 1973, p.858
Corden classifies the most recent stage as the one 'where the link 
between the case for free trade and that for laissez-faire has been severed. 
One can still hold the seemingly disparate views that there are valid 
reasons for government to intervene in an economy>viz. to maintain full 
employment, to bring about a desirable distribution of income, to adjust 
resource allocation and consumption patterns in the light of external 
economies and diseconomies, and at the same time one can believe that free 
trade is best. The reason for this is that intervention in trade may not 
be the best way of dealing with the various problems mentioned above since 
these are brought about by domestic distortions rather than trade distortions. 
The optimal way of correcting these distortions is by dealing with them 
directly, while at the same time allowing trade to flow freely. One of 
the important implications of the new approach is that while it restores 
the argument for free trade it focusses on the choices between different 
policies, for example, tariffs compared to subsidies as instruments for 
protection, rather than the question of trade intervention compared to non 
intervention. In addition, within this framework, international trade 
and development theory has advanced to cater not only for the analysis of 
the effects of tariff barriers to trade but non tariff barriers as well.
One can thus apply welfare criteria to any form of intervention in an 
endeavour to find the optimal form Of intervention. Essentially the new 
approach and the techniques of analysis owe their origin and development to 
Meade, Hagen, Johnson and Bhagwati and Bamaswami. Much of the analysis 
of trade restricting measures in this chapter will be conducted in terms 
of partial equilibrium analysis under the assumption that tariffs and other 
measures are imposed only on final products being traded. The extension 
to the analysis of protection in terms of the trading of intermediate goods 
and the effects of protection on imported inputs will be presented in
3.2 The modern theory of nominal tariffs
(i) The effects o£ tariffs
Tariffs are specific or ad valorem in form and in attempting 
to assess the effects of tariffs or a final product within a partial 
equilibrium framework in terms of price, output, consumption, imports and 
exports, these depend on the position and shape of both the home and 
foreign dem'^d and supply schedules. In general, one can distinguish the 
following effects of a tariff imposed on an imported good:
a) The production or protection effect: Normally tariffs can be expected
to increase domestic output to a certain extent by providing a stimulus 
to local producers and curtailing the extent of competition from foreign 
producers. This effect depends on the elasticities of both local and
foreign supply schedules.
b) The consumption effect: As a result of the increased selling price 
brought about when the tariff is introduced, local consumption normally 
falls unless the slope of the demand curve is perfectly inelastic.
c) The import or balance of payments effect: Imports normally fall by the
sum of the production and consumption effects.
d) The rev< nue effect: Customs revenue is raised as long as the tariff
is not prohibitive. Once more, this effect is dependent on the
respective elasticities of demand and supply. As tariffs tend to
become restrictive, revenue falls.
e) Redistribution effect: Since the price to domestic producers is 
increased at the expense of domestic consumers ,there is a redistribution 
of income in favour of producers resulting from consumers subsidizing the 
output of this product by a certain amount. This effect also depends 
on the restrictiveness of the tariff and the extent to which local 
consumers substitute the local for the imported product.
f) The employment effect; This depends on the absolute magnitude of
the changes in trade brought about by the tariff in relation to the 
initial position of the level of employment at home and abroad and 
the effect on the balance of payments of a country. Domestically, a 
tariff can increase employment in certain sectors if it provides 
incentives for local production of goods that previously were imported. 
Conversely, employment in certain export orientated sectors may fall 
particularly if there is a transfer of resources to the protected
iatory action on the part of overseas exporters and so affect adversely 
employment in the tariff-imposing country.
A priori, because of the enormous range of possibilities, al­
ternatives and qualifications that one can make in assessing the effects of 
a tariff, there is nothing definite that can be said about the abovenamed 
effects of tariffs. The traditional emphasis of tariff theory until 
recently concentrated on these various effects, comparing tariffs to a free 
trade situation. More detailed and specific work concerning the effects of 
tariffs was undertaken by Stolper and Samuelson^^ who attempted to show how 
the imposition of a tariff affected absolute and relative factor rewards, 
and, undet the assumptions of a small country and substitution of local for 
previously imported products, could increase the return to the scarce 
factor. Metzler(4) showed that when these assumptions are relaxed the 
Stolper-Samuelson conclusion is dependent on the relationship between the 
foreign price elasticity of demand for a country's exportables and the 
marginal propensity to import in the country.
O) w. stolper and P.A. Samuelson, 'Protection and Real Wages', Review 
of Economic Studies, Nov. 1941, pp. 58-73.
sectors. Alternatively, the imposition of tariffs may induce retal
L.A. Metzler, '
National Income' .
'Tariffs. the Terms of Trade and the Distribution of 
J. Political Economy, Feb. 1949, 57(1) pp. 1-29.
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Another specific area of research concerning tariffs during 
the 'forties and'fifties dealt with the optimum tariff argument as an 
exception to a free trade situation. Briefly stated, this argument 
attempted to prove that a country can conceivably improve the welfare of 
its citizens by imposing an optimum tariff, provided that it exercised 
monopoly power in foreign trade am’ there was no foreign retaliation.
This latter assumption was in turn relaxed and the argument was phrased :
in terms of the necessity to specify the nature of retaliation. j
Johnson^ and Bhagwati^, showed the possible consequences concerning ;
the nature of retaliation. If a country threatens retaliation hut does 
not perforce carry it out, this conclusion appears to be valid. In "addition 
the conclusions concerning the optimum tariff,.if valid, have far-reacning 
implications for those less developed countries that enjoy a monopoly 
position in their export trade.
• |
(ii) The theory of domestic distortions !
Since the nineteen-fifties, the theory of nominal tariffs ji
developed in a new direction. Instead of being concerned with violations j
of first-best Paretian optima there was a basic questioning of the effective- |
ness of tariffs and other measures dealing directly with foreign trade as ;
optimal forms of protection. Domestic measures may be more or less |
p r e f e r a b le  to  t r a d e  in te rv e n t io n ,  The i s s u e ,  a t  p re s e n t ,  revo lves  around ,
— — — - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   — - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - — " —  " " "  i
(5) ,, Gj Johnson, 'Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation*, Rev. Econ. JStud,, ,
No, 55, 1953-54, 2 1 (2 ) ,  pp. 142-153.
(6) j, Bhagwati, 'The Pure Theory of International Trade: A Survey' I
• Economic Journal, March 1964,
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those situations and conditions for certain policy measures being preferable 
to others in dealing with distortions from the free trade situation. The 
literature on this subject is prolific and prominent contributors have in­
cluded Haberler(7\  Meade(8), Hagen(-9) Bhagwati and Ramaswami(10) and i
Johnson(11). The analysis has followed the lines of comparing tariff and 
subsidies as forms of protection.
The most lucid statement of the argument has recently been 
made by Corden^12^. The analysis is conducted' in a partial equilibrium 
framework. The introduction of a marginal divergence between private and 
social cost brings into operation soma form of government intervention de­
signed to either increase output or protect an industry. The essential 
point of the analysis is that ideally such intervention should not alter 
the level of consumption. He assumes that: |
a) The act of financing a subsidy through taxation does not upsec any
marginal conditions. *
i'
b) There are no collective taxes. - \
c) There are no disbursement costs involved with the subsidy. |
Z 1.
d) The redistribution of income in favour of those factors that produce |
j
the protected output can be neglected. j
I
!
(7) g. Haberler 1 Some Problems in the Pure Theory of International Trade* |
Kcon. J., 60, June 1950, pp.223-60. 
j.E. Meadej Trade and Welfare. London, Oxford Press 1955 ;
(9) E, Hagen, ‘An Economic Justification for Protectionism* Quarterly J . Econ.
. 72, (4), pp.496-514, November 1958. ...... ,
J. Bhagwati and V »K. Ramaswami, 'Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and
the Theory of the Optimum Subsidy*. J, Polit. Econ., 71(1) 44-50, Feb. 1963
(11) Ht Johnson, 'Optimal Trade intervention in the Presence of Domestic
Distortions' in R.E. Baldwin et ai. Trade.Growth and the Balance of Payments
(1^ ) m .M. Cor den ♦ Trade Policy and Economic Welfare op * ait_., pp.17 27
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Corden argues that both the tariff and subsidy would generate 
the same production effect but the two would differ in respect of the con­
sumption effect to the extent that the tariff introduces and creates a by­
product distortion on the consumption side. Corden then applies the com­
parison to various cases such as governments pursuing non-economic objectives, 
e.g. the local production of military goods, and once more he shows that a 
consumption tax or subsidy will be first best,for a tariff introduces a by­
product distortion^ . Furthermore, Corden argues that tariffs introduce 
a home-market bias into production whereas subsidies tend to promote produc­
tion beyond the local m a r k e t . The analysis can be conducted in terms 
of general equilibrium. Gordon's conclusion in this regard is:'In general, 
one can say that the first-best package of corrective policies will consist 
of policies that get as close as possible to the sources of the various 
marginal divergences, and hence that minimize the by-product distortions 
that are created' In the real world in which there are many commodities
and factors the whole analysis becomes more complex. But the optimal 
correction for a particular divergence depends on whether another divergence 
has been corrected. Indeed an inferior policy implemented to correct one 
divergence and creating a by-product distortion introduces the need to correct 
the newly-created distortion. Tariffs, by their nature, create by-product 
distortions in comparison with subsidies.
Corden later relaxes some of the assumptions underlying the 
theory of domestic divergences. The only assumption seriously affecting
W.M. Corden, op_. tit., p. 17
(14) w.M. Corden, op. cit., pp. 25-27
(15) W.M. Cordon, op. cit., p. 23.
:v
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the conclusion is that concerning the costs of disbursement. In many 
less developed countries the question of how to finance subsidies is 
particularly relevant. Just as there exist untaxable sectors in several 
of these countries due to the prominence of subsistence production and the 
low levels of income, so there are unsubsidizable sectors. In many of 
these countries it is insufficient to finance subsidies by tax redistributions 
for the level of taxes is normally low. Thus in such circumstances it is 
easier to protect through a system of tariffs or any other policy designed 
to affect trading relationships, such as a system of import quotas, rather 
than attempt to rectify domestic distortions at their source. In this 
situation tariffs would probably prove a better alternative.
But this argument is not sufficient to'explain the preponder­
ance, universality and popularity of tariffs as a means of protection in 
many developing countries. It is all very well proving in a static situation 
that subsidies are preferable to tariffs, for these deal directly with 
domestic distortions without bringing about any by-product distortions, but, 
in order to gain a better understanding of the theory of nominal tariffs, 
one should enquire as to why in many countries heavily reliant on this form 
of protection, it is inconceivable that tariffs be substituted for by measures 
designed to rectify domestic distortions directly i.e. subsidies. As Corden 
writes,’ ' the whole 'subsidy-biased* approach seems to have a great air of 
unreality about it. How does it come about that tariffs and import 
restrictions are used all round the world when their use for what are often 
the professed purposes of the restrictions can be so broadly condemned?
Surely one can hardly conceive of a country such as India, for example, 
r e p la c in g  i t s  regime of t a r i f f s  and import c o n t ro ls  w< ^ a mass of su b s id ie s
, * , ( 16) to producers' •
(i^ ) Corden# op. cit., p.54.
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The practical appeal for government preference for the tariff
as a form of protection dominates over the theoretical objections.
Politically, governments may find an increase in tax rates to finance
subsidization difficult to implement. There exists no similar resistance
in respect f tariffs for these do not involve increasing taxation.
Furthermore, governments may be influenced by the revenue aspect implicit
in the tariff while a subsidy involves expenditure. Individuals and
government frequently suffer illusions in assessing the merits or tariffs
compared with subsidies. Explicit taxation in the form of income tax,
sales tax or production taxes impose some form of psychic cost and involve
the government in a loss of popularity. This is not noticeable in a
tariff,especially if the tariff is prohibitive. Apart from the psychic
cost involved, a subsidy financed by tax revenue represents a more obvious
form of protection than tariffs. Subsidies and tax increases are presented
in government budgets and are annually renewable and closely scrutinized.
tariffs and quotas, on the other hand,tend to obscure the reality. Few
people are aware of the level of tariffs and of the industries that benefit
from this form of protection. Corden points out that for this reason
those free-trade minded economists showed a preference for subsidies over
tariffs long before the theory of domestic distortions was introducedi
The chances of sustained protection are far less with a subsidy than a
tariff. This argument is most aptly described by the statement, 1 protection
• (17 )
unnoticed is protection more secure1' .
Xiii this connection the point made by Professor Botha in dis­
cussing the recommendations of the Social and Economic Planning Council 
(1945) of substituting subsidies for tariff protection appears valid,
B o t h a a r g u e s  that under a system of bounties the firms concerned 
realize that they are working on borrowed time. A subsidy could be re­
voked at uncomfortably short notice. This indicates the preference that 
producers exhibit for tariff protection,
In addition, because the tariff does not require political 
sanction as is the case with a subsidy, its application in times of crisis 
may be more speedily implemented. It can be applied more 'readily than a 
subsidy. Thus if an important industry in a country suddenly finds it-, 
self confronted by competition as a result of dumping practices from an 
overseas competitor and parliament is in recess, tariffs are more practical 
as a means to combat this type of competition.
(iii) The Infant-Industry argument for tarjff protection
Up to this point the analysis of tariffs has been conducted
almost entirely within a static framework. In a dynamic context, the 
infant-?ndustry argument represents one of the most powerful statements
for the restriction of trade. The argument has a long tradition even
though-it has changed in emphasis and application over time. 'Of all
the arguments that are normally advanced in defence of a national protective
tariff only the infant-industry argument can be shown to be in the interest
of a more e f f i c i e n t  a l l o c a t io n  of re so u rce s  in  th e  world as  a whole, As
such the argument has great intellectual a p p e a l ^ ' .  The fact that the
argument has r e c e n t ly  even extended to  th e  realm of economic development
has added to Its intellectual respectability.
(I*) D . J . J ,  Botha, 'On T a r i f f  P o licy  the  fo rm ativ e  Y ears ' South A fr ic an
Journal of Economics, Vol. 41(4), Dec, 1973, p,35*.
(1*) h T o ru b  , 'The nltomy of C la s s ic a l  and Modern In fan t  in d u s try  Arguments
We 1,twitsch. Arch, 97(2), 1966, p*325
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Various authors^** ' have voiced concern over the acceptance 
of the theoretical arguments set forth for infant-industry protection.
Grubel, for example, questions the conditions for which the argument can be. 
said to be valid. In the 'broad classical’ argument as expounded by 
List, Bastable and Mill the reasons advocate- for insufficient resource 
investment in an industry showing no comparative advantage, were that the 
private rate of return fell below the social rate. Tariffs in this 
situation were justifiable if these succeeded in increasing the private 
rate until it corresponded with the socially optimal relationship.
According to Grubel the validity of this argument for tariff protection 
depends On the nature of the causes underlying this divergence. If it is 
assumed that industry improves the sociological,political and cultural 
characteristics of a country's population, tariff protection is justified 
only to the extent that these characteristics make the population more 
productive and ultimately allow for the removal of the tariff. Further­
more, these changes must be irreversible and non appropriable by individual 
investors i.e. they must be truly external economies.
A narrower interpretation of the classical argument can be 
phrased in terms of declining costs and prices in the domestic market over 
time. Initially* costs and prices in the domestic economy are higher than 
world costs and prices. Protection in this situation is justified under 
the proviso that a domestic firm can lower prices to at least the level of 
world market prices and that these cost reductions arise due to a learning 
process that must be freely available to all firms entering the industry* 
otherwise existing firms internalize the returns from the acquired skills.
More recently* UNCTAD has qualified this argument to incorporate the size of 
the domestic market reaching a certain level to enable external economies
li. Grubel * ibid. *
See also: R,E, Baldwin, 'The Case against Infant-Industry Tariff protection
j, Polit. Rcon 77(3). 595-305 1969,
(21)
of scale to be realized
The true dynamic elements of the infant-industry argument have
(22)
only recently been expounded, Chenery for example argues that in a 
dynamic growth context,external economies refer to the effects that one 
investment project has on the profitability of another and he advocates the 
use of temporary tariff protection to pattern investment in order to attract 
desired resources into an industry with the maximum external economies being 
generated. Protection can later be removed without any efficiency dis­
torting effe ts.
Another type of argument, justifying infant-industry protection 
is that related to the dual economy. This can be thought of as a develop­
ment tariff. It is argued that tariff protection helps bridge the gap 
between the social alternative costs of labour in agriculture and industry 
and enables the industrial sector to offer a higher wage rate than the value
of labour in agriculture.
Grubel's criticisms of these conventional arguments in favour
of infant-industry protection are that there has been no empirical verifi­
cation, (indeed it is nigh impossible to obtain any empirical measurement 
of the magnitude of such external effects) and also these arguments dis­
regard the possibility of other policy measures to achieve the desired 
objectives*^^ Baldwin contends that no clear analytical case can be made 
for tariff protection regarding infant industries* He questions the ability 
of duties to correct for externalities and achieve an optimum learning 
level^1^ In other words,tariffs do not provide any guarantee that socially
(21) U.N.C.T.A.D. Towards a New Trade Policy for Development, Geneva 1964, p.80*
(22) jjtB. Chenery, 'The Interdependence of Investment Decisions', in:
The allocaeian of economic resources, essays in honour of Francis 
Bernard’ Haley,' bv Moses Abramowitz et al., Stand ford Studies in
f  . History. ' and Political Science, ' Standford, 1959*
Gfi': ";, loc, fi, .
(24) R,% wa]dwi;T~up:~c\t., p .298 and p,303*
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desirable expenditures will be made. Myint^ has distinguished two 
elements in the arguments for infant-industry protection. Infant industries 
can compete on domestic and world markets through either increased efficiency 
which arises through learning experience and skill acquisition or_ a lowering 
in costs arising through large scale production (.with the same level of skill 
and experience). Myint classifies the former case as the genuine infant- 
industry argument whereas the latter applies to an import-substitution 
approach. Protection for import substitution purposes is based on the 
capacity of various protected industries to satisfy the existing pattern 
of domestic demand for manufactured goods and as the overall size of the 
domestic market increases, each industry obtains a proportionate share of 
the market according to the given income elasticity of demand for its product. 
In the genuine infant-industry approach,as an industry becomes more efficient 
and lowers costs,it obtains a I **ger share of the market according to the 
price elasticity of demand for its product. The distinction in these 
approaches is carried further. The import-substitution tatiff is bae»d on 
the principle of promoting economic growth through diversification of re­
sources to cater for the domestic market,whereas the genuine infant- 
industry tariff is based on the principle of promoting growth through 
the specialization of resources if a promoted industry can specialise 
along the lines of its potential comparative advantage as indicated by 
the development of its skills. Despite this distinction the general 
criticisms of Grubel and Baldwin remain. Moreover, the probability that 
a tariff introduces a by-product distortion as far as consumption is con­
cerned, as well as the practical difficulties involved in governments 
initially earmarking those industries than can be regarded as genuine 
infants, casts doubt on the validity and use of infant-industry tariffs in
a dynamic context.
(25) y^  Myint,'International Trade and Developing Countries, m  International^ 
Economic Relations, ed. P. Samuelson, Mac Millan, 1969, p. 29
3.3 Other trade distorting measures
Thus far in the chapter the analysis of protection has been conducted 
in terms of a comparison between tariffs and subsidies, i.e. it has been 
limited to price mechanism devices only. Because of the proliferation 
in other trade distorting measures which have increased in significance 
since the years of the Depression, any theory of nominal protection must 
incorporate the effects of these other non-tariff barriers(26). Initially, 
quantitative import restrictions and exchange controls were the major 
instruments of NTB's, while more recently other non-tariff barriers have
risen to prominence.
(!) Import Quotas
The appeal of these during and after the Depression was to be 
found in the convenient manner these could be implemented and the fact that 
nations imposing these restrictions could indirectly sever the moSt^avoUfhd- 
nation obligations existing between various countries. Import quotas are 
widely used today in many less developed countries and are particularly 
important in India and Pakistan. Their importance has declined among 
some of the mote developed countries today. Frequently quotas are
applied for balance of payments reasons rather than as a measure of pro
. t . (27)
tection for industries, but these can have a protective effect
(26) ijj-jggg al-e referred to as NTB's hereafter •
(27) see previous chapter on protective policy in South Africa.
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Import quotas are normally designated in terms of a physical 
quantity of goods being permitted into a country over a particular time 
period. Alternatively, these may be designated in terms of value whereby 
a' certain amount of money is allocated to the importation of goods over the
/no \
specified time period. In contrast to tariffs, Stern describes a 
quota as severing the price connection between countries. Once the physical 
quota has been attained no more imports are permitted, and, under the 
assumptions of partial equilibrium analysis and a perfectly competitive 
framework, the supply curve becomes perfectly inelastic at the point of the 
quota maxima. Consumerr pay an increased price for the reduced volume of 
imports, foreign suppliers receive reduced incomes, and a quota profit 
accrues to the trader or importer who holds a licence. The tariff in 
turn yields a customs revenue* As was the case with the analysis of customs 
tariffs the effects of import quotas are manifold and depend on the 
qualifications and possibilities that may arise. For example, one would 
normally expect Under a quota system that imports fall to the level set by 
the quota. This is not necessarily the case. As a result of the quota 
restriction the average costs of traders, exporters or users may increase, 
in which case imports may fall below the quota level. Alternatively, a 
monopoly of traders, exporters or users may arise and,if the profit maximizing 
import volume is below the quota volume,the deliberate curtailment of imports 
below the amount permitted will be easy to implement.
(28) R. Stern, o£. cit.» p.868*
Another effect,one assumes, which occurs with a quota is that a price 
margin develops between the domestic price and the import price. Tne 
domestic price is expected to rise while the import price will fall. :
However, if the profits trom licensing accrue to the exporters of the 
product, or the users of the product are importers who have been granted 
licences to import the product, or if there is a price control in the quota- 
imposing country, there will not be any margin between the import supply 
price and the domestic price, In addition, the expectation that a volume 
quota brings about a fall in the value of imports need not materialize.
If licences are granted to exporters or/and if the price elasticity of
(29)
demand for the product is below unity, the opposite might well occur 
Conventional quota theory predicts that When a quota is imposed in a county, 
the output of domestic import-competing production would tend to increase.
This may not occur if a monopoly in the domestic Import-competing sector
emerges.
Thus it is difficult to make any a priori statements as regards 
quota protection. In comparing tariffs and quotas one should do so in terms 
of an Implicit tariff rate. This refers to the single tariff rate Which 
. would have the same effect as an Import quota on the Volume and value of 
imports, on domestic and foreign ptice and on the Volume of dom ,tic outgpt.
The id e a  of a s in g le  r a t e  which would g e n e ra te  only normal p r o f i t s  does not 
e x i s t , f o r  d i f f e r e n t  t a r i f f s  a rc  re q u ire d  to  achieve the  ,r . .a  r e s u l t s .  Other 
non-equ iva lences  may a r i s e  in  r e s p e c t  of p r o f i t s  of t r a d e r s  under vary ing  
assum ptions of monopoly or the  n o n - t r a n s f e r a b i l i t y  of import l i c e n c e s .  ^
There exists a vast literature on the equivalence of tariffs and quotas
<29) a M o u n t °£
-ssftKSBSE®-
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but the debate has not yet yielded any concrete evidence that 
tariffs are preferable to quotas as far as welfare effects are concerned.
, The conclusions depend on the assumptions and qualifications. In terms 
of administration,quotas are easier to introduce than are tariffs.
However, the possibility nf Kindleberger's conclusion that a quota may 
convert a potential monopolist into an actual one, being valid, as well 
as the Krenin argument that a quota brings about market equilibrium 
essentially through the price mechanism, rather than through an import 
effect (as is the case under tariffs) suggests that, in terms of welfare, 
tariffs appear less harmful. As far as the comparison between tariffs 
and quotas on the one hand and subsidies on the other are concerned, 
while the former both involve consumption distortions, (even though the 
causes of these may differ), and are thus less preferable to subsidies 
from the point of view of the welfare of the consumer, the fact that 
from a practical and political viewpoint they are easier to implement 
than a subsidy, accounts for their relative popularity as has been
mentioned previously.
(ii) Other non-tariff barriers
Although successful efforts have been made to eliminate quotas
and, more recently, tariffs with the implementation of the Kennedy round of
tariff reductions, interest has now shifted to analysing other N.l.B.'s. 
Baldwin's-> writes that the tariff cuts brought about by the Kennedy Round 
of negotiations have been responsible for the increased attention regarding 
OTU's. Many of these were either not apparent, or of little consequence 
when tariff rates were high. S=ap=rlanda<32) believes that the importance
(31) R.E. Baldwin, Non tariff distortions in international trade 
Washington, i’ho Brookings Institute, 1970, Ohp, 1.
(32) ^  Scapetlanda, Prospects for eliminating non-tariff distortions^
Leiden, A,W. Sijthoff 1973, p.18.
%
of the distortive effects of these measures has fluctuated as perceptions 
of the national interest have changed in various countries. The emphasis 
among the different measures has shown a secular variation, reaching a peak 
in importance after the Kennedy Round reductions. In fact,Scaperlanda 
voices concern at the tendency to substitute NTB's for tariffs as the latter 
were reduced. Mauer and Van de G e v e l ^  liken the relationship between 
tariffs and NTB’s to the clearance of a swamp, NTB's refer to the stumps 
that remain once the swamp has been cleared.
Baldwin^ and Mauer and Van de G e v e l ^  define non-tariff 
trade distorting policies in terms of measures that cause internationally- 
traded goods and services or resources devoted to the production of these 
goods and services to be allocated in such a way as to reduce potential real 
world incomet This level of income refers to that attainable under a 
resource allocation under which no individual can be better off without 
anyone being worse off, in the event of a redistribution.
Rather than examine the different wa,;,t' of classifying NTB s 
one can attempt to assess them by virtue of their refects. The definition 
of NTB’s was phrased in traditional welfare terms with its focus on world 
as opposed to national well-being. In addition it implies the unrealistic
assumptions of perfect competition. A study of these however can be
undertaken by distinguishing tariff-like from quota-like NTB’s and analyzing 
these in terms of the general analysis presented earlier in terms of tariffs 
, and quotas*'36^  A non-tar iff trade obstacle that shifts relative prices and
O 3) Mauer and Van de Gevel, op. cit., p.48,
(3^ ) R„Et Baldwin> o£. cit,, p.5,
(33) Mauer and Van de Gevel, op. cit,, p.50,
(38) his is an approach used by 11, Groner in ’Problems of Non-Tariff 
Obstacles to Trade’ , Economics, 1.0, 32-48, 1974
costs through price burdens and reliefs can be regarded as a tariff-like 
trade barrier, Alternatively, those distortions applicable to sales 
volume and which restrict imports or exports are quota-like in their 
effect. Thus,according to how close these distortions resemble tariffs 
or quotas, they will be similar in their effect to tariffs and quotas.
Appendix 1 adapts some of the more important distortions to tariff- and quota­
like barriers. As an examplo of a perfect tariff substitute
one can consider an administrative charge levied over and above the 
clearance costs of customs authorities, while anti-dumping restrictions or 
voluntary export restraints from a foreign producer acts as perfect quota 
substitutes. Non-perfect tariff and quota substitutes,although they 
differ markedly in effect to the more perfect substitutes,exhibit charac­
teristics according to their proximity to tariffs and quotas.
Apart from the general effects of non-tariff distortions in 
terms of tariffs and quota, the specific effects are considered harmful. 
Groner^37  ^stresses that in contrast with trade restrictions which refer 
to customs tariffs on import or export lists, non-tariff protection burdens 
producers with additional uncertainties. These are not subject to 
international agreement nor negotiation thus they tend to be rigid, The 
protective effects behind many of these are subtle. Apart from this, 
different instruments of trade policy can exist in different combinations, 
Quotas can exist together with quota-like Or tariff"like non-tariff dis­
tortions or tariffs can exist with different non-tariff obstacles. This 
accounts for the fact mentioned earlier in this section that trade liberal­
ization in terms of reductions in visible tariffs did not achieve the 
success hoped for, Xt is obvious that in many countries non-tariff trade 
obstacles were left or introduced as residual protection. Much of the 
literature on NTB's haw tended to focus on the deleterious effects that
(37  ^ H. Groner, pit., £*35*
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these have on LDC's^^\ These countries seem particularly hard hit
for they are less able to adapt to new requirements imposed by NTB's; 
the production-possibilities frontiers of these countries are more 
restricted and thus these countries frequently cannot conform to the 
rigorous standards required when these are insisted upon Various 
studies have also tended to suggest that the export products of LDC's 
in particular, are discriminated against. These factors could help explain 
the tendency among LDC's to implement an inward-looking trade strategy as a 
policy for development.
3.4 Summary
Until recently the arguments in favour of protection compared to a 
free trade situation were based on the unreality of the assumptions of 
perfect competition which pervaded the theory of comparative advantage,
Tariff protection was thought of as a justifiable intervention because 
the effects of such protection were regarded as a means of increai ing welfare 
in the light of second best conditions. It is however not possible to nrbs 
any generalized a priori statements concerning the various effects of 
protection on the levels of consumption, production revenue and foreign 
tirade in a country. There are too many imponderables and possibilities that 
must be accounted for relating to the nature of the product and the reaction 
to this protection, In terms of the theory of domestic distortions the 
emphasis in evaluating nominal protection was shifted towards assessing the 
effects of alternate forms of intervention and the broad conclusion emerging 
from the vast amount of literature in this connection is that divergencies 
from the ideal of perfect competition are in essence a domestic phenomenon and 
k,ny measures designed to rectify these should be directed at the sources of
H. Groner , Ibid.
See also; ^
I, Walter, 'Non-Tariff Barriers and the Export Performance of
Develping Economies,' Amen, E-on, Review, Papers and Proc, May 1971,
pp.195-205.
h
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these diversions rather nan attempts to correct these divergencies 
through intervention in international trade. Even with the optimum tariff 
concept and the infant-industry argument, doubts arise as to whether these 
can be considered as exceptions to the pursuit of free trade.
Despite this, tariffs are regarded by government as the optimum form 
of intervention and the reason for the popularity of this form of control 
results more from political appeal than from any theoretical arguments to 
justify this form of protection. During the'sixties institutional 
arrangements succeeded to a certain extent in bringing about tariff 
liberalization and reductions in the use of quotas as instruments of control. 
But this served to highlight the use of other trade distorting devices, 
many of which can be regarded as substitutes for tariffs and quotas according 
to whether these affect prices and costs, or sales volumes.
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Tariff-like, non tariff distortions
Advance deposits 
Border tax adjustments 
Credit insurance 
Customs valuation 
Exchange restrictions 
Import surcharges 
Internal transport charges 
Minimum import prices 
Social charges variation 
Variable levies
Quota-like non tariff distortions
Administrative regulations 
Anti-dumping measures 
Buy domestic policies 
Customs classification 
Environmental policies 
Exchange restrictions 
Health requirements 
Import calendars 
Immigration policies 
Investment controls 
Licensing
Marketing standards 
Patents
Safety requirements 
Technical regulations
illlllSliliSE,...
The Brookings Institution, 1970.
CHAPTER 4
THE THEORY OF EFFECTIVE PROTECTION
4,1 Introducbion
The discussion of protective measures presented in Chapter 3 was based 
on the broad assumptions that there exists vertical integration in any 
production function in a country and that tariffs and other measures are 
imposed only on tradeable final products. This state represents an over­
simplification. In reality, one finds that production activities do not 
conform to a pattern of vortical integration and, more important, a sub­
stantial part of international trade consists of intermediate goods that 
are used as inputs in the production of final products. In a broad sense, 
one can define industries as processes that add value to the output of 
previous activities. If there are tariffs or other controls on inputs,the 
industry using these inputs will be at a cost disadvantage compared to a 
free trade situation. As Stern writes, 1 once it is realized that tariffs 
are imposed at differential rates on inputs and final products, the protec­
tion or anti-protection of a tariff structure has to be analysed in terms 
of the effects on the value added by domestic factors of production in the 
various producing activities' *
The concept of effective tariff protection is designed to cope with 
these difficulties. Although economists and tariff-making authorities 
have for long been aware of the implications of tariffs on intermediate
(1) R. Stern, 'Tariffs and Opfier Measures of Trade Control: A survey of
recent developments' J.E*L. Sept 1973» p<8/3»
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inputs, the formal analysis, quantification and ramifications of the concept 
has only emerged recently. Until the concept began to be employed, the 
analysis of tariff protection in various countries proceeded along the lines 
of investigating the levels of nominal tariffs imposed in various goods in 
different countries. Thus, for example, in order to quantify the level of 
protection in various countries, each published tariff was weighted by the 
value of imports in question. Apart from the obvious shortcoming in this 
method of the value of imports itself being affected by the tariff, so chat, 
at the extreme, a tariff of such magnitude so as to shut out imports entirely, 
would result in an understatement of the size of this tariff, there was 
no attempt at*assessing the effects of tariffs imposed on, intermediate inputs.
For any proper Understanding of the theory of protection a discussion of the 
effective protective rate is essential. The rate of effective protection
thus depends '"not only on the tariff on the commodity produced by the activity,
( 3 )
but also on the input coefficients and the tariffs on inputs' ' .
4.2 Early references to the concept
The first real reference to the idea of tariffs on intermediate goods 
affecting levels of protection can be traced to Taussig^ ^. Writing with 
amazing foresight, he describes the effect of the tariff structure existing 
in the United Stated in 1824 concerning the production of woollen goods for 
example. The 1824 tariff increased the duties on w o o l l e n  goods from 25 to 
33 1/3 per cent while the duty on wool was raised from 15 to 30 per cent.
His conclusion in this regard was that manufacturers of woollen goods Were in 
about the same position as before^^, In a footnote he set out to demonstrate
O) W.M, Gorden, "The Structure of a Tariff System and the Effective Protective
Rate", J. Pol it. Econ 74(3), June 1966, p.222
(4) p.w. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States New York, Putman, 1914
^  F.W. Taussig, 0£. cjt.,
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this. On the assumption that the cost of wool represents approximately 
one half of the cost of making woollengoods he compares the 1824 increases 
in duties imposed on these goods with the tariff levels existing prior to 
the increase in terms of a concept of 'net protection1.
Prior to 1824:
Duty on woollen goods
Deduct duty on wool, (one-half of 
15 per cent)
Per cent 
25
U
net protection 17&
1824 tariff:
Duty on woollen goods
Deduct duty on wool (one half of 
30 per cent)
net protection
33J
15
18 1/3
Thus Taussig attempted to take into account the importance of intermediate 
stages of production and to show how tariffs imposed on intermediate goods 
could affect the level of protection on the final good, In both cases, 
nominal protection on woollen goods did not reflect a true level of the pro­
tection accorded the industry as a whole.
Another early reference to the basic ideas of what is today known as 
effective protection can be found in Haberler^. This distinguished trade 
theorist in a section discussing the effects of import duties on the means 
'of production stresses the complementarity inherent in any productive process, 
'One means of production is always used in conjunction with other means, the 
whole making a productive combination of factors. When the price of one 
means, or factor, is raised by an import duty there is a danger that the
G. tiabetlet, The theory of international trade with its applications__tp_ 
commercial policy, London: William Hodge and Co., 1937
demand for other means, with which it is complementary, may fall off also, 
the previous combinations being broken up' < J )  . Haberler continues by 
stating that any tariff on a means of production Increases the price of 
this productive source and raises the cost of the production process, in 
which it is employed. Relating this to the balance of payments effect of 
a tariff, Haber ler argues that if the affected industry is an export industry, 
the effects of cost increases may well diminish exports. It may nappen 
that the decline in exports matches that in imports and thus the balance of 
payments is not affected. Alternatively,a tariff imposed on a raw material 
only i.e. with no tariff imposed on a final good, may even increase imports 
of the final good, in which event the original aim of the tariff, via. to 
increase the local production of the raw material or to curb the general 
level of imports,will not be realised. For example, if a tariff is imposed 
on yarns and not on cloth, the imports of cloth may increase.
Corden(8) argues that these earlier writers did not really discuss the 
concept of effective protection In its true form as it was expressed in
later years, for the references did not consider the possibility of a pro­
tective rate being negative, l.e» actually taxing a particular activity, 
nor did they allude to a free trade effective price - rather a free trade 
nomi^ 'H; price. Thus the concept involved was an adjusted nominal rate.
the first real statement about effective protection was made by Barber, 
in his article concerning tariff policy in Canada^), Bather implies that 
any discussion concerned with the merits of tariff reduction must take into 
account the effective level of a tariff rate, This level may vary widely,
, (7) G. llaberler, op_. cit., p»235.
(8) WiM. corden, The Theory of Protection pp. 245-249
(9) GiLi Barber, 'Canadian Tariff Policy' Can. Journal Econ. and Pol. Sex. , 
pp.513-530, November 1955
depending on the proportion of the final value of an industry s product 
that consists of raw materials and supplies, and on the terms on which 
these can be purchased.
The example used by Barber illustrates well the meaning of the 
c o c i - - of an effective protective rate. If there exists, an ad valorem 
rate 01 duty of 20 per cent on the finished product and raw materials are 
turchased at world market prices and account for one half of the value of
a process, the 20 per cent duty provides the activity with a 40 per cent
amount of protection on the value added by manufacturing. As long as 
raw materials can be purchased at world market prices, the higher the 
ratio of material costs to the value of the final product, the higher is 
the effective level of protection provided by a tariff rate. If the cost 
of materials in this example amounted to three quarters of the final 
selling price, under the assumption of the same rate of duty the effective 
protective rate will now be increased to 80 per cent. If raw materials 
are protected by a tariff the degree to which an industry's level of 
protection exceeds the formal tariff rate becomes reduced. In fact, if 
the tariff rate on intermediate goods is greater than that on the finalized 
product, the effective rate of protection is less than the ad valorem tariff
on the final product.
One can illustrate the relationship between tariffs on inputs and on 
final goods in the following way:
Assume that:
(i) The production of a particular good consists only of the 
transformation of imported intermediate goods into final
goods for sale in the domestic market. thus there are only
two stages of production.
(ii) The selling price of the final good is 100 units without 
any duty imposed on the good.
(iii) Intermediate goods account for one-half of the value of the 
process. Thus the value added of the final stage at world 
market prices is 50 per cent.
Let Tg represent the tariff on the final good or the nominal tariff 
and 'i% the tariff on the intermediate good. Furthermore, let and 
represent the value added on the final stage under protection and free 
trade conditions, respectively.
The effective rate of protection^ can be calculated by taking into 
account the change in domestic value added brought about by protection as
compared to a free trade situation.
V1 " Vo
Expressed simply E = — -n---
t£% P
h
V0
E% Relationship between E
0 0 100 50 50 0 equal
10 0 110 60 50 20
greater
20 10 120 65 50 30 , greater
30 30 130 65 50 30 equal
10 10 110 55 50 10 equal
10 20 110 50 50 0
smaller
0 10 loo 45 50 -10
smaller ,
As is shown in this example, as long as the nominal tariff on final goods 
exceeds the tariff levied on intermediate goods, the effective rate will be 
" greater than the nominal rate.' If the tariff on intermediate goods exceeds 
that on final goods, the effective rate will be less than the nominal rate. 
In the event of the same rate applied to both, the effective and nominal 
rates will be equal,
On relaxing the assumption of a 50 per cent value added in the final 
stage of manufacturing, one gets a different set of results that will vary 
markedly according to the proportion of value added by this stage.
Assuming that the value added in the final stage is 80 per cent,one 
arrives at the following results:
V T.% P lo
E%
10 0 110 90 80 12,5
20 10 120 98' 80 22,5
30 30 130 104 80 30,0
10 20 110 86 80 7,5
10 10 110 88 80 10,0
0 10 100 78 80 -2,5
Thus for the same levels of nominal protection as in the previous example, 
effective rates are lower in this case, where the value added of the final 
stage accounts for a larger proportion of production.
Similarly, assuming that the value added in the final stage represents 
only 20 per cent of the value of production the following results are 
attained:
V
Tj% P h
E%
10 0 110 30 20 50
20 10 120 32 20 60
30 30 130 26 20 30
10 20 110 14 20 -35
0 10 100 12 20 -40
The interesting aspect of these examples is that in addition to 
showing the relationship between tariffs levied on intermediate goods and 
final products, the smaller the value added by the final stage of production, 
the higher will the level of effective protection be. Under the assumption 
of a 50 per cent value added, a tariff on final output of 10 per cent and no 
tariff levied on intermediate production yields an effective level of 20 per 
cent. If the final stage process accounts for 80 per cent, the effective 
rate falls to 12 per cent under the same conditions, while a 20 per cent 
value added for final production yields a 50 per cent rate of effective i
protection. Thus it could be argued that those local producers who enjoy 
a high rate of effective protection may be reluctant to increase the value 
added of the final stage of production,for this would entail a reduction in 
the level of effective protection.
Barber(10) applied the nominal-effective .distinction 'to Canada's tariff policj 
The relationship between effective and apparent levels partly explains 
the practice, common among tariff-making authorities all over the world 
and implied by the earlier writers on the subject, of placing comparatively 
low rates of duty on raw or partially-processed materials, somewhat higher 
rates on semi-finished goods and still higher rates on the finished product.
An interesting point made by Barber in a footnote^  ^ concerns the 
effect that fluctuations in raw material prices over a business cycle exert on 
tta level of effective protection, when tariffs are expressed in ad valorem 
terms, father than by specific duties. Dating a period of prosperity the 
ratio of the cost of materials to the value of the product may he significantly 
higher than during a period of,depression, and in order to maintain the same 
level of effective protection, duties will have to be changed accordingly, 
in addition to stressing the obvious need to take into account effective 
rates rather than nominal rates in any tariff negotiations or tariff liberal-
<l0) B arber, ojj. e i t . ,
Bafbet?i op. cit., p<524.
isation programme, Barber also discusses how effective protective rates 
influence the pattern of development in a country. High rates of protection 
on final j;oods induce 'a wide range of assembly operations’ rather than 
integrated operations for manufacturing in various stages. Because of 
the relationship between value added at various stages and levels of 
effective protection, high effective rates induce producers to produce 
only the final processes and discourage taking production further back 
along a process because of the reduction in effective protection that 
would arise. For example, in the assembly of motor cars, if parts and 
components are not subject to duty, the effective protection derived from 
a given tariff on motor cars will be higher, the larger the proportion 
of parts and components that are imported or produced domestically on an 
unprotected basis. Placing a tariff only on final goods will encourage 
mainly the production of those goods.
At about the same time as Barber's article appeared, James Meade 
made reference to a similar co" pt in his important work written during 
the f i f t i e s . Meade, however, did not develop the concept, nor did 
he feel that it justified mention elsewhere in his work. What Meade 
did was to reduce the concept to an arithmetic calculation. Using the 
example of the production of shirts, Meade shows that imposing a $2 duty 
on a shirt the world price of which is $10 and the raw material content
amounts to $4 (assuming this is admitted free of duty) does not represent
2 * 
an effective rate of 20 per cent (i.e. ^ 2  2.  ^^Ut a tate Protecting the
manufacture of shirts (i.e. the value of the shirt less the raw cotton
2
content) amounting to 33 1/3 per cent (i.e. ).
J.E. Meade, Trade and Welfare, p. 157, pp. 162-163.
With the main ideas involved becoming increasingly accepted, the theory 
of effective protection became a much-discussed and researched topic during
(13)
the nineteen sixties. Notable contributors to the theory included Johnson 
Basevi(^\ Balassa(^) &nd Corden^*). The work of these contributors 
included formulating the concept and applying measures of effective 
protection to various countries. As the measure became increasingly 
studied and applied, several limitations of the measure became apparent and 
more recent work on effective protection has tended to concentrate on these
limitations.
4.3 The recent formulation of effective protection
There are several reasons for effective protection emerging as a 
quantifiable and usable tool of analysis only during the past decade, in 
spite of several earlier aversions to as;acts of the concept. One of the 
reasons mentioned in the previous chapter was that, until recently, many 
of the issues involved in tariff theory simply implied comparing tariffs 
with a free trade situation rather than accepting tariffs and protection 
as a second best alternative. This type of analysis invited the use of 
nominal rather than effective protection. Another factor is that until 
recently,much, of international trade theory concentrated on developed 
countries and neglected the role of trade policy in LDG's. Many indus­
trializing countries recently experienced enormous problems in formulating 
a trade strategy for development and in this more dynamic context concen­
trating on nominal tariffs was a pointless exercise. It is significant
(13) 11,G, Johnson, 'The Theory of the Tariff Structure with Special 
Reference to World Trade and Development1, in Aspects of the Theory of 
Tariffs 1971
(14) g . Basevi, 'The U.S. Tariff Structures Estimates of Effective Rates^
of Protection of U.Si Industries and Industrial Labour', Rev. Ec> and Stats
„ c. 48(2) pp.47-1 GO, May 1966. „ 1 , ,
( B, BalaSsa, 'Tariff Protection in Industrial Countries: An Evaluation i
Ji Politi Econ 73(6) pp.573-94 , December 1965
(16) WiMi Cordon, 'The Tariff', in Alex Hunter (ed.) The Economics of 
Australian Industry
that much of the work on effective rates of protection was performed in 
countries such as Israel, Canada, Australia, Latin America, India and 
Pakistan where many of these problems were prevalent. But perhaps the 
most important factor was the recent emergence of a sophisticated tool of 
inter-industry economics via. input-output analysis, provided by Wassily 
Leontief during the fifties. The application of this type of analysis 
to effective protection presented economists with an ideal instrument of 
assessing value added and applying tariff rates to various stages of any 
productive process. This meant that trade theory could now be extended 
beyond the partial equilibrium - two-good type of model.
(i) The Corden formulation for effective protection
The most frequently-used formulation is that of Corden's and 
the notation used here will follow his conventional notation. Corden^^ 
presents an algebraic formulation based on the following assumptions:
a)„ the physical input-output coefficients are all fixed, for 
all firms in an industry.
b) the elasticities of demand for all exports and supply of 
all imports are infinite - the small country assumption.
c) all tradeable goods remain traded even after tariffs have 
been imposed so that the internal price of each importable is given by the 
foreign price plus the tariff.
Consider the case of an importable product, j, which has only 
a single input that is also importable, i. On the assumption that there
are no taxes and subsidies affe 'ting j and i other than an import tariff,
Corden derives the effective protective rate for the activity producing j. 
Let
Vj = value added per unit of j in activity j in the absence of tariffs;
v. = value added per unit of j in activity j made possible by the tariff
structure;
(17)
gj = effective protective rate for activity j;
Pj = price of a unit of j in the absence of tariffs;
= share of i in cost of j in absence of tariffs;
tj = tariff rate on j;
t^ == tariff rate nn i.
The value added per unit of j in activity j in the absence and presence of 
tariffs is then
(1) Vj = Pj (l-a^)
(2) Vj = Pj ( l + t j ) " ^  /)
I
v.-v.
(3) 8 3 - ^
J
t . - a . .  t .
(4) g. = — from equations (1) (2) and (3)
y  " 1-a..
1J
JFormula v4), can be. extended into any number of importable inputs into the
product as follows:
b'LVi
(5) Bj - — J— —
(5.1) ^  " V,
Expressed verbally, Corden. defines the effective protective
*
rate as the ' percentage increase in value added per unit in an economic 
activity which is made possible by the tariff structure relative to the
s i t u a t i o n  in  the  absence of t a t l f f s ' ^ G ) ,  i t  measures th e  percen tage  by
which the domestic value added in an industry in question ceeds the value 
added in that industry when all inputs and outputs are valued at free trade 
world prices. Looking at the more simplified expression:
(3) = I f — L
vj
(18) W.M. Cordon, Ibid. , p. 222.
(19) du Plessis, 'Effective Tariff Protection in South Africa’, SAJE
44(2) pp.158-170, June 1976
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where g. represents the effective rate of protection, v^  the 
value added in industry j at domestic market prices and Vj the value added 
at world prices, one can on this basis interpret the effective rate of 
protection in a number of different ways(19). If Vj refers to the value 
added per unit of output under free trade and Vj the value under tariffs 
of the primary inputs used per unit of output in the free trade situation 
and i f  on ly  one prim ary inpu t i s  u sed ,  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  r e f e r s  to  the  
p ro p o r t io n a l  change in  th e  p r i c e  of th a t  in p u t  r e s u l t i n g  from th e  im position  
of tariffs. More generally, it measures the stimulus to growth m  
industry j stemming from the tariff system, without incorporating any 
reactions to that stimulus . Alternatively if v. refers to the value 
added per u n i t  a f t e r  s u b s t i t u t i o n  between primary and secondary f a c to r s  
i t  ta k es  in to  account th e  r e a c t io n  to  th e  growth s t im u lu s .  In  a d d i t io n ,  
v ,  and v! may be in te r p r e te d  as th e  t o t a l  v a lu e  add d b e fo re  and a f t e r  the  
im po s it io n  of t a r i f f s ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  in  which case  i t  r e p re se n ts  a more 
dynamic in d ic a t io n  of the  r e s u l t a n t  growth in  va lue  added in  th e  in d u s try  
concerned.
t i
84.
'It is essentially in terms of the second and third interpretations 
that the most accurate depiction of the effective rate of protection is 
most commonly alluded to. The essence of the definition attempts to
phrase protection in such a way as to refer to the shift in domestic
resources arising out of a certain tariff structure. Balassa, perhaps 
provides the most acceptable description of the effective rate _ protection. 
'The effective rate of protection expresses the margin of protection on 
value added in the production process rather than on the product price.
It is defined as the percentage excess of domestic value added, obtainable 
by reason of the imposition of tariffs and other protective measures on the 
product and its inputs, over foreign or world market value-added. Thus, 
while the nominal rate of protection pertains to the product and affects 
decisions taken by consumers, the effective rate of protection indicates 
the joint effects on the processing activity of tariffs on the product 
itself and on its inputs and it influences the producer's choice' ,
(ii) The appeal of the concept
Several empirical studies have been performed attempting to
measure effective rates of protection for • irious countries . These
results have indicated that tariff st, in many developed count res
show certain common characteristics that have helped explain some of the
common features resulting from a tariff structure. The application of
the measures to developing countries have yielded even more interesting
results. These findings have led to a widespread appeal for the use of
effective protective rates as an important tool in international trade and
»
economic development, 1
b . Balassa, 'The Structure of Protection in Developing Cfdntri.es.', 
Baltimore, John Hopkins Brass, 1971* p.4#
(21) See, for example, B, Balassa, o£, cit., I. Little et al. Industry 
and trade in developing countries* R,E. Baldwin Non-tariff distortions 
in international trade,
The patterns of effective protection offer explanations for the 
universal tendency of escalation or cascading in tariff structures.
Tariffs on final goods tend to be far higher than on intermediate goods and 
raw materials, All the various studies show that effective rates ate 
lowest on primary commodities, followed by intermediate goods at lower,then 
higher stages of fabrication, and finally are highest for consumer goods. 
Thus,for most products,the effective rate exceeds the nominal rate in many 
countries both developed and less developed.
Related to the above, one can trace the impact of escalation 
on the commodity composition of international trade. The existing tariff 
structure in advanced countries, which is characterized by low protective 
levels for raw materials and high rates of duty on finished prodr ts has 
tended to bias imports from less developed countries towards unprocessed 
primary products rather than manufactured goods. Thus one can partially 
attribute the general heavy concertration in exports of primary products 
from less developed countries to this factor.
The concept of effective protection has also helped explain 
why several attempts at tariff liberalization have failed. Merely reducing 
nominal rates of protection on various goods is insufficient to bring about 
true tariff liberalization, Depending on what goods tariffs are reduced, 
and depending on the inputs and productive activities involved, one could 
find that tariff reductions could well increase the level of protection 
in a particular activity.
In addition, the ideas inherent in the concept of effective 
protection can possibly account for the similarity in many of the patterns 
of industrialization followed by less developed countries. Many of these
i
countries tend to follow a strategy for industrialization that begins with 
the substitution of domestically-produced goods for goods that were pre­
viously imported. The type of goods frequently produced are consumer goods,
Once the initial phases of the import replacement boom are completed many 
countries find it increasingly difficult to capitalise on further opportunities 
for growth, for seldom do import-replacement industries convert themseJves 
into export-oriented industries „ Furthermore, many countries experience 
severe difficulties in extending import substitution beyond the initial 
stages. More will be said about this at a later -age, but for the present 
both these tendencies can be explained in terms of the type of protection 
policies followed by LDC's that are conducive to this type of development.
As, regards the characteristic that LDC's find it increasingly 
difficult to extend the import-substituting process to more intermediate 
stages of production, it is unlikely that the authorities in these 
countries will attempt to encourage this type of production by increasing 
duties on intermediate goods thus reducing the protection accorded to producers 
of final goods.
Another oft-cited tendency regarding production trends in indus­
trializing countries is the adoption of a capital-intensive technology rather 
than making use of the vast pools of labour that are prevalent in many of 
these countries. Once more, the policies of attempting to protect final 
stages of manufacturing and providing high levels of effective protection 
for consumer goods, for example, by levying low duties on capital equipments 
encourage the use of capital equipment in the production process and so a 
capital-intensive bias with capital equipment being relatively undervalued.
The introduction of analysis of tariff policy in terms of 
effective rates rather than nominal rates and the numerical measures of 
such protection in various countries has elevated the concept of effective 
protection to a new status. In terms of effective protection many of the 
problems of international trade are better understood. Moreover, because 
of the emphasis on production activities rather than consumption,its 
application to the relationship between international trade and economic 
development has resulted in the intellectual acceptance of the concept as 
a useful instrument in studying the problems of less developed countries 
in particular. Through studying tariff protection in this light one can 
better appreciate the many problems faced by countries striving to indus­
trialize. The similarity in the results attained in various empirical 
studies of levels of effective protection in different countries tend to 
refute the suggestions of Marxist-oriented theorists who ascribe the plight 
of LDC's solely to exploitation by various colonial powers. Many of the 
problems encountered in these countries can be attributed to the domestic 
policies followed by governments in these countries in their attempts to 
encourage industrialization. The analysis of protection in terms of various 
stages of industrialization processes is a useful instrument in relating 
international trade and economic development and for this reason the concept 
of effective protection has widespread appeal.
(iii) Difficulties in measurement and conceptual problems
Lest it be thought that effective protective measures,such as 
have been devised ty Corden*represent an ideal measure with which to analyse 
policy, it is worthwhile analysing some of the problems associated with it, 
''for indeed there has been a proliferation of literature on the subject.
Firstly there are microtis practical difficulties involved. 
Input-output analysis has only been used over the past twenty years or so
and it! is. virtually impossible to calculate effective protective rates 
for various countries over a time span beyond this period, Furthermore, 
the difficulties in comparing effective rates between different years 
within this time span for a single country according to different input- 
output tables are subject to the same difficulties involved in inter- 
censal comparison. A different value added can arise as a result of 
improved statistical technique rather than the result of a resource flow. 
Also the production of input-output tables in a country is infrequent 
because of the difficulties involved in compiling such tables, so that 
one cannot frequently compare effective rates over time. In South Africa 
over the past 20 years there have been three such tables produced for 1956- 
57, 1963-64 and 1.967. Each of these tables has a different classification
for various sectors. In the 1956/7 table there were 48 sectors while in
1963/4 and 1967 th;re were 36 and 52 sectors, respectively.
In addition, the use of these tables are limited to those 
countries where there exists some sophistication of technique as far as the 
collection and collation of statistics are concerned. It is highly un­
likely that many of the EDO's have available such statistics and,if they do, 
whether these are in fact accurate. As far as inter-country comparisons 
of effective rates of protection are concerned the fact that many countries 
have different classifications of various industries in their input-output 
tables render such comparisons pointless.
Apart from the statistical difficulties involved in computing 
and constructing input-output tables t^are are several problems involved in 
assessing nominal rates of protection, which enter the calculation of 
effective rates. Several studies have simply calculated these by dividing 
the duties by the total imports for a sector which implies an unweighted 
average of duties and disregards those duties that are totally restrictive.
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In addition, one has to assess nominal rates for sectors which conform to 
the input —output classification and as the classifications included in 
tariff schedules are vastly different to the classification according to 
the input-output table some adjustments have to be made. The broad 
levels of aggregation frequently encountered in input-output tables render 
many of the conclusions invalid. Many sectors produce goods for both
intermediate and final uses and to separate out the protected activities
and to attempt to assign values of protection to these according to a 
nominal tariff schedule is a difficult exercise.
Apart from these practical difficulties, there exist several 
theoretical shortcomings in the calculation of effective rates of protection. 
One of the most debated aspects in the literature of effective protection 
revolves around the ptoolem of how to deal with non traded inputs in 
calculating effective protection. In the Corden method cited above, non- 
traded inputs are considered as being affected or protected in the same way 
as primary inputs and these are included in the calculation of the value 
added. Corden then assumes that while traded goods are infinitely elastic, 
the supply of non-ttaded inputs is not likely to be so elastic as that of 
traded goods, and prices of non-traded inputs tend to rise as production 
expands in response to greater protection. Even though it is impossible 
to separate the price gains to these inputs from those of primary factors, 
Gordon's ERP measure is calculated on the value added by primary factors
plus the value added by non-trade^ inputs.
Balassa^23  ^ assumes that non-traded inputs are in infinitely 
elastic supply and the prices of these vary by the amount by which protection 
raises or reduces the cost of material inputs used in their production.
Thus Balassa omits these from the value added. This accounts for the 
tendency in the results for effective protection calculated by the Corden
B. Balassa, og_. cit., pp. 17-18.
method being lower than those using the Balassa method. Gorden includes 
non-traded inputs In botli the denominator and numerator, while Balassa 
excludes non-traded inputs from the denominator.
Another conceptual difficulty concerns the partial-equilibrium
assumption of the linear and homogeneous production function incorporated i
in a., between the domestic and world sicuation. This necessarily assumes :
U
that the input coefficients remain unchanged, Protection may in fact !
induce changes in these coefficients so that the ERP measure will not be j
able to predict the domestic resource shift consequent on the change in ;
tariff structure. Anderson and Naya^^ state that the assumption that 
input/output relationships remain the same before and after the imposition 
of tariffs is convenient and necessary,since information is only available 
for a protected state. Any change in domestic price relationships could 
bring about substitution between primary and intermediate inputs and so 
alter the input coefficients. The observation that effective rates tend to 
exceed nominal rates has been attributed to tariff escalation but it may j
just as well be attributable to an overstatement of the effective fate. |
6
The problem arises from an inability to use the input-output table for a j
country in a free trade situation - only a post tariff situation* (
I
A similar problem arises when one considers the effects of economies of scale. $ 
Such economies could well affect the share of inputs and remuneration to %
various factors. But these are necessarily assumed not to be relevant. . :
I f  one allows for variable factor proportions and general equilibrium j
!
repercussions Tan argues that rankings °f effective protection do not '
necessarily provide any index of economic efficiency even i . the presence :
i
of negative value added, that effective protection rates do not measure the !
maximum proportionate increase in factor rewards and the rankings of effective
_ ] ..y
J. Anderson and S. Naya, 'Substitution and Two Concepts of Effective 
Rate of Protection', American Econ* Review, 59, Sept 1969, p.607
(95')
protection do not unambiguously indicate the direction p £  resource flows .
Another fundamental problem in connection with the conventional 
formulation of the effective rate of protection measure is that its relation­
ship to wp] fare analysis tends to be obscure. Ruff in has shown that 
under the assumption that imported intermediate goods are not produced 
domestically, the effective tariff concept has a strong theoretical 
foundation. However, he argues, the application of the effective 
tariff concept to a multi-commodity world brings about the difficulty that 
effective protection of one industry can only be measured relative to some 
base industry to which the industry in question is compared.„ ..Thus two different
base industries may lead to entirely different results. Apart from this,
Ruffin proves that when imported intermediate goods are produced at home 
the welfare foundations of the effective tariff disappear completely.
Under this, condition the effective rate tends to be biased (in the sense 
that an industry may still be protected or injured as compared to free 
trade output even when the effective rate is zero) and inefficient (implying 
that a higher rate of effective protection may be better than a lower rate).
The analysis thus far regarding the concept of effective 
protection has concentrated only on tariff protection. All that has been 
considered is the difference in value added contributed by domestic primary 
resources with and without a tariff structure. As was pointed out in the 
previous chapter, non-tariff barriers exist and can be regarded as an 
important form of protection. The existence of non-tariff barriers causes 
divergence between domestic and foreign prices, hence a difference in 
domestic value added from what would be in a world without these barriers,
(25) A.H.H. Tan, ’Differential Tariffs, Negative Value Added and the Theory 
of Effective Protection1 , Amer, Kcon. Rev., 60* pp,107-116* 1970,
(26) R. Ruffin, ’Tariffs* Intermediate Goods, and Domestic Protection’V 
Amer, Rcon, Rev,* 59, pp.261-269, June 1969
Various authors have attempted to include the protective effect of these
other distortions using the ERP formulation, Waters, for example, in his
study of the effects of transportation costs on the level of protection in
the United States, finds that excluding transport costs from consideration
not only understates the level of protection for domestic vis-a-vis foreign
resources, but also significantly alters the pattern of protection among
industries in the sense that the escalation in tariff structures appears to
(27)
be partially offset by de-escalation in freight factors
The most comprehensive attempt to assess non-tariff barriers
/OQ \
empirically was undertaken by Baldwin . He argues that:
'An important feature of the effective protection concept is that any 
measure whose effect on input or output prices can be expressed in per-unit 
terms can be introduced into the formula. It is possible, therefore, to 
estimate net rates of effective protection that take into account many non- 
tariff distortions as well as tariffs. For example, quotas - like tariffs - 
raise the effective rate of protection on final products but decrease the 
protection for those items t'*it use the products as intermediate inputs.
An export subsidy causes the domestic price of a subsidized product to rise 
as producers shift their sales to international markets; it therefore 
increases the effective rate of protection..on Value added just as a tariff 
d„eS<29>' .
Baldwin attempts to calculate effective protection arising 
from tariff and non-tariff measures together and non-tariff measures 
separately. His findings suggest that the most important distortions are 
domestic price-increasing measures in the agricultural sector, quotas in 
other sector8* the American selling price system for chemical products, 
federal exercise taxes the federal transport tax, state and local retail
W.G. Waters , 'Transport Costs, Tariffs and the Fattern of Industrial
Protection', Amer. Econ. Rev. 60, 1970, pp.1013-1020.
R.Ei Baldwin, Non tariff distortions of international trade 
^9) % Baldwin, oji, oil:., p,151.
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taxes, and the federal subsidy to highway transportation. His calculations 
include use of both the Balassa and Cordon methods. He estimates that the 
relative magnitude of effecti'.. protection due to NTB's was 19 per cent in 
1958, 15 per cent in 1964 and he anticipated that these would increase as a
response to tariff reductions.
Mauer and Van de Gevel voice doubt regarding Baldwin's approach^ \  
Baldwin attempts to translate various distortions into price equivalents but 
does not indicate how these are arrived at. In addition there are several 
non-tariff barriers that are initially impossible to include in this type of
measure by converting them into a price effect. Barriers such as administrative
hindrances or delays, and quantitative import restrictions can be cited in 
this regard. ’Baldwin himself acknowledges that he has chosen a limited 
number of categories in his study and one of the Conclusions reached by 
Mauer and Van de Gevel in this connection is that Baldwin's estimates should 
be considered as underestimates. In addition to these specific criticisms
on Baldwin's results, there is in his study no refinement nor attempt to take .
into account some of the more fundamental criticisms voiced previously 
concerning the theoretical validity of the effective protective measure.
4,4 Summary
In contributions to the theory of international trade, economists have 
fo r  long concentrated on trade in final commodities. The traditional 
th e o ry  o f  com parative advantage and the  a n a ly s i s  of v a r io u s  t r a d e - d i s to r t i n g  
measures were both undertaken under this framework, While this si-nUfica- 
t lo n  may have been a p p ro p r ia te  a t  the  time the o r ig in a l  theo ry  of comparative 
advantage was formulated, its usefulness in a world where production and 
t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  have become in c re a s in g ly  complex i s  l im i te d .  At p re s e n t ,
WO) W,J, Mauer and A.J.W, Van de GeVe1* 'N on-T ariff  D is to r t io n s  in
international Trade: A Methodological Review, pp, 63 and 64.
any study of protection is insufficient if it is framed according to the 
traditional assumption that domescic producers and consumers respond to the 
price-raising effects of tariffs and other protective measures by expanding 
production and reducing consumption of that commodity which is being protected 
While the introduction of raw material and intermediate inputs in the product­
ion process does not affect the decisions of consumers, they will continue to 
react in the way indicated to changes in price - it is for the producer that 
tariffs on final output as well as on raw materials and intermediate inputs 
become relevant. This is what the theory of effective protection attempts 
to study. The effective rate of protection expresses the margin of protect­
ion on value added in the production process rather than on the product price. 
It is defined as the percentage excess of domestic value added, that arises 
as a result of the imposition of tariffs and other protective measures on 
the product as well as its inputs, over the free trade tr world market value 
added. Effective protection thus influences producers' decisions and the 
allocation of resources among industries.
As a result of these ramifications the concept of effective protection 
appears to be a far more promising analytical tool than nominal protection, 
in assessing the effects of a protective policy and,more specifically,how a 
protective policy has influenced the pattern of economic development in a 
country. However, it must he emphasized that this conceptual tool is still 
in an early stage of development. There are numerous theoretical onceptual 
and practical problems associated with it, and this has accounted for the vast 
amount of literature that has arisen over the past few years attempting to 
.improve and provide a better understanding of the concept. Judging from 
various debates on the. issue much work still requires to be done.
In spite of the many limitations of the concept one cannot dismiss 
the value of this type of analysis. In the conclusion to Cordon's 
book^^\ the author implies an interesting parallel between effective 
protective rates and the theory of consumer surplus. Referring to the 
theory of consumer surplus, Cordon writes that this simple intuitively 
appealing idea on carefu] examination turned out to require many assumptions 
for its validity and as a result purists tended to dismiss it as 'a 
totally useless theoretical toy'. But he argues that it has such strong 
intuitive appeal and there is nothing better available, so people keep on 
using it. 'Theorists' Cordon writes, 'should provide some useful concepts 
that their pt* .tical colleagues or they themselves, can test and use. They 
should certainly help explain the limitations and necessary qualifications 
of the concepts, But theory does not have to be contrary to common-sense 
and the qualifications to a theory need not necessarily overwhelm, Its 
simple message, rather, they should be regarded as signposts to further 
development' .
(3^ ) W.M. Corden. The Theory of Protection, p.243.
CHAPTER 5
TARIFF PROTECTION AMD THE PATTERN OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
5.1 Introduction
The application of a policy of protection in any country is not only 
based on a consistent and deliberate plan of action, but in addition can 
be considered to be a historical result of decisions taken at different 
.imes and for various reasons. These are the product of particular 
circumstances and situations. In some countries the influence and demands 
of special pressure gro-pr may have influenced policy. Frequently, 
t a r i f f - m a k i n g . authorities have yielded to requests for protection, without 
enquiring adequately, if at all, into the impact of these measures on 
other industries, the allocation of resources and the pattern of economic
growth.
Until the introduction of the concept of effective protection, any 
such scudy was necessarily restricted to the effects of tariffs on final 
output. Hi' the development and improved understanding of the concept 
of effective pr.-cection it is possible to gain a better appreciation of the 
effects of protective policy by relating such effects not only to the 
objective actually pursued but according to the multiplicity of interests 
and objectives in a country. Thus the nature of the effective protection 
concept, in that indicates the extent of protection on various ac 'vities 
rather than solely on final products, enables one to evaluate better how the 
protective structure influences productive activities. The emphasis is 
shifted from the price effect (which is of relevance to consumers) to the 
productive effect. In general, a high level of protection on an effective
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5,1 Introduction
The application of a policy of protection in any country is not only 
based on a consistent and deliberate plan of action, but in addition Can 
be considered to be a historical result of decisions taken at different 
times and for various reasons. These are the product of particular 
circumstances and situations. In some countries the influence and demands 
of special pressure groups may have influenced policy. Frequently, 
tariff-making-authorities have yielded to requests for protection, without 
enquiring adequately, if at all, into the impact of these measures on 
other industries, the allocation of resources and the pattern of economic 
growth.
Until the introduction of the concept of effective protection, any 
such study was necessarily restricted to the effects of tariffs on final 
output. With the development and improved understanding of the concept 
of effective protection it is possible to gain a better appreciation of the 
effects of protective policy by relating such effects not only to the 
objective actually pursued but according to the multiplicity of interests 
and objectives m  a country. Thus the nature of the effective protection 
concept, in that it indicates the extent of protection on various activities 
rather than solely on final products, enables One to evaluate better how the 
protective structure influene&s productive activities. The emphasis is 
shifted from the price effect (which is of relevance to consumers) to the 
productive effect• In general, a high level of protection on an effective
basis indicates the stimulus given to producers in any particular activity, 
and if there exists a small element of consistency in the patterns of 
protection in various countries these will have a decisive influence in 
the development pattern in these countries.
The various empirical studies of effective protection in many countries 
have shown a certain uniformity in their results. Effective protection is, 
on average, higher than nominal protection in the industrial sector, both 
in rich countries and poor, because of the phenomenon of tariff cascading 
or escalation, i.e. the prai. ’ ice of levying higher import duties the higher 
is the degree of fabricat The structure of effective protection in
developing countries is such as to favour import-substituting industries 
relative to export processing or otherwise outward-oriented industries.
One can argue that a part of this bias is intensified by the industrial 
protection offered to their own processors by the developed nations, but 
as will be shown later, high levels of effective protection contain an 
inherent bias towards import substitution to the detriment of exporters. 
Another characteristic feature of the structure of protection is that 
consumer goods have received relatively far more protection than either 
intermediate products or capital goods in less developed countries.
This chapter attempts to show the usefulness of the concept of effective 
rates of protection in analysing the pattern of economic growth in a country. 
kn addition, import substitution and export expansion are compared as 
development strategies.and the pattern of growth in the South African 
economy over the past 50 years is examined. By stimulating import sub­
stitution at the ex' > & of export production, various countries have 
experienced severe problems in the later stages of the process. This 
appears true for South Africa as well. The patterns of protection and the 
type of import substitution that these have given rise to, are offered 
as explanations of the apparent failure of a development strategy such as
import substitution as a continuing growth process. The question is 
thus posed as to whether the experiences of several countries that have, 
via their protective policies, implemented import substituting industrial­
ization in a particular way should constitute an indictment of the process 
as a whole. Finally an attempt will be made to offer an optimal tariff 
policy that may increase the rate of growth in lesser developed countries.
5.2 The influence of tariffs on the productive structure
By definition, the motive behind tariff protection in any particular 
country is to restrict foreign competition and, thus, either directly or 
indirectly provide an incentive for firms to produce for the domestic 
market,. In addition, tariffs contain a bias
against exporting. The general line of reasoning is that in iie domestic 
market, producers obtain the tariff-inclunive domestic price while (in the 
absence of export subsidies) export sales receive the world market price. 
Furthermore, unless the firm is somehow compensated for tariffs paid on 
imported materials, it has to pay the same price on material inputs, whether 
these are used for domestic production or for exports.
The following numerical example adopted from Balassa^ illustrates 
the bias.
Assume that the free market price of an item of clothing is R100 and 
the cost of material inputs is R60. The world market value added in 
clothing is thus R40. A 20 per cent tariff on clothing raises the domestic 
price to R120 while a 10 per cent duty on textiles increases the material 
Costs to the domestic producer to R,66. Protection thus enables firms to 
operate with a value added of R54 - the difference between the domestic 
price of clothing and the cost of materials - compared with a free market 
value added of R40. If the producer were to produce for export, in order 
to compete successfully in the export market, he would have to sell clothing
^  B. Balassa, The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries, p.5 
and p.9.
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at tha world market: price of R100. With inputs costing R66 the value 
added in exporting would only be R34 compared to the value added of ''4 
when producing for the domestic market.
For any given industiv, the extent of the bias against exporting can 
be expressed by calculating the percentage excess of domestic value added 
in import substitution over that obtainable in exporting* One can express 
the bias according to the following:
where X. refers to the bia§ in favour of an industry producing for
i
the domestic market.
W. refers to the domestic value added
Y. refers to the value added obtainable in exporting 
i
Apart from the bias expressed by the above example* there are several 
other ways by which high levels of effective protection adversely affect 
exports from a country. As regards the exports of primary products, uhere 
exists.the possibility that the protection of inputs used by these industries 
is so high as to adversely affect these industries,: isulting in negative 
protective rates. Primary exporters could thus be taxed by such a protective 
structure. As an example one can look at agriculture. Since increasing 
productivity in agriculture depends on increasing use of manufactured 
inputs, if duties were levied on such inputs, protection could be considered 
to deter agricultural progress and exports of agricultural goods. Johnson 
. raises att interesting issue in this connection*'2'*, He argues that protect­
ion may produce a vicious circle of self-justifying policy measures* in 
which tariff authorities* starting from the assumption that agriculture
(%) h ,G. Johnson, Aspects of the Theory of Tariffs, London, Allen and Unwin,
1971, 'p.105
offers little scope for growth, adopt a policy of heavy industrial 
protectionism to promote development. By doing so they further retard
' the development of agriculture, The effect on the exports and output
. (3 )
of mining can also be similarly analysed •
As far as the effects on manufactured exports are concerned, the 
above example illustrates the bias against these, Hig, levels of 
tariffs together with overvalued currency rates largely explain why in 
many countries that exhibit high rates of protection,exports of manu­
factured goods fare badly,
Thus it appears that the rationale for tariff protection in many 
less developed countries appears to have been primarily to encourage the 
establishment of domestic production of substitutes for imports, thus 
inducing a particular type of industrialization in these countries.
5,3 import substitution and export promotion as development strateg_i^ eS
The debate concerning import substitution and export promotion as 
alternative strategies for economic development has dominated much of 
the literature on the economies of development, as well as the decisions 
of policy makers in less developed countries. During the nineteenth 
and earlier part of the twentieth century, international trade had proved 
a major source of economic growth in many countries. The pattern of 
trade during this period was influenced by Adam Smith's extolment of the 
benefits of specialisation, The international division of labour and 
international trade were considered mechanisms that enabled each country 
to specialise and to export those'goods and services that it could 
produce cheaper in exchange for what others could provide at a lower 
cost. Thus economic wellbeing was promoted, national income was in" 
creased and the advance in economic Growth was regarded as a way of .....
O) For a discussion on 'the effects of tariff protection on the gold mining
industry in South Africa see A, 13, Lumby, Tariffs and Gold in South
Africa 1886-1939) South African journal of Economics, 44(2), June 1976
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escaping the barriers of poverty. Trade was thus thought of as an 
engine of growth; enabling countries to exhibit surplus resources of 
land and labour that had hitherto no economic outlet, It was believed 
that trade facilitated an improvement in skills and education through 
the employment of workers in trade—iriented sectors. Furthermore, 
trade was said to stimulate invention and discovery and provide material 
means and capital for expansion and development. Post-depression economics 
emphasized the need for countries to diversify their production beyond that 
of supplying primary commodities as a means of achieving increased develop­
ment, These export-led theories with their free trade assumptions were 
rejected after the depression for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
predictions inherent in these theories, that primary export production 
automatically enhances and ensures development, did not materialize, If 
anything, these led to suggestions that more developed countries were able 
to develop at the expense of primary producing countries. Furthermore, 
as prices on international commodity markets dropped sharply, owing to the 
slowdown in the growth in output in more developed countries or to the 
development of synthetic or substitute products, the development of primary 
producing countries was retarded.
Another important reason for the strong appeal of import substitution 
for developing countries was that it was associated with industrialization 
and modernization, thus the generative effects on employment were thought 
to be far greater than was the case with primary production. The fact that 
employment opportunities were severely limited in agriculture and mining, 
when compared to secondary industry, served as a stimulus to governments 
committed to policies of rapid economic growth and full employment to 
follow a path of industrialization through import replacement. It was 
against this background that import-substituting industrialization was 
almost universally adopted as the easiest, most logical and politically 
feasible way or 'aveloping. As far as the decision as to what goods to 
produce, such a form of industrialization offered a ready-made solution - 
simply produce those goods that are imported in large amounts. Governments 
could ensure that local production could be diverted to the substitution of 
previously imported goods, by applying selective controls in the form of 
tariffs, import controls, quotas etc. on imports. By reducing competition 
and assuring a local market, governments provided a positive inducement for 
domestic producers to manufacture these products locally. As the first 
stages of the process simply involve the local assembly and finishing of 
final consumer goods, it was firmly believed that this process was highly 
labour intensive and would not require vast amounts of capital - a 
scarce factor in less developed countries; hence the conclusion about the 
labour-generating effects. It was also believed that the replacement of 
imports would improve the balance of payments deficit in these countries, 
by reducing the volume of imported goods. In addition, arguments m  
.favour of import substitution stressed the reduced dependence on mote 
developed countries that would accompany increasing import substitution.
It was thus considered to be a vehicle fostering the economic independence
in these countries.
As a result of these factors, import substitution was to become a 
widely-accepted and universally-implemented development strategy, thought 
suitable to overcome the problems of less developed countries * After 
about thirty years of this type of industrialization, many countries began 
to experience severe disillusionment with the policy. A reconsideration 
of the merits of import substitution and analysis of the causes of failure 
occurred. The role of tariff protection that was implemented to encourage 
this pattern of industrialization played a large part in the failure in 
many of these countries. The trends in thinking that emerged in the late 
sixties re-emphasized the important role of comparative advantage and 
modified the arguments in terms of export-based industrialization as a 
olution to the problems.
Much of the literature concerning the trends in import substitution 
has focussed on the Latin American experience but studies of import sub­
stitution in other countries yield similar conclusions. In the early
phases of the process, with markets guaranteed as a result of the reduction 
in competition there was exuberance and incentive to partake in the process. 
Manufacturers are guaranteed relatively easy opportunities for growth.
Once the initial stage was completed, and final goods production had almost 
entirely substituted for imports of these goods, problems begatt to emerge as 
growth rates in these industries tapered off and increases in output were 
Conditioned by the growth in domestic incomes. In other words, it appears 
virtu Aly impossible to sustain the initial impetus and high growth rates.
As far as continuing the process further( to the replacement of intermediate
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products) is concerned, this would involve increasing the rates of 
protection on these goods in nn effort to stimulate their production.
This, of course, means that the levels of effective protection levied on 
final goods would be reduced, and their costs of production increased.
Several other effects can be mentioned on the type of import sub­
stitution that was adopted in various Latin American countries and that 
apply to other countries as well. The encouragement given by governments 
with regard to their protective policies frequently suited in 
inefficient or inferior quality production and fragmentation of industries. 
These tendencies are not at all conducive to domestic manufacturing in­
dustries being able to compete in international markets. Another effect 
of the type of import replacement followed in various countries was that 
protection tended to be self-defeating. Whereas the purpose of protection 
is to promote the development of locally-owned and operated enterprises, 
it tended instead to encourage the establishment of subsidiaries or 
affiliates of foreign enterprises, generally the large international 
companies with headquarters in the United States or Europe, and so give 
rise to political anxieties about foreign control and domination of the 
economy. Rather than develop a technology suited to the needs of the 
less developed cc * 'ry, these companies frequently duplicated the 
techniques used in more developed countries which tended to be capital- 
intensive. the use of capital-intensive techniques was further encouraged 
by the high levels of effective protection accorded to final stages of 
production. This .involved low rates of duty on capital equipment and 
hence there was a bias towards the importation of capital goods.
Furthermore, the establishment of multinational companies in the 
f i e l d  of manufacturing production can be considered a response to fill 
the  vacu' , t h a t  a r i s e s ,  as f a r  as lo c a l  needs a re  concerned. The im-
position of protective policies to encourage local production stimulated 
foreign companies to establish branches previously exporting these goods 
in the industrializing country* so that these companies would not suffer 
unduly from protection. These companies for obvious reasons did not 
prove to be exporters.
Thus the question of what follows once the initial stages of import 
substitution have been completed, is important to the development efforts 
of various countries that have adopted this type of industrialization, 
strategy. The options that are open include proceeding with the import- 
substituting process and replacing intermediate products and capital 
equipment (which in the case of many less developed countries would be 
difficult to implement as the success of th’s is dependent on large 
markets and economies of scale) or alternatively, attempting to increase 
the exports of manufacturing industries by exporting those previously 
imported products that have been successfully replaced domestically, or 
those products that require the further processing of these raw materials 
which a particular country is weV endowed with. The creation of larger 
markets for products would supposedly shift the emphasis in production away 
from the limited local market towards the international mavhet.
The latter arguments advocating increased export orientation have 
gained universal acceptance by economists and policy-making authorities, 
as a way of overcoming the impasse brought about by import-substituting 
industrialization. These arguments, obvioutly influe d by the successes 
of countries Such as Japan, Taiwan, Korea and Singapore, appear to be 
theoretically sound. Many of .these arguments are well-summarized by
t
Gerald M e i e r I n  addition to the argument mentioned above concerning 
the advantage that exports are not subject to the constraints of the 
local market, production for export is, to a far greater extent than is
Gerald Meier, Leading Issues in Economic. Development, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1976, pp* 671-677* See also pp. 753-771,
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the case with imports, influenced by efficiency considerations. Such 
production guarant# s growth by competition rather than exclusion. In 
addition, export production, particularly of manufactured goods, can 
provide several industries with economies of scale and thus enable unit 
costs and domestic prices to be lowered.
The kind of products that are liable to prove sources for export 
from 1, ss developed countries ..re likely to be those goods requiring a 
relatively large labour intensity and goods that are not produced in 
more developed countries. It is pointless for a less developed country 
to attempt to export to a country such as the United States those goods 
that can be produced efficiently in the United States. Thus some 
exploitation of the comparative advantage as regards factor endowments 
will prove, the basis for trade from the less developed country. Thus 
export expansion Is said to benefit labour and curb unemployment in that 
such a policy would stimulate a labour-intensive technology.
As regards the relaxation of a country's foreign exchange constraint 
a unit of foreign exchange saved by import substitution is equivalent 
to a unit oft foreign exchange earned by exporting. But one can argue 
that the domestic resource cost of earning a unit of foreign exchange 
tends to be less than the domestic resource cost of saving a unit or 
foreign exchange. This argument is based on the fact that import
substitution Is reliant on high rates of effective protection that involve 
a cost to society. Furthermore, if resources were to be diverted from 
import-substituting'Industries to export-producing industries, where 
presumably some comparative advantage exists, more foreign exchange 
would be earned than would be saved if Import substitution would be
continued.
Another importan factor in comparing import substitution with 
export promotion as a strategy for development involves a comparison of 
•the type of protection required for these to be successful. Bhagwati 
and Krueger argue that export promotion would require subsidization rather 
than tariff imposition, and because the costs of such are more visible 
and require relatively greater use of indirect intervention, the economic 
costs of intervention are smaller in respect of export promotion(5).
The renewed export expansion thesis could be subjected to more
ri- orous analysis. This exercise was the main theme of a conference on
(6)
development problems held at Cambridge in September 1672 . Paul
Streeten's introductory article in this volume places a new perspective 
on the limitations of exporting manufactured goods from less developed 
countries^. He argues that the problems of such an export drive that 
Will manifest themselves include the probability of a disruption in the 
markets of more developed countries for similar types of goods, such as 
textiles, clothing etc. that are produced by many of these countries 
similarly endowed with raw materials and productive factors. One can 
possibly attribute much of the success achieved by countries in the Far 
East during the 'sixties to the fact that these countries were isolated 
as far as their export drives were concerned. Associated with this was 
the fact that many of these countries were too small to disturb the market
<5) <  tion
Proceedings, May 1973, pp. 420-421. 
(6)
(7) Paul Streeten> ojj. cit., pp. 1“22.
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as a whole . If many other developing countries launched similar 
export drives it seems unlikely that the successes achieved by some of 
these countries wcv'd have materialized.
Another factor !''• be considered is that in order for manufactured 
exports from less-developed countries to be successful m  world markets 
these will have to overcome the numerous tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
that are imposed in more developed countries. As has been mentioned 
previously, cascading represents a characteristic feature of protective 
policy in both advanced and less developed countries. In many of the 
more developed countries, the very industries that are protected are those 
which the lesser developedcountries would hope to compete with. In other 
words, where are the markets for these goods going to emanate from, if the 
industrialized countries continually deny admission of these goods? Another 
reason for the successes of the Far East, in this respect, was that these 
countries did not solely rely on exporting manufactured goods to large in­
dustrialized countries, but to lesser developed countries as well.
It ought, also, to be realized that any vigorous export campaign would 
require a fundamental change in the protective and institutional framework, 
that may be far beyond the capabilities of less developed countries to 
implement. As far as the protective framework is concerned,one must take 
into account many of the practical problems and effects of import substitution, 
as well as the policy of encouraging such industrialization. Each one of 
these can in turn be considered to have a harmful effect on manufacture" 
exports. Perhaps the most adverse effect is the shortage of enterpr-.-neurial
ability. The requirement for successful export promotion in the face of
massive competition would involve highly efficient and organizational
(8) in this connection see A, Maddison, Economic Progress and Policy in 
Developing Countries, London: George M i e n  and Unwin UdV,
1970, p.206,
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techniques. Maddison makes the valid pcirt that the sale of manufactured 
goods is quite different from selling foodstuffs and raw materials which
« /Q \
go to well-organized produce markets' The latter requires inter alia
market research, strong foreign commercial representation, quality 
control^ the provision of export credit and insurance etc. Do the 
countries in question have such capable and efricient managemenu!
Domestically, this appears unlikely for high levels of protection would 
not encourage this, whereas the enterprise occasioned by multi-nationals 
will hardly prove a viable source of exports. In political terms the 
possibility of tariff reductions appears unlikely in that governments in 
these countries are seldom in a position to incur the wrath of producers.
Apart from the side effect that the protective structure implemented 
to encourage import-substituting industrialization does not appear com- *
patible with increasing exports of manufactured goods, there exists the 
possibility that governments may over subsidize exports. Bhagwati and 
Krueger point out that in several countries, governments have been so 
preoccupied with export-oriented development that they have intervened 
as much and as chaotically on the side of promoting new exports as other 
countries have on the side of import substitution^ Similarly, Stern
%
while agreeing that the efforts of several countries to promote exports
were successful in that gross foreign exchange receipts were increased
and the composition of exports was diversified,questions the cost of
domestic resources per unit of foreign exchange that was required to
achieve these results. He points out that frequently a relatively
large subsidy is needed to generate exports out of an inefficient manufacturing
s e c t o r . The danger therefore exists that countries may seek indis-
i --—■ - • • • — -..' 1       ' ' L    ' T~
A. Maddison, 1oc* cit.,
(1°) J, Bhagwati and A, Krueger, ojs, cit,,
(U)R, Stern, ' Tariffs and Other Measures of Trade Control1
Journ. Eco. Lit: xi(3), Sept 1973, p.867.
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criminately to expand exports and fail to pay sufficient attention to the 
real costs involved in the products and industries that are subsidized.
Moreover, one can question how the subsidy is to be financed * Individual 
incomes in many of the less developed countries are too low to provide 
a substantial source of revenue for such subsidization.
Finally, the institutional limitations in many of these countries 
as regards the financing of production and transportation infrastructure 
cast additional doubts as regards the capabilities of these countries 
being able to carry out a substantial export effort.
5.4 The growth pattern in the South African economy
Thus far ’in this chapter it has been shown how the tariff structure 
imposed /n a country influences the productive structure in that country, 
by encouraging import-substituting industrialization. Because of the 
limitations of this type of industrialization there has been a trend 
recently for many countries to pursue a deliberate policy of export pro 
duction particularly as regards the manufacturing sector. It is apparent 
from various statistical trends in the South African economy that protective 
policy has induced a similar pattern of development, in that initially import re­
placement provided the. major stimulus to industrial growth, More recently, 
as a result of increasing problems in the implementation of import 
replacement in this country, growth in the manufacturing sector has tended 
to level off. In 1972, the Commission of Inquiry into exports from South 
Africa<-12^concluded' that the long term solution to future growth rested in 
increasing the exports of manufactured goods.
(12) commission of Inquiry into the Export Trade of the Republic of South 
Africa (Reynders Report) E.F. 69-72,
Table 5,1 shows the levels of employment and output for the various 
branches of manufacturing industry at 5-year intervals since 1918/19 to 
1954/55. The importance of this Table rests in the depiction of periods 
during which these industries grew rapidly with regard to both employment 
and output. The general conclusion that can be arrived at from the Table 
is that those sectors of industry concerned with production for final 
demand, i.e. foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco, clothing and footwear exhibited 
steady increments in demand throughout the period. It was only during and 
after the Second World War that other sectors such as transport equipment, 
electrical machinery, machinery, metal products, base metals, chemicals and 
textiles began producing and employing on any significant scale. In other 
words it could possibly be argued that the tariff protection, introduced 
on such a large scale during the 1920ls with its emphasis, on.the protection 
of final consumer goods and employment., was particularly successful in 
bringing about steady and substantial increases in the production of these 
goods throughout the 1920's* 1930's and 1940's. The production of. intermediate 
goods was started only in the late forties.
In Table 5.2the long term average annual rates of growth for the 
various sectors, of manufacturing industries are calculated and tabulated 
according to performance. This Table traces the growth since 1956/57 
and shows that those sectors predominantly producing for final, demand 
(foodstuffs, tobacco, clothing, furniture, leather, etc) increased at 
a rate that was well below the average of 6,3 percent per annum. The 
production of intermediate goods and raw materials in general increased at 
rates above the average, with the exception of the production of machinery* 
Particularly significant is the increase of 8,4 percent per annum in the 
production of transport equipment - the direct result of the implementation 
of a local content programme in the motor car industry.
'TABLE 5.1
LEVELS OF EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT FOR VARIOUS SECTORS OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
1918/19 - 1954/55. _________ _
1918/19 1924/25 1929/30 1934/35 1939/40 1944/45 1949/50
Food
Eopl ('000) 
Output (£ Mill)
23
23
27
22
30
27 • s 4243 6185 73139
Beverages
Empl
Output
4
3
3
2
3.3
3.3
4.0
3.1
5,3
5,2
8,1
10,5 17’4
Tobacco
Eopl
Output
2.6
1.5
2.7
2,2
3,5
2,8
3,3
2,6
4,3
4,2 .
4,8
6,3 .1:5
Textiles
Empl
Output
2,2
0.3
1,6 ' 
0,3
2,0
0,7
4,1
1,5
5,2
2,8
7.3
6.3
16,2
15,8
Clothing
Eopl
Output
10,7
4,0
11,4
4.3
16,7
6,6
29,5
9.5
34,8 
, 14.5
48,8
36,1
6 ,8 
64 8
Wood-products
Empl
Output
5.1
.2,4 w 4.81.9 6.32.3 11,34,5 22,610,0 24,915,4
Furniture
Eopl
Output
3.2
1.2
4,9
1,3
6,4
2,6
6,5
2,9 Vi 11,38,1 15,415,2
Papcr-products
Eopl
Output
0,4
0.1
0,5
0,2 w 1.50.7 3,22,0 4,23,5 7,610,4
Printing 1 Publ 
Empl 
Output
6.1
2.6
7,3
3,8 1: 8,95,0 10,66,8 10,99,3 17,120,5
Leathet-proda
Eopl
Output
2,8
2,0 li 2.61,7 li 3,22,9 5,96,1 5:
Rubber
Empl
Output
- 0,4 0,6
0,2 a 2,73,4 5,07,6 .5:
Chemicals
Empl
output
9,0
5,5
9,5
6,2
9,9
7,6
10,4
8,0
15.3
15.3
23,2
26,8
28,3
51,7
Petroleum
Empl
Output % 0,80,6 0,60,3 .IS 5:1 5:2 4,25,8
Non Met Ming 
Eopl 
output
14,9
2,7
18,2
3,7
23,0
4,7
27,6
7,1 il 46.223.3
Base Metals 
Eopl 
Output
16,2
7,2
26,1
16,7
10,8
4,5
20,1
10,2
33,9 * 
20*4
59,1
42,5
83,6
65,9
Metal Prods 
Empl 
Output
2,2
0,7
4.4
1.5 il il 1: 12,812,5
Machinery
Empl
Output
- - 0,3
o.l :5
Elect Kach. 
Empl 
output a w 1:5 ?;S VS 7,75,3 il
Transport Equip 
Eopl, * 
output
7,6
2,0
11,8
4,8
13,4
7,1
17*4
13,9
20,6
10,5
39,3
47*9
Source! Union Statistics lor 50 years.
1954/55
93
231
11,5
30,3
,1.1
32,9
42,2
76,3
98,0
30,9
27,2
20.7
26.7
14,0
26,8
:7,4
28,8
li
10,9
30,5
33,8
92,6
8,8
24*1
60*7
50,8
29*5
64,3
65*2
101,0
12,8
42,3
23,1
40,3
56,5
101,2
113.
TABLE 5.2
ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH IN THE PHYSICAL VOLUME OF MANUFACTURING 
1 _____ _______ _________ PRODUCTION_________ _______ _____________
1956/57 - 1975
Total
% p.a. 
6,3
Food 4,7
Beverages 8,6
Tobacco 3,0
Textiles 7,2
Clothing ' 4,7
Wood and products 4,0
Furniture 5,2
Paper and products
C
M
Printing and Publishing 8,6
Leather 2,9
Rubber 5,9
Chemicals 7,2
Non Metallic Minerals 5,4
Base Metals 7,6
Metal Products 4,7
Machinery 4,0
Electrical Machinery 6,2
Transport Equipment 8,4
A
Sources: Union Statistics for 50 years
Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics.; June 1976 » Dept of Statistics
U 4 .
While the long term growth pattern on first impression appears 
encouraging, the shorter term growth in manufacturing industry over the 
past five years is disturbing. Table 5.3 shows the percentage change in 
output over the period 1970 to 1975. The average total rate of growth was
reduced to 4,1 percent per annum - a figure well below the longer term rate 
and lower than the estimates of the past few Economic Development Programmes.
Of particular importance is the further levelling off in growth in many of 
the consumer-oriented industries, as well as in some of the intermediate
industries.
It is apparent from this discussion and from the empirical evidence 
presented, that the pattern of growth in manufacturing industry has undergone a 
substantial chahge since the 1920's, Whereas until the Second World War 
manufacturing industry was concentrated on the production of consumer goods 
there has,since that period,been a reduction in the importance of these.
The most rapidly growing sectors in the more recent period since the 1940's 
appear to be the production of capital equipment, intermediate goods and the 
processing of raw materials. It ought to be pointed out that the rates of 
increase shown by the tables depend on the base that is used. Because 
several of the industries were established and operating on a large scale 
during the mid-fifties, their rate of increase is implicitly lower than 
the industries that were only just starting. In addition, these changes 
in growth rates do not take into account the relative importance of the 
various sectors in the total figure, The weighting of the Bureau of 
Statistics for each of these sectors is reproduced in Table 5.4. 0n a 
weighted basis the most important sectors ate food (12,6%), 
textiles (4,9%), clothing and footwear (7,7%), chemical products (9,3%), 
non-metallic mineral products (6,4%), metal products (10,3%), basic metals
TABLE 5;3
ANNUAL RATES OE GROWTH IN THE PHYSICAL VOLUME OF MANUFACTURING
PRODUCTION _______________________
1970 - 1975
% p.a.
Total /‘*1
Food 3*8
Beverages 10,9
Tobacco 5,4
Textiles -0,3
Clothing 5,0
Wood 1 *0
Furniture ?,9
Paper and products 4,0
Printing 10,9
Leather ?,2
Rubber 5,4
Chemicals 5,9
Non Metallic Minerals 3,8
Basic Metals 5,9
Metal Products 1»5
Machinery 5,7
Electrical Machinery 3,5
Transport Equipment 3,3
Source:Quarterly B u lletin  of S ta t is t ic s , Dept of S ta t is t ic s
TABLE 5.4
WEIGHTING OF RESPECTIVE SECTORS OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 1963 - 64
Per Cent
Food 12,6
Beverages 2,8
Tobacco 1,3
Textiles 4,9
Wearing Apparel 7,7
Wood and Wood Products 2,1
Furniture 2,1
Paper and Paper Products 4,1
Printing and Publishing 4,2
Leather and leather products 0,5
Rubber products 2,6
Chemicals and chemical products 9,3
Non-metallie mineral products 6,4
Basic metal industries 9,2
Metal products 10,3
Machinery 5,8
Electrical Machinery 3,8
Transport Equipment 5,3
Miscellaneous industries 5,0
Total Manufacturing 100
Source: Department of Statistics* South African Statistics 1974,
(13)
(9,2%), machinery (5,8%) and transport equipment (5,3%) . It is
obvious that the slowing down in production in several of: the consumer- 
oriented industries, particularly during the most recent period influenced 
the levelling off in the rate of growth o f the total for manufacturing 
industries.
Various studies undertaken on the role of import substitution in the 
growth of manufacturing industry in South Africa1, conclude that it was the 
main growth stimulus to production up to 1956757^ \  At this time, the 
country was practically self-sufficient in respect of the provision of 
final consumer goods. Thereafter, as the process was extended to the 
provision of capital goods and intermediate products, import replacement 
slowed down as a stimulant to industrial development. in discussing the 
quantitative aspects of the contribution of import substitution to industrial 
development in South Africa, the Reynders Commission summarizes the conclu­
sions reached by Scheepers. ''By the end of the fifties, in fact, South 
Africa reached an important milestone in its industrialization process when 
the contribution of secondary industry towards G.D.P. (in real terms) 
equalled that of the primary sector for the first time. After the middle 
of the. fifties, however, import replacement as the dominant growth force
declined, as illustrated by the fact that during the period 19-5677 to'
196374 import replacement contributed only 16 percent to the growth in 
manufacturing production, as against 52 percent during the period 1926/7 
to 1956/7. Although a relatively substantial import replacement potential 
still remained, this was confined largely to the heavy intermediate and 
capital goods industries which are very dependent on large markets and
(13) Weights obtained from South African S ta t i s t ic s  1974 p .12,45
See for example, C,.F. Scheepers, "The Effect of Import Substitution on 
the Volume and Structure of South Africa's Imports, 1926/27-1963/64, 
Volkskas Finance and Trade Review, Vol VIII No. 4, December 1969 pp. 258- 
T 7 1 "and1 (//"‘/iar ais^ ' imp or if Replacement and the Development of Intermediate 
Industries in the Republic of South Africa', Volkskas Finance and Trade 
Review March/June 1966, p p , W 4 ,  T " ...................................
economies of scale for their economic viability' . The Commission 
adds that during the period 1926/7 to 1956/7 the proportion of imports to 
Gross Domestic Product (expressed at constant prices), having initially 
risen to 42 percent in 19^6/7, declined to 25 percent in 1963/4 and then 
levelled out^^,
As shown in Table 5.5(reproduced by the Reynders Report from FcheenerjS1 
original data^17^ ), the opportunities for. import substitution had appeared 
to be largely exhausted during the 1960/s. Despite the considerable 
amount of import replacement that had taken place in the intermediate 
and capital goods industries, it became apparent that by the early sixties 
the character of import substitution had changed. In terms of time, it 
seemed more difficult for import substitution to have any significant effect 
on total supply. As many of the opportunities for further import substitution 
on an extensive basis seemed to be exhausted, according to the various 
studies, the argument proceeded that industrial growth in the later sixties 
was conditioned by a new factor - the emergence of a large non-white market 
resulting from the relatively rapid increase in non-white incomes during 
this period, Concern was expressed by the Reynders Commission that the 
growth of manufacturing industry (which it classifies as being a net 
loser of foreign exchange) will impose increased pressure on the balance 
of payments^1®, A structural problem is apparent in South Africa re­
flected by the increasing disparity between imports and exports, This
/15)
Reynders Report, 0£. cit., p.29 
<16> ibid.
^ ^  G,F< Scheepers, Die Invloed van invoerveranging op die otnvang van Suid
Afrika se invocre, ll9"26/2.7^ 1^ 3''/6%%"liWpub%ished doctoral I:how is / '
U. 0,F»S« Bloemfontein, 1969, p«64
Reyuders Commission, ojj, c i t , ,  para, 37
TABLE 5.5
IMPORTS PER SECTOR AS A PERCENTAGE OE TOTAL SUPPLY IN SOUTH
(1956/57 PRICES)_______ _______ ______ _ ____
1926/27 1963/64
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 8 6
Gold mines
1 **
Coal mining
2 18
Other mines
Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco 15 ' 5
89 43
Textiles
76 8
Clothing
40 3
Footwear
tt j 74 27Wood
15 1
Furniture
Paper and products ^
17 9
Printing and publishing
7  30
Leather and leather products
88 9
Rubber products
Basic chemicals ^
Miscellaneous chemicals ^
j i 87 32Petroleum and coal
Non-metallie minerals ^
Basic metals ^
, . 67 12
Metal products
06 62
Machinery
Electrical machinery ‘
73 37
Transport equipment
Motor vehicles and repairs 83
74 40
Misc. manufacturers
31 19
Electricity gas and water 
Commerce
Transport and communications 
Misc. services
Source; Reyndcts Commission p.35 and also C.F. Scheepers p.64,
AFRICA
120. ;
involves inter alia the increasing difficulty and declining influence of
import s u b s t i t u t i o n (19) (whereby merchandise imports of the country
consist almost entirely of expensive capital and intermediate goodsf and
raw materials to the extent of 80 percent of total imports) ‘ while
exports, characterized by a heavy reliance on the primary sector and
limited in so far as trading partners are concerned, have not kept pace
with the increase in i m p o r t s . Thus 'an enhanced export effort
should ... be regarded as an inherent part of the stage of economic
. , ( 2 2 )
development into which South Africa is now progressing
The concern expressed by the Reynders Commission is shown clearly in 
Tables 5.6 to 5.8, In Table 5.6}which shows the proportions of each category t0 
total imports and exports according to various sections of the Standard 
International Trade Classification over the period 1946 to 1970, the 
trend evident in the behaviour of imports is as follows:
1. Imports of manufactured goods and foodstuffs have shown a noticeable 
continual downward trend;
2. Imports of intermediate goods such as mineral fuels, chemicals and 
of machinery and transport equipment haM' *n general shown an upward 
tendency, Of particular sig n ifica n ce  is  the fact that imports of machinery 
and transport equipment have more than doubled over the period under con­
sideration. This trend is confirmed by import statistics for the
(19) 2bid pp. 8-10. para, 25
(2°) Ibid p, 10. para. 27
(21) Ibid p. 57, para. 78
(22) ibid P» 57, para, 80
1
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calendar year 1975 shown in  Table 5.7,  Machinery, transport equipment and
intermediate products accounted for approximately 80 percent of the total 
import bill • While the 1975 classification (according to the Brussels 
Trade Nomenclature) is not comparable with the previous classification, 
the trends in imports are still well illustrated.
The export trend shown in  Table 5.7 shows a heavy relian ce on food, 
crude m aterials and manufactured goods^S). The high proportion of 
manufactured exports i .  m isleading,for included in th is  category are exports 
of jew ellery , polished /refined  diamonds, Kruger rands, processed wool, 
and refined sugar. In f a ct ,  the vast proportion of manufactured exports 
includes processed agricu ltu ra l and mining commodities. Furthermore,the 
r e la t iv e ly  sharp increase in exports of manufactured goods experiences 
after 1965 was influenced by increased manufactured exports to Rhodesia, 
after that Country declared independence. This is particularly true in 
the case of exports of machinery and transport equipment. With the heavy 
reliance in exports on raw materials and agricultural, it is hardly 
surprising that export values for South Africa are Subject to such enormous 
flu ctu a tio n , A s ig n ifica n t factor,apart from the low le v e ls  of other 
manufactured exports, is the low proportion of intermediate goods and 
capital equipment in the export bill. Figures for 1975 (shown in 
Table 5,?) onCemote i l lu s t r a te  the continuation of these trends. As far as 
the d irectio n  of exports from South Africa i s  concerned (Table 5.8) there 
has been a noticeab le le v e llin g  off in trade with he t e s t  of A frica, while 
trade with America and Asia has been increasing. Trade with Europe has 
remained relatively constant. <
.
The conclusions of the Reyndets Commission focussed on suggesting 
means ter improving exports. «  " gard s the increasing ot exports as the 
only p ossib le  s tr ategy tor growth in the Sonth African contest. Its_______
(^  Export figures do not include gold.
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recommendations for the short term involve concentration on the further 
processing of mining and agricultural materials for export purposes, while
the longer term solution would require an increase in the export of 
manufactured goods other than processed mining and agricultural materials. 
Its* rationale for this conclusion is that manufacturing is regarded as the 
key to the creation of employment opportunities for the growing population; 
for providing a stimulus for growth of the other sectors of the economy; 
for ensuring balanced economic development and for playing a leading role
(24)
in the development of the African continent •
Unfortunately, the Reynders Commission did not go into sufficient 
analytical detail in prescribing the methods whereby a country can switch 
from a production pattern which is designed to cater almost entirely for 
the local market, to one in which those protected industries in the country 
can be expected to enter the highly competitive export field. As was 
discussed in the previous section, the problem of converting from a policy 
of import substitution to one of export promotion is one of the most 
complex in the field of international trade and economic development.
It is apparent from these trends that South Africa is not unique in its
structural problem.
(24) Reynders Commission, ££. cit., p. 112, para. 57
TABLE 5.6
PROPORTIONS OF TOTAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS BY VARIOUS CATEGORIES 1946 
(FIGURES ARE IN PERCENTAGES AND REFER TO SlTCj
IMPORTS
1946
Food 1 1 , 3
Beverages 1»1
Crude Materials 6,8
Mineral fuels 3»6
Animal+ vegetable prods, 0,8
Chemicals 4,6
Manufactured goods 35,1
Machinery + Transport Equip. 19,7 
Miscellaneous 15,5
EXPORTS
Food 10,1
Beverages 2,5
Crude Materials 43,8
Mineral fuels 5,6
Animal+ vegetable prods. 0,5
Chemicals 4,7
Manufacture goods 23,2
Machinery + Transport Equip. 1,6 
Miscellaneous 6,1
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
7,0 4,4 4,4 3,6 4,0
0,4 0,9 0,7 0,7 1,0
9,4 7,3 6,7 7,5 4,7
8,8 7,6 6,8 5,3 5,0
1,3 0,9 0,8 0,6 0,4
4,4 6,8 7,0 7,1 7,8
36,4 31,0 28,6 24,3 19,5
25,5 31,8 36,9 42,1 46,7
5,9 7,8 7,4 7,0 8,9
11,6 21,2 21,4 21,3 19,7
1,1 0,7 0,7 1,1 0,9
37,8 43,2 41,9 34,8 23,2
2,5 1,6 1,7 2,9 5,2
1,3 0,8 0,1 0,9 0,6
4,7 4,4 4,4 3,4 4,5
19,8 20,0 22,8 26,7 28,1
2,9 4,3 4,5 4,5 1,4
2,8 3,5 2,6 8,6 1,3
Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years
South African Statistics 1974
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TABLE 5.8
DESTINATION OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 1958 - 1575
IMPORTS
1958 . 1966 1969 1975
Africa 6,8 11,0 5,2 4,9
Europe 57,5 51,3 53,7 58,7
America 21,9 22,1 21,0 20,0
Asia 12,9 12,5 17,2 14,2
Oceania 0,9 1,9 1,9 1,7
Other - 1,2 1,2 0,5
EXPORTS
Africa 18,6 16,3 14,7 11,4
Europe 50,0 58,5 56,1 54,8
America 8,6 13,6 9,5 15,1
Asia 4,9 8,9 12,3 17,0
Oceania 1,4 1,0 1,0 0,9
Other
(PERCENTAGES)
Source: Reynders Commissi oil, oj). cit ■ *
Dept of Customs and Excise, Foreign Trade St itistics, 1975
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' 5.5 More detailed consideration or the import substitution process
From the preceding analysis it is apparent at first glance, that the 
efforts of developing countries to devise a strategy for industrialization 
appear doomed to failure, irrespective of whether the emphasis be placed on 
import substitution or export promotion. Because import substitution has 
universally been regarded as a failure in so many countries, the question 
is raised whether this should serve as a general indictment of the strategy 
at large or merely a criticism of the type of import substitution that has 
been implemented in these countries. Most of the criticisms raised v
previously apply to a specific type - a badly-conceived import substitution 
rather than the concept in general. The dominant feature of the type of 
strategy that has been unsuccessfully implemented in many countries is
that it does not provide incentives to explore backward linkage towards
'
intermediate and capital goods.
One should, perhaps, look at the concept in more detail. Many would 
regard import substitution as applying only to industry. This is incorrect,,
. and, if anything, an extremely narrow interpretation of the concept. Import 
substitution can be applied to agriculture and services as well as to 
manufactures. Many critics of import substitution automatically overlook 
th< possibilities of domestic agricultural production replacing food imports, 
and the local training of manpower replacing foreign-skilled workers, managers 
and consultants^*^ ,
The conventional and most widely used measure of import substitution refers 
to assessing the behaviour of imports in a country in relation to total supply. 
Hollis Chenery introduced this measure,defining import substitution as
. (26)
occurring when there is a decline in the ratio of imports to total supply »
The magnitude of import substitution-IS-between 2 periods of time-0 and t-is
This point is raised by Mahbub el HaQ., Director of policy and planning, 
at the World Bank> in a paper entitled, 'Developing policy alternatives, 
!in P. Strecten, o£. cit., p.93.
(26)j^g. chenety, 'Patterns of Industrial Growth', American Economic Review 
50, Sept 1960, pp. 624-54.
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given by IS^= Gn^Vz^0 " m^t/z^t)
where = imports, = total supply of the products of sector i.
Z'i ~ \  + Mi ™ domestic production in i.) By dividing this number 
by the increase in domestic production one can attain the percentage of 
growth in a sector that can be accounted for by import substitution.
But the Chenery definition is essentially narrow in that it tends 
to neglect the inter-industry relationships concerning productive 
activity. Morley and Smith write that 1 an import ultimately substitutes 
for or supplements the output of many domestic sectors. If an import 
is to be replaced without induced rises in imported inputs or reductions 
in the supplies available for final demand in other sectors, production 
must be increased not only in the industry finally processing the good, 
but also in its supplier industries and in their supplier industries and
so forth" <‘27\  In effect, what is implied here is that the newly re­
quired intermediate output was previously supplied by the import of the 
final product, e.g. a suit of clothing that is produced in its entirety 
domestically instead of being imported. According to the conventional 
Chenery measure the final value of the suit of clothing will be counted 
as import replacement. But the local production of this suit of clothing 
has induced the local usage of wool and cloth that was previously imported 
with the suit. Any accurate assessment of the total Supply of each 
sector's products should therefore include the implicit elements of 
imports and will yield a better measure of the process. Implicit imports 
are excluded from conventional definitions, nor is their displacement 
by local production counted as substitution. the local production of 
wool and yarn should also be incorporated in the measure,
(2# Samuel A, Motley and Gordon W. Smith, "On the Measurement of Import 
Substitution', American Economic Review: 60, Dec 1970, p. 279.
With the use of ini ^output tables one can readily show the
relationships between intermediate production to the final product. In
♦ V? •
this way one can redefine the import vec: or m as the domestic production
that is required to substitute entirely for imports (incorporating both
A
intermediate and final usage) and so reach a new supply vector Z .
2* =■ X + M* where X is equivalent to gross production
. • * , d*. c* t* t* t*
Thus one can redefine import substitution, IS. -On. /z. - m. /Z. .) Z.
In this way, implicit imports are incorporated.
The advantages o£ the redefined measure, when compared to the conven­
tional one, reflect themselves in a number of ways. Firstly, as far
as the quantification of import substitution over a period of time i» 
concerned.Morley and Smith prove that the Chener: definitions are likely to 
yield underestimates for most semi-industrialised countries in recent
d e c a d e s .
The process of import substitution in less developed countries passes 
through a sequence ;of stages: ,
1) light consumer goods based on raw materials;
2) consumer durables;
3) some intermediates and capital goods.
For those sectors that produce exclusively for final demand the two measures 
ought to yield identical results since indirect imports are always zero. 
In the same way, if a sector produce', little for intermediate use, the 
relative differences will be small. Thus industries such as clothing, 
transport equipment, food processing etc. should indicate small differences.
(28) s.A. Motley and G.W. Smith, 0J3, bit., p. 731.
As far as pure intermediate industries are concerned, 'total direct supply 
is a unique function of the production of the user sectors, while indirect 
supply is a linear function of imports. If import substitution in the 
traditional sense is occurring in the major uses of such an intermediate 
product then IS^* > IS^29^. The results that Morley and Smith attain 
show that for a country like Brazil the Chenery measure tends to under­
estimate import substitution in intermediate industries m  particular , 
The traditional definition Which ignores linkages misses import substitution 
in intermediate goods industries.
In addition to measuring the extent of import substitution over a
period of time, one can, with the use of an input-output table, work out the 
*
component for a particular moment from the data presented in an 
input-output table and compare this with the conventional measure of imports 
and output for each of the various sectors, The implications Of this 
comparison are such that differendes in the two measurements could indicate 
better the extent of import substitution still possible under the redefined 
concepts of imports and total supply. If an industry demonstrates that, 
according to the conventional measure» there is relatively little scope for 
further import substitution this could be a false assertion. Ji' by 
increasing the process in other sectors^ a greater demand for this industry s 
output is generated which is used as an input in the process, intermediate 
import replacements may be extended considerably.
The results of measuring import substitution over time and for two
separate years for South Africa are presented in a later chapter. The
conclusions will also be discussed later. Suffice to say that the
differences in these results for the different measures are significant.
* ,
(29) S.A. Motley and G.W. Smith, o£. city, p. 731
The relevance of this type of analysis to the discussion of import 
substitution is such that the 'exhaustion1 thesis that has characterized 
. ch of the import substitution in various countries is open to question, 
if such substitution is defined in a wider context. There may be consid­
erable facility for increased import substitution in intermediate goods 
for longer production runs and economies of scale at this level, which could 
stimulate growth and development in many countries. The linkages induced by 
such industrialization could stimulate growth in various industries.
5,6 A discussion of alternative protective policies to stimulate growth 
in industrjailzing countries
The foregoing analysis showed how tariff protection tends to structure 
patterns c£ production in many countries. Tariff protection contains a 
definite bias in favour of import substitution and it appears from the way 
that im-ny countries have implemented protective policies, import substitution 
has been badly conceived, Moreover, in recent times, tariff-making 
authorities have shown themselves inflexible in adopting to changed re­
quirements - whether these involved pursuing import substitution more 
vigorously or expanding exports of manufactured goods. Thomas Lowinger in 
his study of the Brazilian economy arrived at a conclusion that appears to 
have validity in several other countries that have followed similar patterns
of industrialization^1 .^ He attempts to show that the structure (and
level) of inter-industry protection in Brazil had an unfavourable effect
on the country's import-substituting process and was inappropriate for
(32)
the future expansion of manufactured exports .
Assuming that a policy of deepening the import substitution process 
is followed (a policy which for reasons mentioned above may be the only
t31  ^me, Lowitiger, 'import Substitution, Export Promotion and the structure 
of Brazil's Protection'. Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 10,
1974, pp. 430-444*
The relevance of this type of analysis to the discussion of import 
substitution is such that the ’exhaustion* thesis that has characterized 
much of the import substitution in various countries is open to question, 
if such substitution is defined in a wider context. There may be consid­
erable facility for increased import substitution in intermediate goods 
for. longer production runs and economies of scale at this level, which could 
stimulate growth and development in many countries. The linkages induced by 
such industrialization could stimulate growth in various industries.
5,6 A discussion of alternative protective policies to stimulate growth 
in industrializing countries
The foregoing analysis showed how tariff protection tends to structure 
patterns of production in many countries. Tariff protection contains a 
definite bias in favour of import substitution and it appears from the way 
that many countries have implemented protective policies, import substitution 
has been badly conceived. Moreover, in recent times, tariff-making 
authorities have shown themselves inflexible in adopting to changed re­
quirements - whether these involved pursuing import substitution more 
vigorously or expanding exports of manufactured goods. Thomas Lowinger in 
his study of the Brazilian economy arrived at a conclusion that appears to 
have validity in several other Countries that have followed similar patterns
of industrialization(311, He attempts to show that the structure (and
level) of inter-industry protection in Brazil had an unfavourable effect
on the country's import-su! stituting process and was inappropriate for
(32)
the future expansion of manufactured exports .
Assuming that a policy of deepening the import substitution process 
is followed (a policy which for reasons mentioned above may be the only
(31) ^ Lowinger, 'Import Substitution, Export Promotion and the Structure 
of Brazil's Protection'• Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 10,
1974, pp. 430-444.
one available to some countries) a possible type of protective policy 
involving tariffs would perhaps require that the protection accorded to 
raw materials and intermediate products be increased, thus reducing effective 
levels of tariff protection on final consumer goods. While one may argue 
that this would result in an increase in the prices of final goods (owing to an 
increase in costs), the advantages of such a policy measure,in terms of 
rationalization of some industries and increased efficiency that producers 
may be forced to strive for,may outweigh .the increase in costs. Tariff- 
making authorities in many countries appear to have overlooked the tendency 
for tariffs to stimulate production for domestic markets only. The greater 
the difference between the level of protection accorded an import-substituting 
industry and that applying to imported inputs, the more will the profit 
margin depend on preventing the domestic production of inputs. This is an 
explanation for the fact that rather than reducing a country's dependence 
on imports, the import substituting process results frequently in increased 
reliance on imports. Hirschman suggests that the same i.*. -„rialist/ 
producer who makes the final good should perhaps attempt to effect the 
backward linkage himself(33\  What the producer loses on the one, he 
makes on the other, and for certain industries such as metalworking and 
chemicals, such vertical linkage is possible.
The other advantage of this type of policy is that such reductions in 
effective protection could well force producers to look beyond local 
markets. If producers could prove successful in the replacement of 
intermediate goods and if some advantage could be established in the pro­
duction of these goods,they could prove valuable exports* particularly to 
countries that have not yet evolved these processes* Thus the function 
of exports would be to enable countries to overcome obstacles of market size 
and ,by competing in world markets, industrialists would be forced to attain 
and maintain high standards. The reduction in protection and the possible
A.O. Ilirsthman, A Bias for Ilon o  New Haven and London, Yale Univ. Press
: . ' ■] 
1 3 2 - | 1
forcing of manufacturers to be more outward-looking would result in growth 
through promotion rather than protection. The stimulus provided by 
increased exports of final products may well provide incentives for manu­
facturers to pursue backward linkage to the intermediate stages. Alter- :
natively, authorities could offer rebates on tariffs on intermediate goods 
if producers could prove that they are bona fide exporters.
The other possibility of combining and converting import substitution 
and export expansion would involve a drastic revision of the existing tariff 
system in many countries and a constant surveillance of protected industries I '
to ensure that these do not become inefficient and sheltered by tariff {I
protection. Although, politically, governments would find this difficult |
I
to implement, the revised system would have considerable advantages. |
. i
The basic rationale for tariff protection, as explained previously, is 
that protection to an industry be levied temporarily during the initial period  ^ j
of high costs, on the understanding that the infant would eventually be able | I
to compete on equal terms with established foreign producers on the home
• j| , ■
market, as the size of the. market increases. The distinction made by
Myint(3/t) and mentioned previously, concerning the different ways in which I:
this can come about is illuminating in this respect. The true infant g
I'
industry, in which efficiency is increased through learning and experience, |j
differs markedly from the import'-substituting industry in which a lowering 
of costs comes about as a result of the increase in market size or large |
scale production, with the same level of skill and experience. The j
implications of these differences are enormous with regard to the pattern , j
of industrial development in a country. On the home front* as genuine . |
infants approach maturity they can afford to have levels of competition increased j  
through tariff reductions, whereas those import-competing industries that |
are dependent on income elasticities of demand will tend to become reliant '
(34) u, Myint, International Trade and Developing Countries, in International 
Economic Relations ed> E. Samuelson, MacMillan 1969, p.29. See Clip 3.
Fn 25*
0
*
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on tariff protection. In other words, tariff protection tends to become a 
permanent feature in these latter industries.
As far as exports of locally substituted products are concerned, the above-
5... • oned distinction is also important.. . The genuine infant will be able to survive
and n, , ^  xke in International competition by virtue of the fact that it will
have developed some advantage in production, whereas the import-substituting
industry, unable to compete on the home front with reduced protection, will
not be able to ...iter world markets, unless it is provided with some form of
favourable treatment. The mere enlargement in the size of the protected
domestic market and the potential economies of large scale production are
not sufficient to ensure that an individual industry will be able to lower
costs without an improvement in its own capacity to specialise enabling it 
to take advantage of these opportunities^35^ .
In other words, Myint implies that an optimum tariff policy requires 
some stimulus for producers to lower costs by increasing efficiency.
This will shift the emphasis of production away from income elasticity 
of demand to price elasticity of demand, and in this way more efficient 
local producers will eventually be able to compete to a greater extent on 
both home and overseas markets. In practice, however, it is
virtually impossible for tariff authorities to foresee the long term effects
of selecting certain industries for protection, Once industries have been 
selected, constant surveillance is requiredto ensure that they
do n o t become inefficient behind a tariff shelter, Frequent downward
revisions in tariffs, either directly or indirectly (through increasing 
tariffs on intermediate goods), can act as a stimulus for producers to 
"reduce costs and shift the emphasis in production away from the home market 
to the international market, The enlargement of a protected home market 
is by itself not sufficient to ensure an industry's capacity to lower its 
costs and compete in both local and export markets.
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The idea behind such an 'optimal' tariff policy is that industrial 
growth will be promoted rather than protected. Countries adopting such a 
policy will be able to enjoy the benefits of extended import substitution, 
while, at the same time,industries are provided with an opportunity for 
increasing efficiency and possibly acquiring comparative advantage in certain 
activities which could serve as a basis for the export of manufactured goods. 
Instead of pursuing a policy to export all types of manufactures, which is 
implicit in many of the outward-looking policies advocated during the sixties, 
countries can still enjoy the benefits of import substitution without 
suffering from a reduction in exports. ,,
5.7 Summary
In tMs chapter an attempt was made to show how the type of tariff 
protection practised in many countries influences the pattern of growth 
in these countries. The concept of effective protection provides an aid 
in explaining this relation hip. High levels of effective protection on 
final consumer goods encourage inward-looking policies and these are detri­
mental to exports, whether these exports refer to manufactured goods or 
primary products. While in its early stages, import substitution offers 
exciting growth possibilities, various countries have experienced enormous 
problems in the later stages of the process. This appears to be the case 
in South Africa as well. While the debate over inward- and outward-looking 
policies is by no means resolved and while, with changing circumstances, 
the arguments in favour of the one outweigh the arguments in favour of the 
other, the ideas expressed in this chapter have questioned the meaning of 
the concept of import substitution and suggested a possible tariff policy 
that could possibly bettor affect the pattern of growth id less 
developed countries. The next chapter looks at levels of effective protection
in the South African economy.
CHAPTER 6
THE LEVEL OF EFFECTIVE PROTECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA
6.1 Introduction
Thus far in attempting to relate tariff protection and the pattern of 
economic development in South Africa, protective policy was described in 
terms of the conclusions and recommendations of various commissions of 
enquiry into such policy, while trends in the growth of the economy were 
analysed in terms of broad statistical indicators. From the analysis 
presented in Chapters 2 and 5 (dealing with the historical aspects of 
protection and economic growth in South Africa respectively) it appears 
that tariff policy in South Africa has had a decisive impact on the 
productive structure, in the country, in that such policy has encouraged 
a policy of import substitution. The general trend in the protective 
structure of the country has appeared to be the levying of relatively 
high duties on final goods designed for consumption and utilizing large 
amounts of labour, initially white labour, as well as the levying of low 
duties on capital and intermediate goods.
It was also suggested in the previous chapter that deeply-rooted 
structural problems have recently, come to the fore, with regard to the pattern 
of development in South Africa. In urder to analyse whether the protective 
structure in South Africa has contributed to these, one should ideally 
analyse these in terms of the levels of effective protection that have been 
implemented in the economy over time. Such analysis is not possible for a 
variety of reasons. Firstly, as has been mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
concept of effective protection is a relatively recent one, The tools used 
for such analysis,viz. input-output tables, have also only recently been 
developed, In South Africa, for example, the first input-output table was 
devised for the 1956/57 period. In addition, there are problems involved 
in comparing input-output tables and industrial censuses on which these are
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.based oyer periods of time, in that the categories, and classifications of 
industries frequently change from one time period to another. Yet another 
complicating factor is the difficulty involved in obtaining duty levels, 
over periods of time, that are readily accessible. Perhaps one of the 
most serious sources of difficulty involves the classification of duties 
according to the input-output classification. Duties are frequently 
expressed in terms of a schedule of tariffs that differs vastly from the 
input-output classification based on a standard classification of industries. 
These latter problems related to duties have necessitated an unsatisfactory 
approach in attempts to calculate nominal tariffs. Frequently (and South 
Africa is not alone in this problem) nominal rates are perforce estimated 
by dividing the duties collected for each sector by total imports for a 
sector as given in the input-output tables. The disadvantages in this 
approach will be discussed later as will some additional difficulties in
estimation,
This chapter concerns itself With analysis of two recent and detailed 
studies Of effective tariff protection for South Africa. Some of the major 
conclusions emerging from these studies are discussed. In addition, the 
results are analysed and interpreted in a way that is different to the 
authors' methods in these studies. In conclusion, a revised and more 
manageable method of measuring effective protective rates is suggested in an 
endeavour to overcome several of the difficulties described above. It must 
be emphasized that the measures referred to in this chapter apply to effective 
tariff protection only, and exclude other forms of protection such as trans­
portation rates, import controls, subsidies, devaluation, fluctuating 
exchange rates etc. Attempts to incorporate these would serve to complicate 
an already difficult exercise considerably. Furthermore, in a country like 
South Africa, the paucity of statistics concerning these latter factors would 
make any such analysis virtually impossible to undertake.
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6 .2 The lip 1 den Measure pf effective protection i n  South. Africa
This measure was "put forward in 1974 and presented in the form of a doctoral
dissertation by Merle H o l d e n . A summary of results was presented
(2)
recently in an article by the doctoral candidate and her husband . The
purpose of the Holden study was essentially to calculate effective tariff
protection in South Africa for 1956/57 and 1963/64 to ascertain how changes
in nominal tariff rates have affected the pattern of production in South
Africa, Their calculations suggest that, broadly interpreted, there was
an increase in the levels of both nominal and effective tariff protection
over the 1956/57 - 1963/64 period. Because of the relatively low Spearman
rank correlation coefficient of 0,51 between the percentage change in the
nominal tariff"rate and the effective tariff rate, the implicit conclusion
is ' if changes in nominal rates provide an accurate indication of the
intended impact of commercial policy * the actual and desired impact of
(3)policy frequently differed' .
The basic assumptions und .±ying the Holden model art, that:
(i) international prices of imports and exports are fixed,i.e. the 
demand for South African imports and exports are perfectly elastic;
(ii) input-output coefficients are fixed over the relevant time periods;
(ill) tariffs are assumed to be the only form of market distortion. The 
reason given for this assumption is that there does not exist in South 
Africa comprehensive price survey data which would enable a comparison to 
be made between domestic and world prices for each industry. 'Thus an
Gwendoline Holden,'Effective Tariff Protection and Resource Allocation 
in South Africa from 1956/57 to 1963/64'Ph.D 1974. Duka. University,
(3)Ibid., p. 379.
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incomplete picture is, obtained of the true protection granted to each
industry, At the most this implies that the calculations made reflect
only effective tariff protection rather than the total effective protection
granted to each industry' ^ . The authors claim, however, that during the
years in which the study was undertaken non-tariff protection was not at a
maximum so the results are not quite as incomplete as otherwise might have 
C5)been the case 1; and
(iv) despite input-output coefficients being fixed, the value added per 
unit of output of each industry rises with output. The implications of 
this assumption is that the ‘supply of primary factors is less than perfectly 
elastic.
Both the Balassa and Corden formulae were used in the calculations. 
Nominal tariff rates were calculated b. dividing the duties collected for 
each sector by total imports for that sector as given in the input-output 
tables for the relevant years. 'As imports are only recorded in total for 
each sector,it is not possible to use anything but a simple unweighted 
average,,..to determine the rates 1^ .
Furthermore, with regard to differences in levels of aggregation in 
the two input-output tables, most of the aggregationjit is argued,takes 
place in the processed foodstuffs and textile sectors and the tables are 
comparable in terras of their ISIC groupings. Thus the authors reclassify 
the broader 1956/57 table to conform with tue 1963/64 classification,
The results, reproduced in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, confirm that the Balassa 
formula yields higher absolute effective rates than,the Corden formula. As 
explained previously the reason for. this divergence in the two methods is 
that the Corden method implies that the elasticity of supply, of non-tradables
(4)
(5)
(6)
Ibid., p.371
Ibid.. p.371.
id,, pp.372 and 373,
i
TABLE 6,1
EFFECTIVE TARIFF RATES FOR 1956/57 FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY
Nominal
Sector Simple
Balassa
.Corden Tariff
Rates
1, Agric. Forestry 0.21 0.07 0.44
2. Gold Mining -3.21 -2,74 0
3. Diamond Mining -2,87 -2.74 0
4. Coal Mining -3.89 -3.40 0
5. Other Mining -3.52 -3.19 0
6. Slaughtering & Meat -3.53 -1.91 0,5
7, Diary Products 21.39 12.62 3.63
8. Fruit & Veg. Products 34.57 5.86 14.91
9. Fish & Sea Products -5,87 -4.94 0.58
10. Grain Mill Products 200.84 65.02 0,4
11. Bakery Products 69.67 39.1 13,35
12. Sugar & Refineries 15.42 6.9 5,5
13. Chocolate & Confect. -3.85 -3.31 2.86
14. Misc. Food Preps. -6,08 -4.42 2,2
15. Distillers & Wines 63.94 14.56 142.05
16. Breweries -8.96 -7.75 19.2
17. Tobacco Manuf. -63.7 -57.09 30.3
18. Spinning, Weaving 
Knitting Mills
12.68 3.98 8.5
19. 16.9 9.36 12.96
20. Cordage, Rope -2,16 -3.64 3.5
21. Footwear (excl. Rubber) 2,96 1.27 6.16
22. Clothing 31.88 18.33 19.6
23. Made-up Textiles -14,07 -12,98 3.4
24. Wood & Cork -2.97 -2.59 1.18
25. Furniture & Fixtures 55,21 35.87 22.54
26. Pulp, Paper & Board -2.14 -1.94 1.17
27 * Articles of Pulp, Paper 74,74 39.80 19.09
28. Printing & Publishing 10,63 7.81 8.4
29. Tanneries & Leather 1.66 0.43 2.6
30. Rubber Products 34,01 17,46 17.9
31. Basic Ind. Chemicals -1.77 -1.40 0.6
32, Miscellaneous Chemicals 7,71 1.93 8.62
33. Products of Petrol -31.53 -22.22 , 40.4
34. Structural Clay 5.93 3.79 6.2
35, Glass 27,56 13,48 14.24
36. Cement 132,77 44,76 31,14
37, Mon-Metallic Minerals -0.33 -0.33 3.19
38. Iron and Steel -3,38 -2.65 1.0
39. Non-Ferrous Metals -5,01 -2.09 0
40. Metal products 2,54 1,45 3.6
41. Machinery -2,02 "1,94 1,3
3,642, Electrical Machinery 1,78 0,84
43. Transport Equipment 
Motor Vehicles
3,57 1.30 3,56
44. -9,84 -9,84 9,05
45, Misc, Manufacturing 18,97 4.79 7.47
Source: Merle Gwendoline Holden, 'Effective Tariff Protection and Resource
Allocation in South Africa from 1956/57 to 1963/64', p»38,
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